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MR. EVANS

Mr. Saunders?

MR. SAUNDERS - SUBMISSION

Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. You will have received the brief that I filed on behalf of the Government of Scotia, together with the brief filed by Commission Counsel, and that of Ms. Derrick, on behalf of Donald Marshall, Jr. In my remarks this morning, I will review the themes that we canvassed in our submission, and the components, which we suggest form a part of any new compensation which this Commission deems appropriate. I will, this morning, from time to time, address certain of the remarks made by Mr. Spicer, and Ms. Derrick, in their briefs. not spend too much time reviewing the evidence that was heard, either at the original Royal Commission, or during the Inquiry during the first week of April of this year, or in subsequent Discovery Examinations of certain witnesses. My detailed review of that evidence is set forth in our written brief. I well recall the direction given to all counsel in early February, when you, Mr. Commissioner, met with us, and expressed the hope that this process, called by the Government of Nova Scotia to re-canvass the adequacy of Donald Marshall, Jr.'s earlier compensation, would be non-

Consequently, I saw my role as being adversarial. instructive, as best I could, providing whatever 2 information we could gather, on useful precedents, 3 research, text authorities, jurisprudence, or other 4 sources, suggesting the proper components of 5 compensation award, and the manner in which those 6 features, and methods of payment might be addressed by 7 you. Where possible, I have attempted to scrupulously 8 avoid the adversarial role, and instead, sought to 9 describe varying methodology which might be applied to 10 this unique situation, and advanced the factors and 11 principles which I consider to be appropriate or 12 persuasive. We have, on behalf of the Government of 13 Nova Scotia, advanced certain proposals, which are 14 And we have urged that they form part of this 15 Commission's recommendations. And we have provided you 16 with the guidelines and suggestions which might provide 17 assistance, in the final analysis, of this award. 18 Where warranted, we have not hesitated to break new 19 urge upon you, as a Commissionary, a 20 particular or unique solution, given the special 21 circumstances of this case. We say we have not shied 22 from innovation. In fact, we have urged it, 23 occasion, and suggested various ways for 24 accomplish that. But neither do I hesitate to draw a 25

line where I suggest it ought to be drawn, or say that, for all good reason of common sense, sound judgment and 2 important precedent, that reasonable 3 compensation ought not to be breached. I will suggest 4 that the award determined by this Commission of Inquiry 5 be a significant element to the restoration of public 6 confidence in the administration of justice in Canada. 7 And for that reason, any new award to Donald Marshall, 8 Jr., must be both fair and realistic, to both him, and 9 our system of justice. It must retain a result that 10 will impress the ordinary onlooker as being sensible. 11 And it must not offend reasonable standards for 12 These goals were repeated by Mr. Spicer for 13 the Commission, and Ms. Derrick for Mr. Marshall, in 14 her brief. For his part, Mr. Spicer urges that Donald 15 Marshall, Jr. be compensated fairly and generously for 16 his past and continuing sufferings. He urges that 17 Donald Marshall, Jr. be given an amount to make his 18 life comfortable. Ms. Derrick asks that the award be 19 sufficient to give Mr. Marshall the opportunity to 20 recover a life for himself. After so many years of 21 pain and suffering, that he be provided with sufficient 22 means to bring about his healing and restoration. 23 These then, underlying premises are the 24 submissions which we'll make. With respect to your 25

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mandate, Mr. Spicer has already referred to the provisions of the Order in Council, to re-canvass the adequacy of compensation, in light of what you, as Commissioners, found to be factors, and to determine any further compensation which is to be paid, as a result. In these respects, you are asked to consider the recommendations four through seven of the findings and recommendations of the Royal Commission. And Mr. Spicer has articulated those to you. In addition, I now confirm, for the record, on behalf of the Province of Nova Scotia, that we are prepared, and ask you to consider, non-pecuniary damages suffered by Donald Marshall, Jr.'s parents. And that regard may be had to the period of time, from the decision of the Court of Appeal in the reference, in May of 1983, to the release of your report, in January 1990, as being a span of time for which compensation might I have also, on behalf of government, considered. recommended that the expenses incurred by Donald Marshall, Jr.'s parents, on account of their son's wrongful incarceration, be reimbursed. And I will say more about that later in my remarks this morning. me turn now to damages, on behalf of Mr. & Mrs. Donald Marshall, Sr., both pecuniary and non-pecuniary. urge that you, Mr. Commissioner, favourably consider

