NOVEMBER 26, 1988 - 9:30 A.M.

CHAIR

Ladies and Gentlemen, good morning.

We've spent two days considering the way in which the justice system here in Nova Scotia and, indeed, elsewhere has treated natives, blacks, and others. And this morning, we are going to spend our time considering the way in which the Office of the Attorney General, which in every province of Canada is responsible for prosecutions, might be restructured, should that be necessary, perhaps not. To insure that prosecutions are conducted fairly no matter how well connected the subject of an investigation or how poor or marginal the subject of an investigation. Whatever his race, whatever his politics, to insure that prosecutions are proceeded with when they ought to be, and that when they ought not to be, they are not proceeded with.

Well, for this morning's discussion, we have four very distinguished Canadian lawyers. I will introduce them all now before they come to the podium, and do so briefly, because I think they're well known to you. You've already met some of them during the course of the last three days.

Our first speaker is to my right, my immediate right,
Professor John Edwards of the Faculty of Law, at the
University of Toronto, Special Adviser to the Marshall
Inquiry. Professor Edwards is Canada's leading authority

#### MR. THOMAS BERGER cont'd.

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on the Office of the Attorney General, perhaps the Commonwealth's leading authority on the Office of the Attorney General. And we will ask Professor Edwards to prepare the ground, so to speak, to give us an overview of the measures that are being considered in other provinces and in other countries. The Office of the Deputy... of the Director of Public Prosecutions in England, the recent reforms made in Australia in the federal government there, and the various states, the office of the special prosecutor or independent counsel in the United States.

Some of the issues that have been agitated before the Marshall Inquiry here in Nova Scotia are not unique to Nova Scotia and have led to proposals for reform in the conduct of prosecutions in other jurisdictions.

We will begin then with Professor Edwards. Then we will hear from Mr. Richard Vogel, Q.C., of Vancouver, a distinguished member of the British Columbia Bar, who has been in private practice many years, but did a stint of public service as Deputy Attorney General, where he had responsibility for some years for maintaining an overview of prosecutions and prosecutorial discretion. I think you've met Dick Vogel. He's the gentleman with gray hair, and quite a bit of it there. Dick will speak second.

Our third speaker is to Dick's left, a gentleman with a good deal of hair, and none of it as yet gray, and that

## MR. THOMAS BERGER cont'd.

is Morris Manning, Q.C., of Toronto, one of the nation's leading defence counsel, needs no introduction to any of you. I think you're aware that his most recent triumph was his very great success in the Supreme Court of Canada in the Morgentaler case and we're very grateful that he was able to come here to be with us today.

Finally, to my far right, is Serge Kujawa, Q.C., of Regina, one of Canada's ablest prosecutors, a terror of the criminal element in Saskatchewan. He is general counsel to the Attorney General's Department in Saskatchewan. Perhaps no one in Canada has had more experience than Mr. Kujawa when it comes to the prosecution of serious crime. His most recent well known case was, of course, the prosecution of Colin Thatcher for murder. Mr. Kujawa, despite his eminence, when I asked him how I ought to introduce him, said, "Just say 'I'm an old prosecutor'."

So there you have our panel. I will say nothing further, but invite Professor Edwards to come to the podium to begin the discussion.

#### PROF. JOHN EDWARDS

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Commissioners, Ladies and Gentlemen.

Throughout Nova Scotia's history, back to colonial days, the Attorney General has been at the very apex of the justice system. So, indeed, has he been in the federal situation, the head of the Department of Justice, as the

Minister of Justice and the Attorney General of Canada.
It's an office which has an even longer history in England,
going back to the thirteenth century. And yet, despite
this enormously responsible position, the level of
ignorance that exists, not only amongst members of the
ordinary general public, but amongst politicians, lawyers,
be they members of the judiciary, the practicing bar, or
those of us who seek to teach the future members of the
profession. That level of knowledge as to the strange but
important series of duties and responsibilities attached to
this office is, to my mind, one of the most remarkable
features which, hopefully, this Commission will be
instrumental in bringing about a change which, to my mind,
is fundamental. If, in fact, we are to achieve through
those who hold this office, and those who serve as agents
of the Attorney General, whether they are Deputy Ministers
or whether they are line prosecutors, an understanding of
what it is that are the essential qualities which will be
associated with this office, to my mind, we have a very
long way to go before we achieve that degree of public
confidence in those who are the incumbents that they will
reflect those qualities of even-handedness, of
impartiality, of a resistance to political interference, of
independence from the pressures that are a constant
accompaniment of this particular office, public confidence

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in this province and in other jurisdictions in Canada and outside Canada. Perhaps it's a reflection of modern times. But if one looks across Canada, the experience that citizens of Nova Scotia have been experiencing in the last few years is, as Judge Berger said, not unique.

The adjacent province of New Brunswick saw fit to establish a Royal Commission with even wider terms of reference than the Marshall Inquiry. They did not pursue its terms of reference, but the latent causes would be well understood and recognized by those who live across the border in New Brunswick.

More recently, in terms of days rather than years, the recent report coming from Manitoba suggests that that province, likewise, is experiencing some of the turmoil of trying to ascertain what is expected and what is unacceptable in terms of the way in which discretionary power is exercised.

British Columbia has, for some years, as Mr. Vogel,
I'm sure, would be quick to point out, not being an
exception to the general rule that the public scrutiny, the
enormous attention given to the manner in which, not only
the Attorney General, but his senior officials conduct
their duties, again, brings home once again the perhaps
enormous gulf that exists between the conception of what
this office demands and the realization, or the failure to

realize, even the most basic tenants of the office.

In the United States, we are all able to recall the revelations that accompanied the Watergate hearings. And the activities of the most recent occupant of the office of the Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Edwin Meese.

If you go across to Australia, you can come if you could in your imagination with me, around the Commonwealth and discover that what has been occupying the attention of the Commissioners here in the Marshall Inquiry can be replicated in so many countries. Why is it then that, in fact, the perception on the part of those who, ultimately, those who hold public office are accountable to, falls so far short of the expectations. Those expectations are simple. They're not difficult to, I think, explain. I've said them before. I repeat them again. They are a combination of even-handedness, fairness, impartiality, and an independence which requires some personal qualities.

Whatever I may say in the few remarks that I'm going to make here, I want to leave with you, or I hope, an indelible recognition of the fact that no matter what system is in place, no matter what constitutional machinery we create or change, the essential qualities are those of personal integrity, qualities of character, backbone, and an understanding of what this office truly represents.

I've described the duties of an Attorney General, as

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requiring the agility to walk a tightrope. And I think that's precisely what so few of those who come into the office have an understanding what is expected of them, and so little guidance that is provided. Nevertheless, there are some strikingly splendid examples that one can cite, and there are occasions which are all too familiar in which those standards are sadly not realized.