reimbursing them for their out-of-pocket expenses. asked Ms. Derrick to prepare a series of calculations, 2 to fairly reconstruct those damages. They were based, 3 part, on records still available at 4 institutions. Other gaps were filled by recollection, 5 and guesstimates. I have reviewed those calculations, 6 which total some fifty-five thousand dollars (\$55,000). 7 And I recommend that that sum be accepted by you. 8 addition to that sum, Mr. Commissioner, I propose that 9 an add-on be calculated for pre-judgment interest. 10 other words, interest lost by Mr. & Mrs. 11 Marshall, Sr., on their money, which they would 12 otherwise not have had to spend. I disagree, to some 13 extent, with Ms. Derrick, in her brief, that the amount 14 of pre-judgment interest be fixed to run on all of the 15 dispersements going back to day one. Rather, the 16 evidence is that these dispersements were incurred over 17 the 11-year time span that their son was incarcerated. 18 And I believe the proper way to compute the interest 19 is that suggested earlier, that you seize the rate that 20 you find to be most appropriate over that time, and 21 simply half the rate. With respect to non-pecuniary, 22 or general damages on behalf of Mr. & Mrs. Marshall, 23 Although the component is not specified I say this. 24 in the Order in Council, we do urge that you favourably 25

consider such an award to his parents. This award is 1 not made to Mr. & Mrs. Marshall on account of them 2 being MicMac. It is made to them because they are 3 loving, caring parents, who were aggrieved, by virtue 4 of their son's wrongful incarceration and conviction. 5 Their suffering is immeasurable. Their strength, the 6 love, the tolerance and support is not merely obvious, 7 but well documented in the evidence before this 8 Commission. In my written brief, at page 8, I have 9 referred your Commissioner to some specific details, 10 regarding their loss and their suffering. It is 11 evidence before this Commission, that Mr. Marshall's 12 business suffered. To what degree, we do not know. 13 But I am recommending that you at least take it into 14 account, in considering a lump sum award to Mr. & Mrs. 15 In my questioning of Mr. Marshall, he 16 confirmed that when he gave up the business in 1983, 17 it was continued by one of his sons. I was not 18 particularly impressed with the narrow approach taken 19 by the Royal Commission in New Zealand, in the Arthur 20 Thomas case, which declined to award non-21 pecuniary damages to Mr. Thomas' family. 22 behalf of government, that the preferred approach in 23 this case, is to find that Mr. & Mrs. Marshall, Sr. 24 are entitled to award of non-pecuniary damages. You 25

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may ask what, if anything, may be taken as a useful guide, to assist you in determining an appropriate level of compensation to his parents. I have referred you, in our brief, to several cases in the context of fatal injuries litigation. At least that provides the analogy of the analysis conducted by a judge faced with the prospect, as you are, of monetary compensation for such intangibles as loss of quidance, care companionship. Each of those tragic situations bears the absolute finality caused by the death of a child. Courts there must grapple with the value of such a loss, when attempting to compensate parents for the permanent termination of any hoped for shared guidance, care and companionship. I have considered those cases in our written submission, and referred you to recent awards, both in Nova Scotia, and in Ontario. At page 18 of our written brief, I referred you to the decision of Mr. Justice Krever in Gervais v. Richard. From that case, and others, it is seen that there's no objective yardstick for fixing non-pecuniary loss for such things as pain and suffering, loss of amenities, etc. still largely an arbitrary and conventional decision. It is simply not possible to put any price tag on the pain and suffering endured by Donald Marshall, Jr.'s However, they are able to share the love and parents.

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affection and companionship of their son, for his and their future. The references that I have included in our written brief, suggest an appropriate sum, in instances where there has been a loss of life, and where that devastation is irreversible. And I suggest that these may be a helpful guide to you, in measuring and contrasting the loss suffered by Mr. Marshall, great though it was, but not permanent. turn now, Mr. Commissioner, to the derivative claim on behalf of Donald Marshall, Jr., with respect to the MicMac community. We are unable to support this claim. To say that it goes beyond the scope of your mandate, or accepted principles of compensatory damages, ought not to be the case, as narrow minded, or oppressive, or restrictive, or ill-informed, or mis-guided, or to ignore Mr. Marshall's distinct cultural identity. is none of those things. It is simply to say, to anyone observing this compensation process, that the analysis performed must be rooted in legal principle and authority. There is nothing in your mandate, in my submission, which would sustain or legitimize the derivative claim being advanced by or through Donald Marshall, Jr., on behalf of the MicMac community. Neither is there any precedent which might suggest it included. simply wrong to say that Ιt is

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rejection of that part of the claim is prohibited, on the basis of the argument that it would offend the prescription in your recommendation, that there ought be no limit on an award, or any part of the award. interpret that to its conclusion, would suggest that all claims are limitless, subject to no critique or comment. We say that it is beyond your mandate. reject the suggestion by Ms. Derrick, in her brief, that we have not acknowledged the harm done to Donald Marshall, Jr. That was obviously done by the Royal Commission in the report, and done following, by the response of government, in February of this year. Some might find it, I suggest, disturbing to hear or read that a relationship between a child or a parent, in a non-aboriginal context, is somehow less. Who is to say that the spiritual connection is any less in a Chinese, or a Jewish, or a Scottish, or an Italian family, for example, or the kinship is any less? This Royal Commission determined that, the fact that Mr. Marshall was a Native, was a factor in his wrongful conviction and imprisonment. The Royal Commission did not say that it was the only, or a pivotal, or an overwhelming reason for his treatment and incarceration. The Royal Commission did not weigh its findings. My friend for Donald Marshall, Jr., urges that you must include, in

any compensation, an acknowledgement, in dollars, of his special cultural heritage, and his relationship 2 with his community. It is suggested that hostility and 3 indifference towards the MicMac community and its 4 culture still exist, notwithstanding the release of 5 your report, or the apology of government, or the 6 unanimous resolution passed in the House of Assembly. 7 It is argued that it is critical that a serious effort 8 be made to strengthen and reinvigorate MicMac culture. 9 Without appearing, in any way, to comment on the 10 descriptions characterized by my learned friend, I 11 simply say that it is not within the mandate of this 12 Commission to award a material acknowledgement, 13 described or requested. It was not a recommendation of this Royal Commission, that such an approach be 15 taken in re-evaluating the circumstances of Mr. 16 Marshall's situation, and the adequacy of his 17 compensation. Had it been your intention, then I'm 18 sure it would have been articulated as specifically as 19 all of the other findings and recommendations were 20 written. And it was not. Instead, the concentration 21 emphasis, by this Royal Commission, 22 compensation paid to Donald Marshall, Jr. personally. 23 And that then, is the focus that I have taken in our 24 brief, and my submission this morning. We concur with 25

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Mr. Spicer's conclusion, and rejection of the derivative claim. If it is not the function of this compensation process, and your mandate, to pay Donald Marshall, Jr., his dreams, then it is surely even more remote and not within your function or mandate, to advance the dreams of others. We must leave it to Mr. Marshall personally, to determine whether he wishes to share some of what he has received, or might receive, with his community, and in that way, foster the idea of a cultural account. I turn now, Mr. Commissioner, to the claim advanced by Donald Marshall, Jr., with respect to pecuniary loss. My friend Ms. Derrick engaged an Actuary, Brian Burnell, to prepare a series of calculations which purported to quantify his past and future loss of income. These were based on scenarios advanced by counsel for Mr. Marshall. Discovery Examination of the Actuary and the psychologist were completed two weeks transcripts of their testimony have been filed with you, together with their reports. Having considered the calculations originally prepared by that Actuary, and in light of his cross-examination during Discovery Examination, I submit that his calculations are inappropriate and inaccurate. They do not provide much assistance, if any, to you, in fixing this portion of

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Mr. Marshall's award. In our written brief, beginning at page 21, I have set forth extracts from the evidence of this witness, and drawn to your attention, those factors which he did not consider in preparing his projections. It is our submission that those facts, if known, would have provided a much more accurate indication of Mr. Marshall's actual loss. knowing the extent of Donald Marshall, Sr.'s earnings, is really impossible to contrast his son's expectations to his own. It certainly does not seem appropriate to imply that he would have earned wages as a union plumber, or a union plaster, when there is no evidence to indicate how Donald Marshall, Sr.'s own income would have compared to those levels. remembered that Donald Marshall. Sr.'s employment was interrupted by periods of unemployment, during which time he acquired welfare. Neither did Mr. Burnell take into account those negative contingencies which appear from the evidence, the reports and the Discovery testimony of those expert witnesses. I have drawn your attention to those factors. And following the Discovery Examination of those witnesses, Mr. Spicer and I asked the Actuary to go away and return with new calculations, after taking into account such evidence. That information was provided to me a few

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days ago, and I have reviewed it. And I presume that you have the letter from Mr. Burnell to Ms. Derrick, with schedules attached, dated May 17th, and the letter from Mr. Burnell's partner, Ms. Gmeiner, to Derrick, dated May 23rd. These purport to calculate present and future loss, having regard to the negative contingencies identified by Mr. Marinic. psychologist. I have concluded, Mr. Commissioner, that even these revisions are not helpful. They complicate a process already fraught with uncertainty. I share the concerns expressed by Mr. Spicer. They simply invite extreme speculation. And it is deceptive to place too much attention on the dollar mentioned in these reports. Instead, I have concluded, and respectfully submit, that the way to approach it, is as if it is a diminution of earning capacity, awarded as a lump sum and part of the non-pecuniary damages to be considered by you, for Donald Marshall, Jr. You have met him. You have questioned him privately. And you are in the best position to decide. You can do it without affixing any guess as to a percentage of disability, or how long that might last. And I say, why add to his burdens by attaching such a level of presumed disability? Especially where, as here, we simply do not have any expert evidence to