When I came to undertake on behalf of the Commission a study of this office, and of those related offices, it became very apparent to me that one of the initial features that had to be recognized was the inherent problem of duties in relation to the police, in relation to the appointment of the judiciary, in relation to the appointment of and supervision of Crown prosecutors, which in itself represented an inherent conflict. And I was pleased to see, even during the course of the hearings, that in Nova Scotia, belatedly perhaps, the government has seen fit to take away from the Attorney General the duties and responsibilities of supervising policing in the province, in the creation of a ministerial Solicitor General. That has been done in other parts of Canada, and I believe it is an essential forerunner of other changes which, no matter how much one stresses, the inadequacies of a system in itself as guaranteeing an observance and an adherence to those qualities I've described.

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Nevertheless, it is my view that certain other fundamental changes are called for. My remarks are not directed in terms of a criticism of Nova Scotia and of the system as it has been administered in this province. As if Nova Scotia was unique in this regard and, therefore, it had to put its house in order where other parts of the country have been immune. That is not the case. I don't think it's an exaggeration to say that the rest of the country, both federal and provincially, are watching very carefully not only the discussions, but also what eventuates from this particular Commission. There is a ferment of concern. There's a great deal of desire to see whether the models that may come out of this Commission have an application, as I believe to be the case. Scotia, as a single province, simply represents a whole body of experience that can be replicated directly in all the other provinces. And, consequently, whatever changes are maybe recommended by this Commission, are more than likely to be the activating force in producing parallel measures in other parts of the country.

One of the aspects of the Attorney General's office, which I think needs to be understood, is quite clearly, under our system, he's an elected politician. He's a member of the House of Assembly. He's a member of the Cabinet. We also, historically, accord to the Attorney

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General responsibilities as the guardian of the public interest, the provincial statute enumerating all his duties and responsibilities, declare that the Attorney General has the statutory, constitutional duty to see that all actions of the executive branch and of the legislature conform with existing law. It should be advent of the Charter of Rights, has, in dramatic fashion, re-emphasized that primary responsibility of the Attorney General to insure that the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter of Rights are his paramount responsibility. This reflects the ideals of the office. Clearly, where the Attorney General is seen as an avid, active politician, on the floor of the House of Assembly and in some of the more hidden sanctum of the Cabinet deliberations, does create difficulties in the minds of ordinary citizens. How can you reconcile these two expectations? I'd be less than sanguine in believing that, in fact, the mere recapitulation of what I've described as these duties and responsibilities can, in itself, by bringing them to the attention of the incumbent, bring about realization.

The office of the Attorney General, as a member of the Cabinet, is clearly one that gives rise to the question if, in fact, it were to be suggested that by removing the Attorney General from elective office, removing him from being a member of the Cabinet of the government of the day,

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could we, by one stroke, achieve the necessary reforms to bring about those ideas I've described? It's a very attractive, but I think a rather dangerous proposition to subscribe to, without realizing, as with all questions, there are two sides to the coin.

I espouse with greatest emphasis the need to insure the independence with which the Attorney General discharges his responsibilities. And, at the same time, I would want to continue to assert that any office that carries with it such immense responsibilities as to the kind of society we live in, which is really, in my mind, the nature of the functions that attach to this office, particularly with respect to prosecutions. If that person is not held accountable to the legislative body, to the community at large in the fashion in which our system of parliamentary democracy, I believe, is based upon, you may achieve much by way of independence, but you would lose an enormous aspect of the accountability of the office.

For my part, therefore, I have gone through this very carefully in asking and answering the question. I come down on the side of maintaining, no, I do not see in the transformation of the office of Attorney General into a public non-elected office, the solution to many of the problems that Nova Scotia has experienced. I do, nevertheless, believe that there are other certain changes

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which, in the series of opinions that I've prepared for the Commission, review of the experience in the United Kingdom, in England, in Scotland, in Northern Ireland, in other parts of the Commonwealth. I've looked at the United States and I have come to the conclusion that, yes, the time has been reached where we have to give serious attention to the establishing of a statutory office of a Director of Public Prosecutions.

Each of the provinces already has, in effect, whatever his title may be. He may be the Director of Crown Prosecutors. He may be called, as Mr. Kujawa was in Saskatchewan, the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Don't be misled by that title into believing that once you've conferred that title, that you have somehow contributed to the solution of these problems. The difference between the Director of Public Prosecutions, who is a government servant, a public servant, a public official, who within the bureaucratic system is under the direct supervision and control of his superiors, is not what I am suggesting that the Commission examine and adopt. Namely, the creation of a largely independent, independent by virtue of legislation, where you create a statolatry office in which the holder enjoys the status, analogous to that of a Supreme Court judge, with a degree of security of tenure, that provides the insulation very necessary to

protect against some of the more insidious and less apparent influences that are constantly exerted against those who discharge the duties of prosecuting, and in which the duties, powers, functions, and responsibilities, the level of accountability, the direction of accountability, the nature of the independence associated with the office are spelled out by statute.

One of the questions that I would content myself before letting my commentators, who have had an opportunity to read more carefully the rather fuller development of this subject that I have prepared. To what extent where you have an independent, a staturally independent director of prosecutions, should an Attorney General as the Minister accountable to the Legislative Assembly have a right to become involved in individual cases. That is one of the critical questions.

Accountability, after all, would suggest that if you are to be accountable that you should have an ultimate power of disposition, control, with respect to the office upon whom independence may be granted, but not total independence. You can go the route that many of the Commonwealth countries have chosen to do. Some of you, who may have familiarity with Jamaica and other parts of the Caribbean, would know that the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions is enshrined in the Constitutions of

those countries. Some of them have seen fit to confer upon this office the powers to discharge the responsibilities without being amenable to any direction or control from any other person or authority. Total absolute independence. There is no accountability, total independence.

I find that unacceptable. It runs counter to my adherence to the view that our system of parliamentary democracy requires that everything that's done in the name of the state ultimately has to be accountable to the Legislature through a particular minister of the Crown.

Nevertheless, that model does exist.

I do not envisage, and I would resist any temptation that an Attorney General may have to interfere or to seek to influence the decisions made by the Director of Public Prosecutions and those who serve under the Director, the line prosecutors, in a general manner. It ought to be the most basic presumption that an Attorney General and his Deputy foreswear any desire to become involved.

Nevertheless, there may be exceptional cases. Only this morning, I was reading the latest chapter in the Province of Alberta in which the Premier and the Attorney General and the Lubicon Indians are now faced with the question of contempt of court charges, where the Lubicon Indians are threatening to withdraw completely from the negotiated settlement of their problems on the terms that

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the contempt of court charges be withdrawn.

These are the kind of pressures that, in difficult circumstances, raise their head and they have to be addressed. They are not likely to go away. You have to have very clearly defined principles upon which the system functions, if you are going to succeed in adhering to the twin principles of independence and accountability.