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establish it precisely, either as to the level or the continuance of any dis-function. Instead, Commissioner, I would prefer the approach used by judges, both in Ontario and Nova Scotia. And I have a copy of a decision of Mr. Justice Davidson of our Supreme Court, Trial Division, which I'll refer to you. And I've passed copies to my friends. decision of Mr. Justice Davidson, of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Trial Division, in the case of Poirier v. Dyre and Dyre. The citation is penned at the top of the case report, Mr. Commissioner. And it's a decision that was rendered on May 19th, 1989. Ιt involved a 17-year-old male who suffered injuries in accident, and claimed compensation from defendants, as a consequence. I simply review quickly, the findings of fact of Mr. Justice Davidson, and then we'll take you to the law. In paragraph 1, Davidson, J. says:

"The Plaintiff suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident on December 9, 1985, in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. The Defendants have admitted liability, and the only issues relate to the quantum of

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damage, to which the Plaintiffs
                 are entitled."
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      And paragraph #12:
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                  "It's
                         described
                                      that
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                                             the
                 Plaintiff developed an early
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                 interest in wood working. When
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                 he entered high school, he took
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                 a number of academic courses
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                 in grade 10, but his favourite
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                 subjects were shop and gym."
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      #13:
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                 "Tony stated that by the time
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                 he completed grade 9, he had
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                 decided to become a carpenter."
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      Mr. Justice Davidson, in Clause 14, said:
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                 "There is no doubt that Tony
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                 is an energetic and industrious
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                 youth."
      Turning now to the law referred to by His Lordship,
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      starting at paragraph #18. The Trial Judge says:
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                 "The young Plaintiff is seeking
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                 a substantial sum, for loss of
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                 future wages. Brian Burnell,
                 an Actuary, testified for the
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                 Plaintiffs and made a number
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of
                       comparisons,
                                       including
                 comparisons between the sums
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                 the Plaintiff could expect to
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                 receive
                            as
                                      journeyman
                               a
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                 carpenter ..."
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       And then a series of other alternatives are mentioned.
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       At the end of the paragraph:
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                 "The various scenarios were
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                 further
                           refined
                                      by
                                           other
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                 calculations, considering
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                 further
                           assumptions.
                                             The
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                 projected
                              loss
                                     of
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                 earnings
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                 hundred
                             and
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                 thousand dollars ($235,000) to
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                 nine hundred and forty-six
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                 thousand dollars ($946,000)."
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      His Lordship says:
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                 "In my opinion, the actuarial
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                 evidence was of no assistance.
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                 Since the Supreme Court of
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                 Canada, in 1978, there has been
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                 attempts to make use of this
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                 type of
                           evidence
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                                       in
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                 situations
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                                        it
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inappropriate to do so.

Actuarial evidence should only
be received where there has
been evidence placed before the
Court, which establishes, with
reasonable certainty, the
hypothesis on which the Actuary
is to make his calculations."

His Lordship then goes on to refer to commentary from our Court of Appeal, in a case called <u>Guy v. Trisec</u>, and from the Supreme Court of Canada in the trilogy of cases which have already been described. One final reference to the case, is to turn to paragraph 28, My Lord. And that is the reference to commentary of the late Mr. Justice Morrison, the Court of Appeal, where he said:

this being a case diminution of earning capacity which is incapable of precise calculation, rather than complete loss of earning capacity, I feel that question of damages for future pecuniary loss of earnings should be included as an item

under general damages." And so that is the approach that I would commend to 2 you, with respect, Mr. Commissioner, that ought to be 3 taken, in reviewing the pecuniary loss claimed on 4 behalf of Donald Marshall, Jr. I now wish to turn to 5 the ---6 MR. EVANS 7 What was the award there, for the general damages? 8 MR. SAUNDERS 9 I believe it was thirty-five thousand dollars 10 (\$35,000), Mr. Commissioner, with respect to this 17 11 year old's loss of future. Yes, that is stipulated in 12 the case note, at the beginning of the case: 13 "General damages of thirty-five 14 thousand (\$35,000)15 were awarded." 16 MR. EVANS 17 Without any comment with respect to out-of-pocket, or 18 future earnings rather? 19 MR. SAUNDERS 20 Without any specific comment with respect to that. 21 But rather, just the diminution of That's right. 22 earning capacity was incorporated in that overall 23 award. And I submit that where one doesn't know, and 24

where one is forced to this extreme speculation, as

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identified by Mr. Spicer, and suggested by myself, that that is the approach to take.

MR. EVANS

Thank you.