For my part, therefore, I would see it as an extraordinary situation, an exceptional situation in which an Attorney General might deem it incumbent upon him to become involved and to give directions, and that he be required to do so in writing, and that those instructions in writing be tabled in the Legislature, and by other means through the official gazette in a way that the general public, which is the ultimate body of accountability, has the opportunity to ask itself, did the Attorney General Were the circumstances such as to deem it necessary? justify that intervention? There may be a balancing of considerations where the ultimate test is, was this necessary? Was it wise? Was it imperative? Was it justified? And the only way you can do that is to insure the facts are on the table and a judgement can be rendered by the ultimate tribunal; namely, society at large.

So the changes that I would hope to see introduced into our system of prosecutions in this country will, I

believe, be enhanced provided this balancing of the respective principles is reflected in the kind of system, that I've been seeking to advocate in these opinions, for the attention, consideration, by the Commissioners. But I come back to say that no matter what system is in place, there has to be a better understanding of the expectations of what the office requires. We have a long way to go by way of educating everyone as to the extraordinarily important nature of this office of the Attorney General. The creation of a staturorally independent Director of Public Prosecutions, I think, will go a long way to restore the perceptions in the public mind that the system is, indeed, committed to those ideas that I've described and, hopefully, the choice of individuals to occupy this kind of office will reflect the expectations and will not be something that can be simply continued out of the status Fundamental changes are called for, and I think the time has been reached in which those changes should be implemented.

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Thank you, Professor Edwards.

Before calling on Mr. Vogel, might I just offer a postscript to what Professor Edwards has said? I have had the advantage of reading some of the work that Professor Edwards has done.

#### MR. THOMAS BERGER cont'd.

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In most provinces of Canada, I think in every province of Canada, responsibility for launching criminal prosecutions resides with the Attorney General, ultimately. He may delegate that function to the Deputy Attorney General or his Director of Criminal Law. In the end, however, those responsible for launching prosecutions or not launching prosecutions are really employees of the Attorney General and are perceived to be often not in a position of independence. The fact that the Attorney General has ultimate authority to determine whether a prosecution should be brought or not may lead the general public to believe that these things are not done fairly.

I recently met John Cowdrey, who is the new Director of Public Prosecutions in the State of Victoria in Australia. In the State of Victoria, they had a series of continuing controversies, not unlike the controversy you've had here regarding the Donald Marshall affair, and there were allegations of corruption in the Office of the Attorney General. A great many allegations were made that the system was not dealing fairly with well connected persons or with persons with no connections at all. And the State of Victoria went very far, farther than Professor Edwards would go. They established an office of Director of Public Prosecution. Mr. Cowdrey holds the office. He was in Canada earlier this year and some of us met him, and

#### MR. THOMAS BERGER cont'd.

he is given the same tenure as a Supreme Court Judge. He is in the Attorney General's Department, but he has the ultimate responsibility to determine whether a prosecution will be brought and the Attorney General cannot give him directions in the matter. He has tenure until he is 75 years old. He can't be fired by the Attorney General. The Attorney General can't interfere with him in any way. He makes his report to the Legislature. And there you have a model that gives the authority for launching prosecutions to someone who is quite independent of political interference or political influence.

I was talking to Judge Coutu yesterday about that and he said, "Well, that's pretty dangerous, isn't it? Because if you got the wrong man or woman in that office, you couldn't get them out. The only way you can get rid of them is through impeachment."

It shows how delicate and difficult it is to draw the balance and we will now ask Dick Vogel to tell us how that has been achieved in British Columbia, where, as you know, all things go as they ought to.

#### MR. RICHARD VOGEL, O.C.

Mr. Chairman, Colleagues, learned Commissioners, and friends.

Tom Berger and I come from the "nut fringe" of Canada, as you know. So we, naturally when we're invited to leave,

we come.

I want to pay a compliment publicly to John Edwards.

I was, as Tom Berger said, the Deputy Attorney General for six years in British Columbia. I hadn't been the Deputy Attorney General before I was appointed. So I had a lot to learn, and I did learn a lot. But one of the invaluable aids in that learning curve was John Edwards' book on the Office of the Attorney General.

While it was geared, really, on the English experience, it was extremely useful to me. I have my own copy, and it's very worn, and what I had... I worked for three attorneys before I had finished and, on each occasion, John, when I met the new Attorney General, I gave them a copy of your book. Now I can vouch for the fact that two of them read it. Now I'll leave you all to guess which one didn't.

But the book was absolutely invaluable. It gave you the framework. It gave the person who had these very difficult positions, and they are fraught with difficulty. The real problem is that it really didn't matter, in many cases, which way you went, you were going to be criticized.

And perhaps the best example of that was the Clifford Olsen case. You're all aware of the fact that Clifford Olsen was ultimately convicted on a plea of guilty of a series of serial murders, mostly children, and in some

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cases, there were sexual overtones to the deaths, of some eleven children. Now we were faced with a situation, administratively, of we could not possibly prove murder in any one of the cases. The most we could have probably accomplished, after Clifford Olsen had been arrested, was a conviction for impaired driving. And I won't go into the background of that, but I will tell you that, and it's in this case where we agreed to pay a very substantial sum of money to Clifford Olsen's then wife. But although she was technically his wife, they were separated and they were divorced very shortly after. It was probably the most controversial decision of the term that I had while I had my office. But the interesting thing in retrospect, and I thought of it this morning listening to John, was that we knew when we made the decision that we would be criticized whichever way we went. To that point, the payment of substantial sums of money were relative to informers and to those who had the necessary evidence that was required for a conviction, was relatively uncommon. Most of you are familiar with the situation, was it Kirby in Ontario?

It's a very, very difficult area. But I mention it this morning to say that the whole of the discussion in respect of the decision prior to deciding what we, and there were seven of us in the discussion, including the Attorney General, and whose decision it was. The whole

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discussion took two hours. About 30 to 40 minutes of that two hours was devoted to determining whether or not we would bargain with Olsen with the sum of money he demanded, or the equivalent, to get the evidence we required to prosecute him for murder. That took about 30 to 40 minutes. The rest of the two hours was devoted to how we would announce and implement the decision.

And that goes to your point, John. In terms of being public, coming out, taking the heat. Now the Attorney General concerned was Allan Williams. We set out, in the course of the balance of that two-hour period, a whole course of conduct for him to pursue. The first thing was that the negotiation group had to be set up and that was, in fact, assumed by the Department of Justice, the federal lawyers, with the R.C.M.P. The money was ultimately paid by the province and the responsibility for the decision was that of the provincial Attorney General. Allan Williams then went to all of the media, operational media people-the newspapers, the two newspapers, the radio stations, and the televisions stations, individually, over a period of three days, by appointment. He went over with each of the people concerned. Now the wrinkle here was that no announcement could be made until Olsen's trial was completed. And there were two messages that Williams carried. One, this is what we've done. You can say

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nothing about it until the trial is completed. This is what we've done and why we've done it. You can say nothing about it until the trial is completed or we will prosecute you for contempt. It's absolutely essential that Olsen get a fair trial.

So that the press had about... My memory is the decision was made in late August, early September. The trial collapsed on a plea of guilty in January, February. So the press and media had about six months, four or five months to scurry around and prepare their attack, and attack they did. It was an extraordinary media assault on the exercise of a prosecutorial discretion.

And, historically, when one looks back to it, from this perspective, I say to you, in the context of the talk that John has given you, that that really was a very important process for me to go through to understand what it is that we're talking about when we're talking about the role of the Attorney General. The very extraordinary delicacy of the office. The requirements of character, the requirements of strength, the requirements of a value system in that individual who served as Attorney General. His ultimate, his ultimate responsibility, of course, not only to himself, because he does put his footprint in history in accepting the oath of office, to that particular office, I think, more than any other provincial office in

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matters of integrity and conscience, is to protect the integrity of the institutions that fall within his ambit of administrative influence.

So that when we're talking about the things that we're dealing with here today, the question about the integrity of the justice instruments in Nova Scotia, and I recognize that justice in many cases is quite a long way down the list of primary concerns. I think, really, we must all accept, and while it hasn't, I don't think, been said here, all of us accept the fact that the minority groups, whether visible or not, must have adequate housing, they must have food, they must have a health system, they must have educational opportunity, and all of the things that go with the keeping and the preservation of a decent life, a life that we've come to appreciate and expect as Canadians. Not only for ourselves, but for all of those who have citizenship.

But when we get to that point of sustenance and survival, surely we must expect that the justice institutions of each of our provinces retain the integrity in all of these very difficult decisions as we go along.

Now I leave to the Commissioners the question of whether or not the system in Nova Scotia has met the test. Clearly in our discussion group, particularly yesterday, there wasn't a single person in the room who was prepared

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to concede that that was the case. Virtually, I got the message from those who reported on behalf of their discussion groups, that that was more or less the position of each of the other discussion groups.

And I say that quite deliberately because I was really shocked at this piece that was in the Mail Star about the Marshall bash on the public tab. One of the speakers dealt with this. I don't know if Robert Gordon is in the room. I have had some experiences with the media. Two things, the shallowness of the reporting on this point isn't going to assist the public discussion in any way. It distracts. Now, clearly, if one reads this, the Attorney General doesn't come out very well, but he was sandbagged by the media. He knew nothing of the background of the party. But when one looks at the, not only the story, but the placing of the story in the newspaper and its general content, almost a column and a bit, one realizes that there is an enormous responsibility on the media to deal with the And it's in the public interest that those issues be dealt with intelligently. My judgement is that there was some editorializing by the paper in the placing of the story on the front page. The paper, the story should, in my judgement, should never, this is an outsider's view, should never have been carried. But carried in the way it was carried, it's extraordinary to me that that should

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happen at this stage of this Inquiry. The whole country, by this time, is watching Nova Scotia. And it works, I'm afraid. I bumped into a very good lawyer friend last night. He demanded to know why I was in Halifax. I told him, and he talked about "being on the dole." So that I, it wasn't a situation in which I could take him by the scruff of his neck and shake him. But he clearly is getting the message, Mr. Gordon, and the editors of the Mail Star, as you choose to phrase it. That's not going to help this community. It's not going to help this community deal with these terribly sensitive and very complex and extraordinarily difficult problems.

What we're here talking about, first, is the recognition of a problem. If this Commission, in the course of its debates and consideration, come to the conclusion that the system, the justice system in Nova Scotia has failed, they must then characterize that failure. And if they characterize that failure as racism or anything equivalent to that, that will be an extraordinary advance. The problem has been recognized and it's been dealt with by an authoritative tribunal who have taken the deliberate, quite deliberately taken the time that's been required to sift through an extraordinarily complex series of patterns.

I didn't know about the issue of the Negro murders...

the black killings that were in the background, until I came to this conference. And insofar as I'm concerned, I just say this again, and I address it, I suspect, particularly to Robert Gordon. I've learned a great deal by coming here. I didn't go to the dinner, although I was invited. But I haven't, in any way, and I wasn't by the coverage of the media, prepared to deal with the problems that I've, in terms of being able to take the responsibility of being on this panel today, to deal with them by what I've read in the media before coming.

And I've got a lot of loyalties to Nova Scotia. I went to the law school here many years ago, and I'll mention this in a moment, and I remain a member of the Nova Scotia Bar. And that was primarily why I came. It was going to be an opportunity for me to come back after a long absence to see what, in fact, had happened. And, as a consequence of having been where I was in British Columbia over the six years that I was there, I knew a lot of the players.

So that when I come here and I sit here and I listen and I, particularly in the discussion groups, I feel the heat and the venom and the anger. I really am terribly concerned for the responsibility that you, as Commissioners, have. The recognition, if it should come, has to lead into some sort of deliberate categorization of

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mechanics. What's to be done?

Now John Edwards has given us an option. Do we rigidify the system? Do we continue the existing system? Must we have some kind of mechanical process for the vetting of qualification, for example, for the Attorney General, for the Director of Public Prosecutions? There were interesting suggestions yesterday from Rocky in respect of what he expected from the Ministry of the Attorney General in the routine administrative process of selection of prosecutors for the individual cases. expect you, as Commissioners, have to get down to that level. My expectation is that you will be dealing with the bigger roles, the bigger jobs, and the saddling of the expressed and positive responsibility to exercise the conscience of the government of the day through the office of the Attorney General. What security can we have on a day-to-day basis that that conscience will be honourably discharged in accordance with the traditions of this very historic office that John Edwards has talked about so knowledgeably in his books, his writings, and his talk today?

Once we recognize, I say, the mechanics that are required in order to empower, to empower those who have the public responsibility to administering, and to empower those who have the outside responsibilities of insuring

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that when and if they or theirs come into the maws of the law, they and theirs are going to be treated fairly and appropriately. So that there must be both recognition and empowerment.

Now what's the relevance of this to this talk here today and my role with you? I thought I would talk for a moment about the changes that have taken place in British Columbia, how it came to pass that they did, with a view to illustrating that it takes a great deal of time, a lot of effort on the part of a great many people, but, more importantly, a sustained political will.