MR. SAUNDERS

I turn now to a consideration of the cost of future care claim for Mr. Marshall. Counsel have considered the two facilities described in the information, which was provided to you. To preserve anonymity, I have simply referred to those facilities as one and two, in our brief. Both take a specialized treatment approach, while at the same time embodying cultural awareness, and the techniques of Alcoholics Anonymous. and methods of each facility, so far as they are presently known, are described at pages 30 and 31 of our brief. I did, Mr. Commissioner, question certain entries in the series of estimates which were provided by my friend, Ms. Derrick. I have raised these, for further reflection by you. We say that the process of compensation is designed to consider the fairness of the previous award paid to Mr. Marshall personally. Neither the terms of reference, nor the findings and recommendations in your report, suggest that his compensation be expanded, so as to include any cost of future care or treatment, accommodation or

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expenses of somebody else. And so, we simply raise the questions posed at pages 31 and 32 of my brief, not at all to challenge the necessity of treatment for Mr. Marshall, and obtaining the means for providing it. But rather, to critically review the expenses proposed for others, who are outside the terms of reference, in my submission, and for which there is no evidence that they ought to be included within the therapy, or are a necessary component of Mr. Marshall's treatment. You will be asked to address and determine the proper method of payment, in providing for this cost of future have described three possible options, care. beginning at page 33 of the written submission. first way would be to simply include it as a part of his overall general damage award. And he would use whatever was required for his compensation, to pay for psychological counselling and drug abuse treatment. A second way would be to set aside a specific sum, either as a structured settlement or a fixed amount, should Mr. Marshall choose to seek and complete such therapy. The problem is, what happens if he doesn't? It would be unworkable, in my view, to have a separate amount set aside, and potentially tied up, for the balance of his life, or some long-term plan, unless or until he obtained treatment. This would imply or

impose some kind of long-term, on-going connection or 1 obligation. And no one wishes that. Instead, I have 2 suggested a third option, which would make sufficient 3 funding available to Mr. Marshall, should he desire to 4 seek such treatment. This would prevent, as Mr. Spicer 5 puts it -- and I concur -- the simple issuance of a 6 blank cheque. Instead, it should provide a reasonable 7 amount of money, to provide for Mr. Marshall's 8 rehabilitation. And I have gone further. Rather than 9 deplete his general damage award by the cost of future 10 care, I have instead proposed that you designate an 11 amount you consider to fairly represent the cost of 12 future care. Then, if Mr. Marshall embarks on such a 13 program, and completes it, the facility chosen would 14 simply inform the Government of Nova Scotia that 15 counselling had been provided, and would list the 16 expenses incurred. This sum would then be repaid by 17 the Government of Nova Scotia, to Mr. Marshall, to 18 reimburse him the cost, which he had earlier paid. 19 submit that this method is the fairest in providing 20 access to funds, should Mr. Marshall require them, and 21 be interested in using them, without depleting any 22 other award that you may give him for non-pecuniary 23 It is in this context, and this context 24

alone, that I have referred this Commission to those

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cases dealing with the principles of mitigation, as described at page 61 of our brief. If I could just turn Your Lordship's attention to some of those references. Page 62 of the submission extract, from the decision of Lord Justice Singleton, in the Markroft case, where His Lordship said:

"I do not wish to say anything that would hurt the feelings of the Plaintiff, in a case of this kind, but I do believe it to be the duty of the Court to say that if а man is recommended by his own medical advisors, and by others, to undergo a course of treatment, he ought to undergo it. If he is advised that it gives him reasonable chance of recovery, and if the treatment reasonable, he ought to undergo it. If he will not, and does not, he must see that it is a little hard upon the Defendants, if they are asked to pay damages in respect of

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aperiod extending afterwards."

Similar comments are identified at the bottom of page 63, and the top of page 64 of our brief. And so it's in that context, that I have addressed the issue of mitigation. And I have proposed that third option, as being a method to permit the fund to be available, and accessible by Mr. Marshall, should he choose.

MR. EVANS

That fund would be maintained by the Government of Nova Scotia?

MR. SAUNDERS

It wouldn't be a fund, Mr. Commissioner. It would just be an indication by the facility, that the thing had been done and completed, and a request made, and a cheque issued.

MR. EVANS

Well is there to be a limitation on the amount?

18 MR. SAUNDERS

I believe that you ought to determine what a reasonable sum would be for the future treatment of Mr. Marshall, so that we have some idea as to the amount that it is.

MR. EVANS

Do you express any opinion as to the time limit?

MR. SAUNDERS

You identified earlier, Mr. Commissioner, the dispatch,

or speed, with which it must be undertaken, if it's to have results. You have the evidence of the psychologist, Mr. Marinic, who said that if he failed to seek such treatment and therapy, he would jeopardize his chances of having a satisfactory life. On that basis of that evidence, I believe that the time frame ought not to be long, perhaps five years, so that within the five years, hopefully Mr. Marshall will have recognized and taken the opportunity to acquire the treatment, that so many of his friends and expert witnesses have urged him to take.

MR. EVANS

You have gone over the various components of the claim submitted by Ms. Derrick.

MR. SAUNDERS

Yes, My Lord.

MR. EVANS

I think if you will check the airfare, you'll find that there's a mis-calculation there, I think.

MR. SAUNDERS

I see. I didn't note that.

MR. EVANS

I think it's double, but we'll check that out with Ms. Derrick. But I do think it is double the actual fare.