We started out in British Columbia in '68, '69, something of that order, and Tom, you'll remember this very well. The Bar was very concerned about what they considered to be the breakdown of the administration of justice in the province. The Bar appointed a Committee under the Chairmanship of Tom Berger, a very big committee. But my memory is that there were 25 or 30 lawyers who worked on this committee a long time. And I very distinctly remember a meeting with the then Attorney General at a Bar convention, it was Les Peterson, where we sat down with the Attorney General. We presented our report to him. This would be about 1971, '72, and we put a price tag on what would be required. Well, the result was that he did nothing, absolutely nothing. And the further

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result was that there was a change in government. And we like to think that the government changed because the Attorney General did nothing about the administration of justice. But that's, I'm afraid, not the case. But the really interesting thing was that the successive government, the succeeding government, the N.D.P. Government under Dave Barrett, did a great deal. It was a revolution. They appointed a new deputy, a David Vickers, who came from the Bar, a direct appointment, and David was the perfect appointee. He had been directly and indirectly involved in a lot of the ferment in the Bar, very cognizant of the agenda that the Bar wanted, had some comprehension of what was required in terms of academic study and assessment, and set about very deliberately. He created a Crown corporation, if you like. Filled it full of thoughtful people. And it produced a whole raft of recommendations as to how the system would be changed. And changed it was. And we thought, at the end, when I was appointed in 1977, David was the Deputy for four years to the day under the leadership of Alex MacDonald, who was the N.D.P. Attorney General. He had fundamentally and radically changed the administration of justice in the Province of British Columbia. Now when I came in, the Ministry was some five thousand people direct within the Ministry. The organization was not clear. There were a

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lot of muddied lines and a lot of muddied responsibility. But the fundamental changes had been made. And let me just go over them very quickly. There had been a fundamental role change for the Attorney General in that he expected a regional prosecutorial system to be in place. And the Deputy had a fundamental change in that he had to put in place that regional prosecutorial system. The Attorney had accepted the responsibility for what we call "professionalizing the provincial bench." It had been a lay magistracy prior to this. He implemented all of the changes required to retire the lay magistracy and to appoint qualified lawyers on a province-wide basis, right across the piece. The prosecutorial responsibilities, in additional to being regionalized, some ten regions across the province, were professionalized as well. The political patronage process whereby the prosecution responsibility an assize, for a case, was withdrawn completely. jurisdiction had been exercised by the deputy prior to David Vickers' tenure on effectively a political basis, as had the appointment of the magistrates been exercised, essentially, on a political basis. So that when I arrived, what was in place,

So that when I arrived, what was in place, effectively, was a professionalized magistracy, a regionalized and professional prosecutorial structure, working under administrators across the province, and it

had a very dramatic effect. It bucked up the police. It really did change in a very fundamental way the administration of every courtroom in the province. The police were no longer prosecuting. There were court reporters in virtually every province at the magistrate's level, at the provincial court level right across the province, which was an incredible change, an absolutely incredible change. The police didn't like it one bit. They muttered and carried on about it over many months and years about the loss of the ability to decide which case went forward and whether or not a prosecution would be laid. And they're still at issue on that point.

But by the time, and my point is this, that these changes in terms of recognition took from about 1970 to about 1978 or 9 to be implemented. Now we didn't use any statutory enacting resources, if you like, to effect these changes. These changes were implemented really by administrative fiat. But the general philosophical thrust of these changes was essentially a political decision by the N.D.P. government that held office from 1973 to 1975. No changes were made by the succeeding Social Credit government. And Social Credit in British Columbia, while it's responsible for many of the nuttier parts of our reputation today, and Tom and my ability to go around and tell jokes about our political figures, to its credit,

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didn't make any changes in terms of cutting back. We always had a fiscal problem, but when I took the office, I took the office as, so far as I was concerned, an independent person. I was not a political supporter of the government of the day. I had no, ever any expectation of being treated in that character by anybody to whom I was responsible. And I was very fortunate in the strength of character and the professional will and dedication of the, particularly the two Attorneys General that I worked for initially— Garde Gardom and Allan Williams.

So that I have this background when I come here today to deal with John Edwards' proposals in respect of the Director Prosecutions. And he's absolutely right. That these changes have to happen. And I recall dealing with Ian Scott at the time that he was trying to decide whether he would be the Minister of Health or the Minister of the Attorney General after the Liberal success in Ontario. And I was in touch with him and I said, "Look it, the revolution that took place in British Columbia has to occur in Ontario. It's absolutely vital that that revolution occur under the administrative charge of a knowledgeable and competent active practicing lawyer. It has to be nonpolitical, it has to be thorough, and it has to happen."

Now I don't think Ian Scott took the job because I was in touch with him, but I say the same thing to you today.

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That if, in fact, there is a recognization of a breakdown and a failure in the system in Nova Scotia, then there must be the mechanics recommended for the implementation for the change to insure that that doesn't happen again. When it does happen, despite the inadequacy of the reporting in the Mail Star, it reflects on the whole country. When the ticket scandal broke in Winnipeg, that really affected, in my judgement, the administration of justice right across the country. There are a lot of people who are prepared to believe, with some cynicism, that the institutions do not work with integrity. Whether that's an inherent thing or it's an Americanism, I don't know and I don't think it's profitable to speculate upon. But when there are scandals in respect of the institutional fabric of the administration of justice, it affects everyone. Not only the professionals in a place whose responsibility it is to run them, but those who have the expectation or the worry of becoming involved with those institutions and worrying about whether or not they're going to function in a nonpolitical integral and integrated and professional manner.

It was put very well to me when I was arguing salaries for the provincial court bench with the premier. And he finally said, "You know, you're right, the last thing in the world an accused person wants to think about when he's

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standing in front of a provincial court judge is whether or not that man is worried about his salary." Now I thought that... But he didn't do much about the salary levels, I've got to say, but he put it very well.

I heard a Vice-Chancellor from England say, "Look the most important man in the courtroom is the one who is going to lose. When he leaves that courtroom, what is he going to think in the after moments of that experience about the adequacy of his hearing?"

The most important person in Nova Scotia is the person who will deal with the institutions of justice in this province after this Royal Commission has made its recommendations. Will those concerns that I felt yesterday in the discussion, are they going to be placated? Are they going to be resolved? I don't know. One hopes, and that's why we're here. We're not here to eat thirty-eight dollar lunches or dinners or whatever they might have been.

And let me just talk for a moment, and I'll quickly conclude, on an optimistic note. And I can say this because my wife is not here. She'd choke me to death if she heard what I'm now going to say to you.

She was a year behind me at Dalhousie, as a medical student. She did her rotating internship and we both went to England and studied and then returned to British Columbia and practiced for twelve years in the Kootenays,

which is the sticks, if you like. So that the changes that I've talked to you about, in terms of the administration of 2 justice in British Columbia, was a very real thing to me, because I had practiced in a town where the magistrate was appointed as a political favour to somebody. He was very interested in collecting the debts of his business. wasn't the least bit knowledgeable or competent to discharge his justice's responsibilities in respect to the administration of the Code. So that when Patty and I went to Creston, first to Cranbrook, and then to Creston, she 10 ultimately, after we got settled, looked for work. She 11 went to see the clinic in Cranbrook, and I remember this 12 very clearly. She came home and she had talked to the 13 leading physician of this group and the man had explained 14 to her very carefully that, really, women, and people in 15 their community were used to dealing with male doctors, and 16 that there was no expectation on their part that that was 17 going to change, and if she wanted to work, really, there 18 was no work for her because people wouldn't come to her for 19 treatment. So she suggested that perhaps if they booked 20 their office on their days off, she could, by that trick, 21 see the patients in that man's practice. And there was no 22 concern on his part because they, after all, wouldn't be 23 satisfied with the treatment by her and they'd come back to 24 him and so on. So that was agreed that people in the 25

clinic book their days and she worked their days off with their patients. And the result, interestingly, because we only stayed there twelve months, was that Patty had her own very big practice very quickly. And they were very appreciative, I may say. We moved to Creston and exactly the same thing happened again. Really, the patients in our practice like to deal with men, and there's no room for women. The result of this, of course, is that this cultural change took place quite subtly, very quietly. And I'm told by Patty today that the lady doctors who start practices in Vancouver are very much more quickly successful than the male doctors, which is quite a revolution, when you think about it, over a period of twenty or thirty years.