MR. SAUNDERS

That is, that in actual fact, the fare would be double what is noted in the brief, or vice versa?

MR. EVANS

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No, it would be one half.

MR. SAUNDERS

We'll look into that. And we can advise the May I turn now to a consideration, Mr. Commissioner, of the non-pecuniary damages, claimed on behalf of Donald Marshall, Jr., and the assistance which, I submit, may be obtained from the consideration of the Supreme Court of Canada in the trilogy of cases. We must, I suggest, as did the Royal Commission in New Zealand, in the Arthur Allan Thomas case, seek guidance from the mandate of the Commission, together with any useful precedents and jurisprudence that may obtained from other jurisdictions. While admittedly, the non-pecuniary damages suffered by the Plaintiffs in the trilogy of cases, came as a result of serious accidents, nonetheless, the principles and guidelines outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada, do provide assistance, in my view, in understanding and fixing a non-pecuniary damage award. In those cases, the Courts endeavoured to measure the losses suffered by the victim, and award a sum of money which would provide

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solace, and make the person's life more endurable, using the only means available, to provide that level of comfort, which the Court determined would provide adequate compensation. The fact that the Supreme Court of Canada fixed a limit or a ceiling of a hundred thousand dollars (\$100,000) in the trilogy, which has since been exceeded to almost two hundred thousand (\$200,000), on account of inflation, is not the basis of my submission. We are not saying there should be a pre-set limit on non-pecuniary damages component of a compensation award for wrongful incarceration. Such a position was stipulated by the Federal and Provincial guidelines and fixed at a hundred thousand dollars (\$100,000). But that notion was rejected by this Royal Commission. And we have accepted the Commission's recommendation. For any number of reasons, a hundred thousand dollar (\$100,000) limit might be found constraining, or inappropriate, to the peculiar circumstances being examined by any future Royal Commission. Rather, what I am suggesting is that guidance may be obtained from the principles enunciated in those cases. It doesn't matter much what the dollar limit or ceiling was. What does matter, is that the Court considered it appropriate to reserve a sum of money, for the most grievous, tragic and irreversible

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of personal injury cases. If this is the sum which a Court has decided is reasonable, by reason of several legal, social and policy considerations, in the case of a young person whose life is irreversibly altered, and on account of total physical disability is rendered unemployable and wholly dependent on others, then we suggest it may be a legitimate measure against which someone who is not so severely injured may be compared. It is for you to determine whether such considerations are worthy of contrast. Someone who, like Donald Marshall, Jr., is still physically and mentally capable of enjoying employment prospects, outdoor recreation and sound and gratifying relationships with women, young children, and members of his family. Mr. Spicer has reviewed with you the circumstances surrounding the Teno, the Thornton and the Andrews decisions. brief, we have referred to those, and as well, others. One decision was that of the Supreme Court of Canada in Lindal v. Lindal, Mr. Commissioner, a 1982 decision. Mr. Justice Dickson, as he then was, for the Supreme Court of Canada, wrote for the majority in dismissing the appeal brought in that case, and affirming the reduction of a non-pecuniary damage award component from one hundred and thirty-five thousand dollars (\$135,000)hundred thousand dollars down to one

(\$100,000). In that case, Brian Lindal claimed against his brother, for damages suffered while a passenger in his brother's car. He was in a coma for three months, suffered extensive brain and brain stem injury, leaving him with speech impairment, spastic movement, loss of muscle control. He was left emotionally scarred and given to fits of depression. Mr. Justice Fulton, for the British Columbia Court, decided that the facts of that case made it an exceptional case, and so broke through the ceiling of a hundred thousand dollars (\$100,000). The British Columbia Court of Appeal reduced the damage award from one hundred and thirtyfive thousand dollars (\$135,000), to one hundred thousand dollars (\$100,000). And Mr. Lindal appealed. And the sole issue then, before the Supreme Court of Canada, was whether or not that reduction was appropriate. And the Supreme Court of Canada held that it was. The facts of the Fenn decision, that are referred to in our written brief, are equally as tragic. In our case Book of Authorities, the Fenn decision, in the Court of Appeal, is at Tab 7, Mr. Commissioner. And one really can't imagine more horror.

4 MR. EVANS

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Peterborough?

MR. SAUNDERS

That is <u>Fenn</u> v. <u>City of Peterborough</u>. That is correct. And so that's at Tab 7 of our book of cases, Mr. Commissioner. And I'm just going to highlight an extract from page 223 of that decision, which described the facts, as Mr. Fenn literally came home from noon hour, rounded the corner of his street, and saw that his house had been demolished, on account of a gas explosion. And the facts were described:

"As a consequence, Mrs. Fenn was pinned to the floor by rubble. Her baby, Gregory, had been in her arms and was beside her. She was conscious until her rescue. She watched the fire spread. Her legs were consumed by fire, and her body and hands terribly burned. She heard her children crying. When she was rescued, the burns to her legs were so severe, that her feet fell off."