Look at the advances that women have made. And I think about this in terms of recognition. And I will come to the point that it's a personal problem for each of us, whether it's racism, whether it's sexism. Whatever it might be, those affected must take some responsibility in respect of affecting the change that's required, the recognition and the mechanics.

Women have, and I needn't go over it with you, they've made extraordinary advances in respect of divorce, extraordinary advances in respect of education, extraordinary advances in respect of abortion, which still

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is a big issue. But today, and I can tell you that in my 1 practice in that small town of Creston, I had to go to the 2 hospital and threaten litigation in order for them to 3 approve a surgical procedure known as a tubal ligation. 4 The lady was single, she was pregnant, she was forty, and, at that time, that was a very advanced stage for children. 6 They had an administrative procedure in that hospital, 7 imposed by the administrator of the hospital, that the 8 tubal ligation could not be done without the written 9 consent and approval of the father or the husband. Now 10 that was, so far as I was concerned, a totally wrong 11 process for them to administratively impose on this lady in 12 respect of her health. When I threatened the litigation, 13 they withdrew. 14

Now that was a fairly simply process for me and that lady. But the advances to this day are really quite incredible in those areas for women. And I say to you that, if you're concerned about racism in this community, you should have some regard to the changes that have taken place in respect of ladies and their... women and their educational opportunities, their expectations from this community.

There were five ladies in our class at Dalhousie, and I've said this before at this thing. That was the largest group of ladies, of women ever in a law class at Dalhousie.

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One is now on the Supreme Court of Canada. We have Chief Justices in Nova Scotia and in British Columbia, who are women. Routinely, classes are graduating in every one of the law schools in Canada somewhere in the twenties, where a third to a half of the class are women. Now that was absolutely unimagineable, totally and completely unimagineable twenty years ago.

A very good friend of mine, now a retired officer of the R.C.M.P., a Deputy Commissioner when he retired, has a daughter who is a prosecutor in Toronto. She was sent out by the Attorney General to run an assize in a small town. And after the trial was over, the bailiff stuck his head in, they were waiting for the jury to come in. There were three women in that room. One was writing recipes from a book, another was knitting, and the third one was reading. And the bailiff sort of said, wistfully, "You know, somehow I prefer the old days when they sat in here drinking." So I say, take heart, and keep up the pressure.

One more and last point. I want to make two points. These conferences are extremely important and might I say, give a compliment to the Commissioners. I couldn't believe it when I was asked to come. I guess thirty years of practicing law, I didn't understand how this format would work. I didn't really think, initially, that it was appropriate or perhaps even proper that the Commissioners

## MR. RICHARD VOGEL cont'd.

should invite a wide range of people who, in their 1 judgement, think might give some useful comments in respect 2 of your responsibilities. And I picked up Tom Berger's 3 point at the beginning. When you have your responsibilities, I can now see much more clearly that you 5 do have the view, and you're to be credited for having that 5 view, that you can take all the help that you might get. And I don't know that you've got a lot of help from us in 3 the last three days, but we're very glad that you've asked us to come. So far as I'm concerned, it emboldens me to . 1 think that you are going to deal with the issues. - 1 say to the rest of us, that the reason that these - 2 conferences, in my judgement, are of value is that they - 3 embolden us to work within ourselves and within our - 4 community to empower the disadvantaged, as we see them, to - 5 work to preserve the integrity of our institutions is daily • 5 It's personal work. It's work within our heads, - 7 particularly when you're dealing with something as - 3 insidious as racism. We must create the political will to compel change in a mechanical, pragmatic way. So far as I'm concerned, we're not likely to do it if we don't, if we're not emboldened by processes equivalent to this. Thank you very much.

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Well, thank you, Dick. I'm sure all present now

realize why, when Dick Vogel left the Deputy Attorney General's office in British Columbia, he left with the respect and admiration of the profession, the Bench, the Bar, the public, and all of our political parties.

Dick has to leave soon to get a plane to get back to Vancouver. So I'll thank him again, on your behalf now, and we will take our coffee break and then we'll come back to hear Mr. Manning and Mr. Kujawa.

[BREAK]

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Ladies and Gentlemen, before we ask our next speaker to make his presentation, could I, since we may not have another opportunity, could I, on your behalf, thank Susan Ashley and the Commission staff for making this gathering one that has gone so smoothly and for treating us all with such hospitality. I won't say anything about the famous dinner that resembled the New Year's Eve bash on the Concorde, but the arrangements have been simply excellent and, on your behalf, I just want to say to the Commission staff how much we appreciate it.

One other thing, we are going to hear from Mr. Manning and Mr. Kujawa, and I should state the obvious. That means that since we want to adjourn at 12:30, there will be only limited time to hear further remarks from the floor.

That's in the nature of things and it happens at all of

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these conferences. I, as Chair, have taken it upon myself to give our guests as much time as they need, since I think we're all eager to hear from them.

But I should tell you, and I've been asked to tell you, that if you have any representations to make to the Commission, you can simply write to them here in Halifax at their office. I've been told that if you do make representations in writing to the Commission, along the lines that we've been discussing here these past three days, or in furtherance to anything you may have said these past three days, to simply send your submissions in writing to the Commission, but do so as swiftly as you can, as they must soon be getting on with the completion of their report.

Well, that brings us to our next guest, Mr. Morris Manning, and we'll ask him to speak to us now.

### MR. MORRIS MANNING

I'd like to start by making three observations.

First, merely because I'm wearing a three-piece suit doesn't mean I'm a pimp. I'm a solicitor, all right.

Secondly, I was brought here to critique a paper, which doesn't exist by a judge who is not here. And, in a way, though, I wish he had been, because Justice Watt is a man for whom I have the greatest respect and I'm sure that, in years to come, he'll have earned his spurs and

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recognition as one of our great judges.

And, third, I didn't have an opportunity, because of prior court commitments, to come to the conference earlier and to attend the now infamous dinner. And I'm sorry about that. Because if I had, the bill would have been higher, I would have had more Scotch, but the bill wouldn't have been half as high as it would have been had I been retained to come here.

But, interestingly enough, the remarks about the dinner, and particularly the parading of ignorance by the Attorney General and his comments, highlight what is a most difficult area in the criminal justice system; that is, the ties by the Attorney General to his or her constituents. And I'll address that in a few moments.

The background that I bring to this conference is not merely that of a defence counsel. I think it's important to stress the fact that, in the summer of 1964, I worked as a summer student in the Ministry of the Attorney General, then called the Department of the Attorney General for Ontario. In 1965 and 1966, I articled for the Attorney General of Ontario. And from 1967 to 1976, over nine years, I worked as Crown counsel and, ultimately, senior Crown counsel, head of civil litigation and legal advisory services.

Since that time, I've been in private practice and

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have seen, therefore, the system from both within and without. So my observations today bring me to a period in time where, after 21 years, almost 22 years in practice, I'm familiar with the criminal justice system and how it operates and how it's supposed to operate. And a lot of how it's supposed to operate came to me from two sources. The first, the people that I worked under at the Ministry of the Attorney General, Bill Common and Bill Bowman. Two people who held the post of Director of Public Prosecutions, even though it was a statutory-type post, even though they were civil servants who held the ideals that one finds expressed in papers and books written by John Edwards.

The other area where I was able to go and find out what an Attorney General was supposed to be and what he was or wasn't, it was John Edwards' books, or book then, and now books. So that, in the past, I've had both practical and academic experience with this subject.

And I say that not to pat myself on the back or to show you that I'm well qualified to speak on the subject, but to give you some idea of the background that brings me here and why I was so pleased and honoured by the invitation from the Commission. Surprised, because it's an unusual and very bold step for a Commission to take, but nevertheless, quite honoured. I know two of the

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Commissioners from interacting in the justice system and the judiciary system in the past, and one by reputation. And we are, indeed, fortunate in Canada, not just in Nova Scotia, not in the Marshall Inquiry, but in Canada, to have three such distinguished individuals, such experienced individuals who are opening up their minds to the problem that exists not only in this province but in the whole of Canada. I view what they have done as being of critical importance to the justice system in this country. I view it in that way because I hope that their recommendations will provide a model for the whole of the country. I deeply hope that their recommendations will not be put into never-never land by each provincial attorney general because it's not on the political agenda. I deeply hope that some day the justice system will get the kind of financial support that it has never had in this country. I deeply hope that we will have attorneys general in positions, be they political appointees, be they elected, be they put into a new position or an old position, who realize, who realize that the justice system in this country is not working. That it doesn't help those people who are being discriminated against. Ultimately, those people are the poor. The justice system will always work as well as it can work for those who can afford to pay for the best lawyers. It doesn't ultimately work for those who

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can't, notwithstanding our legal aid schemes. It doesn't work when we have an attorney general who takes the job and says he'll change the system, who doesn't change it at all. It doesn't work when the attorney general can't convince his Cabinet colleagues to spend the kind of money that is necessary to pay provincial court judges what they should be paid so that the best people are attracted to the job. To pay Crown attorneys the best that they can be paid so the best people will stay in the job. Ontario has lost more experienced Crown attorneys in the last few years than in the past 15 before, and that creates real practical problems in administering justice. Young lawyers don't have the experience necessary to deal with sensitive cases in a proper way. They're afraid to make decisions for fear of being over-ruled or overturned in the back room.

And that leads me back to the problem we see highlighted by comments by the Attorney General about a dinner. And I say that because I'm sure the Attorney General's reaction is not based on his role as Minister of Justice or Attorney General, rather that his reaction to any such criticism of any such dinner is based on his first impression of how is this going to look to my constituents? Because the attorneys general in this country are married to the political system. They're tied in to constituents. And that's a pragmatic and realistic fact. And so long as

you have an individual holding government office, who must go back to the people, who must be re-elected in the same way as anyone else, and who is identified and closely connected with the Cabinet, with the government of the province or the government of Canada, that individual can never be said to be independent.

Now we must have a system of accountability. There's no question of that. Young Crown attorneys prosecuting sensitive cases in the provincial courts at all levels of court in the provinces must be accountable to someone above them, because we have to have recourse. We have to have accountability. We can't let it be a runaway train, as it were, the justice system.

So that it's my view, as you can readily see, that we must have change in the system. The system is not working. And the question then becomes, what kind of change should we opt for? The model that's been put forward by Professor Edwards and the model that's been put forward by Professor Stenning, whose book I had read long before coming to this conference, and whose paper about Professor Edwards' tomb that he's prepared for this conference, which is a marvelous work. I don't know how anyone gets to be so prolific to churn out that material on a monthly basis like a short newspaper column he turns out fifty, sixty, a hundred pages of critical comment founded in fact and in

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great legal research. And my compliments to him. But I have studied both, not for very long, but I have thought about both, against my background, and I cannot see how we can change this system by further marrying the attorney general's position into the cabinet. I think we must divorce it from the cabinet. I think we must opt for a new system, which is separate and independent from cabinet influences. Then they don't have to be direct influences to be important. They can be indirect and have a great effect on the administration of justice.

We must recognize as a matter of practical political reality in this country, that there are no votes in the justice system. There are no votes for those who advocate higher pay for judges, because people think judges are paid too much anyway. There are certainly no votes for advocating higher pay for lawyers who are on government staff, because they're viewed as being at the government... at the trough, anyway. There are no votes for building new and better courthouses because, after all, the only people that are going to go through those courthouses are criminals.

So who is going to vote for the justice system? When it comes time to slice up the provincial pie, to allocate resources by management boards of cabinet, or whatever they're called in whichever province, the justice system is

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always at the bottom. Because we, as Canadians, have not yet demanded high quality justice. And because we haven't demanded high quality justice, which has to be paid for in the same way as high quality medical care, we're getting the kind of justice system that we deserve, in a sense. We don't really deserve it, but we're getting it because our political leaders haven't the gumption to call for more resources. And linked to that, is the position of the attorney general, who is the minister of justice, knows there's problems in the system, but has to go back into cabinet to convince his cabinet colleagues of that. And everyone has different claims and different priorities.

So I think that, unfortunately, Philip Stenning's work, and I admire it greatly, doesn't have that degree of pragmatism or political reality as its basis as does Professor Edwards. I worked for seven attorneys general over a period of almost twelve years, as a student and as a lawyer, and I saw things that surprised me, because I didn't understand them, and things that surprised me, because I did. I saw pressure being put on governments to withdraw charges against cities for pollution offences.

And at the time, as a young lawyer, I was asked to withdraw an appeal that I had launched as Crown counsel, and I was ordered to withdraw it. And I refused, because I didn't think what was happening was correct. In retrospect, and

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after the fact, a lot was explained to me that should have been explained to me at the time. The other considerations being that the municipality was undertaking certain programs and so on. In other words, there was plea bargaining, but it was being done at the wrong level. I was ordered to withdraw the appeal. I said "no." I was brash and full of myself at the time. I figured I could always go back to driving a laundry truck, as I did to get through law school. And nothing happened. Another Crown was asked to go out and do the job and did it. I was waiting for the repercussions and there were none. I saw appeals being taken in order to support a local Crown attorney, who was having difficulty because the judge sitting on the bench was always ruling in favour of his nephew defence lawyer, and no one would do anything about it.