And so on, it goes. The horror of Mr. Fenn is described in the trial decision, of Mr. Justice Holland. And as one could expect, claims were

advanced, on behalf of Mrs. Fenn, and Mrs. Fenn, not 1 only for her terrible injuries, but the nervous shock 2 suffered by Mr. Fenn and the separation that ensued 3 between them, because the constant memory was enough 4 to drive them apart. At trial, two hundred and fifty 5 thousand dollars (\$250,000) was awarded to Mrs. Fenn, 6 which included a component for loss of future income. 7 They went on to Appeal, so that the amount of the 8 damage claim, the non-pecuniary damage claim for Mrs. 9 Fenn was broken into components. The Appeal Court 10 ordered one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars 11 (\$125,000) non-pecuniary damages to her. The balance 12 was declared to be for future income. For the horrible 13 nervous shock suffered by Mr. Fenn, forty thousand 14 dollars (\$40,000) were awarded. And that included loss 15 of consortium, on account of the devastation, in the 16 injuries suffered by his wife, and the death of his 17 children. It is my respectful submission, 18 Mr. Commissioner, that it is not insidious. 19 illegitimate, to wonder whether there ought to be some 20 comparison. We do ask the question, because if we are 21 to advise a crippled 24 year old, now confined to a 22 wheelchair or a bed, totally dependent on others for 23 life support, who can't move from the chin down, and 24 whose life expectancy is shortened as a consequence, 25

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if we are to tell such an individual that non-pecuniary damages for her or him are said to be within a range determined by the Supreme Court of Canada, then what answer do we give, if it were suggested that Donald Marshall, Jr. be entitled to more non-pecuniary damages It is simply not enough to suggest that this case is different than a motor vehicle case, because one victim was hit, and someone else was affected, by virtue of the system. Nor, I say, is it any answer to say that the Supreme Court of Canada has no standing here. We are simply suggesting, Mr. Commissioner, that these decisions may well provide a framework, a standard against which non-pecuniary damages to Mr. Marshall may be considered. The several categories proposed, to describe what his damages should include, have been addressed in our brief, starting at page 46, and by Mr. Spicer and Ms. Derrick in theirs. I simply repeat the point, that I think it would be wrong to fix a sum of money for each heading, and then simply add them up for a total. Such a method would be duplicatous, given the natural overlapping of many of the harms suffered. There may well have been harm suffered by Donald Marshall, Jr. during his incarceration, which were peculiar to him, on account of being the son of the Grand Chief, and a MicMac.

These special features may be considered by you, in determining his non-pecuniary loss. But only in such a way as to recognize that he suffered differently, not that he suffered more. We concur with the position advanced by Commission counsel, that one must not award greater general damages on account of cultural distinctiveness, because in doing so, you would be approving a proposition that Mr. imprisonment was worth more, on account of his race. And that approach simply invites discrimination. have been referred to the Arthur Allan Thomas case, where Mr. Thomas' nine years in prison, was brought about by police deliberately planting evidence, in order to frame him. For his non-pecuniary damages, the Royal Commission in New Zealand awarded the equivalent of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars (\$250,000) Canadian. In addition to that, he was awarded, I believe, close to five hundred thousand dollars (\$500,000) New Zealand, for the loss of his farm, after the Royal Commission first took into account the negative contingency of mortgage payments which he would likely have incurred, had the wrongful arrest and incarceration never happened. With respect to the component of pre-judgment interest, Mr. Commissioner, I've described the approach ---

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MR. EVANS

Before you leave that, do you have any comment to make with respect to the matter of aggravated damages?

MR. SAUNDERS

I will at the end of my submission. I'm coming to that, if I may.

MR. EVANS

Then I won't interrupt you.

MR. SAUNDERS

Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. On the item of prejudgment interest, I have described what I submit the approach may be, beginning at page 41 of our brief. We've considered the practice in Nova Scotia, calculating the appropriate interest rate, and have reviewed decisions in Nova Scotia and Ontario, as well as reports and recommendations of the Ontario Law Reform Commission, suggesting the appropriate rate of interest, and its method of calculation. First, for the pecuniary damages suffered by Mr. and Marshall, Sr., I suggest that the rate be staggered over time. I make the same recommendation concerning any claim of Donald Marshall, Jr., for past loss of income, that the rate of interest be staggered over time, you determine the appropriate rate and half it, because not all of the loss of income commenced in

1971, but rather, was suffered over the duration of his incarceration. I make the same point, with respect to 2 non-pecuniary damages claimed by Donald Marshall, Jr., 3 or non-pecuniary damages which we submit ought to be 4 awarded by this Commission, to his parents. Not only 5 ought they be entitled to an award for their suffering 6 by way of non-pecuniary damages, but I would ask this 7 Commission to favourably consider an interest 8 component, on top of that. For the same reason that 9 those losses were not suffered all at once, but grew 10 and developed and were added to, tragically, over the 11 11 years of his incarceration, I believe any component 12 There is of interest ought to be staggered as well. 13 the suggestion made by the Ontario Law 14 Commission, Commissioner Evans, that the appropriate 15 rate, in that kind of case, if you had already taken 16 into account inflation, in determining what a likely 17 award for general damages for Donald Marshall, Jr. 18 ought to be, if you had already taken into account the 19 idea of inflation, then the Law Reform Commission has 20 said that that ought not to be doubly compensated. 21 so that, if there were going to be an add-on for 22 interest, that instead of looking at a rate and then 23 halving it, over the years, one would instead, apply 24 25 a rate of 2.5 percent. And the authority and citations

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for that approach, are set forth at page 53 of our submission. I turn now, Mr. Commissioner, to the idea of punitive damages. We submit that this is not a case for punitive or exemplary damages. Such damages are not compensatory, but rather are strictly to punish or deter the wrong-doer. It would seem incongruous for this Commission to make such an award. You were directed to re-canvass the adequacy of compensation paid. Punitive damages are unrelated to the function of compensating the Plaintiff. In our brief, we have appended articles and case authorities for principles which we believe might be of assistance to you, in considering the issue. In the case of Donald Marshall, Jr., when the miscarriage of justice came to the attention of government, he was released Dorchester, without undue delay. The reference was convened. The province established this Commission, and empowered it to conduct an exhaustive review of all matters relating to his arrest, conviction, and imprisonment. A settlement was paid. As a result of your investigation and report, Mr. Marshall was entirely vindicated. This government accepted all of your recommendations that were its responsibility. An interim payment was made by the Province, counsel, once requested by his and

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recommended by you. The Attorney General, on behalf of the Province, expressed a profound apology to Mr. Marshall, and to his family. And he quickly convened this Commission, to re-canvass the adequacy of the compensation previously paid. For all of these reasons, we submit it is simply not a case where punitive or exemplary damages ought to be awarded. submit that you will already have taken into account those swollen or aggravated or intangible injuries Marshall, suffered by Mr. such as distress and humiliation, mentioned by Mr. Spicer, when you embark on the process of determining what his non-pecuniary damages ought to be. In our submission, we have commended the structured settlement approach This was one that we urged at the outset. In our written submission, we have identified what I consider to be the attractions of such an approach. It would ease the flow of compensation to Donald Marshall, Jr. And it would avoid an administration of any fund. It would safeguard continuity of interim payments. It would guarantee a stream of payments for a term considered appropriate by you. It would provide structure and stability to his future. In that way, Donald Marshall, could Jr. embark whatever employment, counselling and treatment was to his

On the question of whether or not such choosing. compensation paid by the Federal or Provincial 2 government would be taxable in his hands, we prepared 3 a memorandum to his counsel, and refer to jurisprudence 4 on that point, the details of which are described, 5 starting at page 72 of my brief. We urge that an 6 advanced ruling be obtained from Revenue Canada 7 Taxation, to ensure that any structured settlement 8 proposed satisfied the conditions of the Interpretation 9 Bulletin on which structured settlements are based. 10 The details of our recommendations to Mr. Marshall's 11 counsel are set forth in that section of 12 13 In conclusion, Mr. Commissioner, we have recommended that pecuniary damages be paid to Mr. & 14 Mrs. Marshall, that their expenses be reimbursed. 15 have also urged that, in the unique circumstances of 16 their case, non-pecuniary damages be paid to them. 17 have concluded that any new compensation paid to Donald 18 Marshall, Jr., should not include a derivative claim, 19 sought on his behalf, with respect to the cultural 20 21 account. We have proposed that a pre-judgment interest 22 component be applied to the damages which might be 23 awarded to Mr. & Mrs. Marshall, Sr., and their son. 24 And we have indicated how that might be done. We have suggested precedents that might be helpful to you, in 25

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carefully addressing the non-pecuniary damages of Mr. We have reviewed, in our submission, the Marshall. testimony and documentary evidence, emphasizing the hope that he will enjoy a future which will prove satisfying and rewarding, to both himself and his family. There is much to be confident about, as one reviews the evidence led in these Compensation Hearings. Not only the strength, dedication and support shown by so many of the witnesses who appeared on his behalf, but the positive attributes, intelligence, the leadership qualities, strength of character which were identified by people closest to him. These all auger well. He has had some success in facing the notoriety which follows him. it would appear that he can now use this positively and constructively, to articulate worthwhile concerns in You have spent time with Mr. Marshall, and questioned him closely. We can be confident that professional assistance is available to him, and that such efforts will prove beneficial, as soon as he is ready to embark on that help. As Mr. Spicer has pointed out, things have recently started to take a turn for the better. Mr. Marshall deserves our respect and our support. He has been sustained through this ordeal by inner strength, and the warm affection and