Now whether that was a proper reason for appealing a case in order to show that the system was wrong remains to be seen to this day. I wonder how fair that was to the particular accused. I didn't think it was unfair at the time. I wonder what that accused would think.

I saw an appeal taken with respect to a sentence handed down in Northern Ontario with respect to native people, which sentence was viewed as being too harsh. And I saw the Court of Appeal consider the matter in a way

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which I had never seen before from a really pragmatic, practical, everyday, reality way and lower the sentence because they knew about the situation in the community.

In order to deal with that kind of situation, it was my feeling at the time that the almost independent office of director of public prosecutions should be operating away from the political process. I had not yet had the experience that I have today nor the learning that is based on Professors Edwards' and Stenning's works in order to help me formulate my thoughts on this subject.

But having formulated thoughts on this subject, I look around and I see great legal issues that come before us as a people, and I wonder why Attorneys General act or refuse to act under certain conditions. For example, let me highlight a few. The Meech Lake Accord is felt by a lot of people in this country to be seriously flawed because it endangers the rights of women and native peoples under the Charter. There's a very serious question of interpretation of the Meech Lake Accord, yet the governments refuse to put those serious, legal questions, constitutional questions, before the Courts of Appeal or the Supreme Court of Canada because the governments themselves agreed with the Meech Lake Accord. That, to me, highlights a situation where an independent attorney general, or prosecutor, or director of public prosecutions, or whatever you call the office, would

operate in the way that was in the best interest of justice and law and not merely politics.

On the other hand, for example, the Ontario government got itself out of a very neat problem, political problem, with the Catholic School Funding case by placing that before the Ontario Court of Appeal. Kicking the political football, as it were, into the Court and saying to that Court, "Here, you solve our problems for us by giving us your interpretation."

The abortion issue raises the same kind of concern. It's a political football, as we've all seen in this country, and whichever side one is on in this debate, I think we can all agree that politicians are cowards when it comes to the issue because it has done a lot of politicians in, and yet some attorneys general have not acted properly. For example, in the province of Quebec in the Morgentaler case, the continued prosecution, notwithstanding acquittals and the continued harassment using the legal process, raised great questions in the minds of Canadians not about Henry Morgentaler, not about the abortion issue, but about the abuse in the justice system.

In Ontario, after the jury acquittal, the decision to appeal was laid on to the Attorney General, Roy McMurtry.

Now, I am sure that Mr. McMurtry, knowing him as I do, agonized over that decision, but I am also certain, without

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knowing any facts, that he did not make that decision totally on his own because the decision had great ramifications in society. And that's the kind of scenario that we're going to run into more and more with the advent of the Charter of Rights.

Because the Charter controls government, both at the legislative and executive levels, someone has to place the case before the Court. Someone has to prosecute, and when the defence lawyer in the criminal case raises Charter Rights and that defence says, "We are saying that legislation is unconstitutional," the attorney general, ultimately, bears the responsibility for what decisions are made as to whether or not, for example, that particular argument should be agreed with.

You cannot have an attorney general make those kinds of decisions with respect to the propriety of government acts, executive acts, legislative acts, and be part of the government acts and legislative acts at the same time.

That's clearly a conflict in interest. It's clearly a lack of independence. And while there's political accountability in the system, the political accountability is obviously through the political process, and we must be realistic about that process.

Those who go through the justice system, those who are poor and economically disadvantaged, because that's the

bulk of the people through the justice system, seldom have time, seldom and almost never have money to be able to participate in the political process as we see others participating. They can't support a political candidate. They can't take time to knock on doors, and they haven't got the money to take out ads in the papers.

As a result, we must be realistic about who has access to the political system and, at the same time, we must see where the attorney general's role comes in that system. If the attorney general is part and parcel of the political system in the same way as his cabinet colleagues are, then we've got a problem in this country, and it's never going to go away.

We see a model, in effect, in the House of Commons or in the legislative assemblies where the speaker of the House, who's supposed to be an impartial arbiter in the House of Commons or in the legislative assemblies, is part of the political process in a sense and is elected by the people at large. So we already have built into our system a kind of a model wherein someone runs for political office, has a constituency, gets to be elected and then is supposed to exercise quasi-judicial type functions, is supposed to be fair and impartial as between a number of competing political parties.

And I'm sure that with some thought and with the help

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of people like Professor Edwards, we too can map out a new truly Canadian solution to a Canadian problem. We don't have to slavishly follow the English model or the Australian model, although I was pleased to hear that the Australian model provides not only for security of tenure like a Supreme Court Judge but also pay like a Supreme Court Judge.

But we have a lot of problems in this country created by the Charter which is there to help us. Operation Dismantle informs us of our view of the role of the courts today, and it's totally changed. It's changed because the courts review what the legislative bodies do and what the executive branch of government does, what the police do as part of the investigative arm for the executive branch. That's all up for review now.

And so the conclusion I bring is that, first, in my view, discrimination does exist in the justice system as a whole against those who are poor and can't swing political clout. And, second, that discrimination can be dealt with if we separate out the prosecutorial authority from the political process in such a way as to ensure justice and fairness and independence along with the necessity of accountability. Third, that Phillip Stenning's view, while I admire him and his work greatly, I feel is not appropriate, based on my experience.

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Times have changed greatly. Crime is different, for example, money laundering offences you never heard of before. Methods of detection of crime is different, wire tap evidence, terrorism offences and so on. The defences have changed dramatically; we've constitutionalized both the process as well as the substance of the criminal law. But what has not changed, what has not kept up with the times is the prosecutorial system and the role of the attorney general.

It is time for a change. It is time for a model to be used, and why do we not view it in such a way that we can try it, and if it doesn't work, we don't have to stay with it. Why don't we build in a sunset provision in our new model. After all, Canadians like to look at precedent. don't like to move too quickly. We've now got a precedent in the Charter of Rights. The over-ride provision, which allows government to take away our rights for a period of time, is confined to five years at first instance and then five years again. We could put in a new model and have it go out of existence after five years or ten years and then renew it upon a restudy of the situation. If it's warranted to be renewed, we'll renew it. And if it's not warranted, if the situation has worsened, we'll try something else or go back to our original system. The advantage is it will take away the uneasy feeling that many

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have expressed and that I have had for quite some time that 1 either we have a political decision being made in 2 important, high-profile, political cases such as Clifford 3 Olson, the Guy-Paul Morin case, the Morgentaler cases in 4 Quebec and Ontario, the Kirby case, and so on. Or we have 5 the feeling that the whole system at the lower end, where 6 there's not this high political view, or pers-7 pective,...kind of case, is being run by people who are civil servants who don't have accountability to anyone. Either view makes us uneasy and should make us uneasy.

In closing, let me say that, having started the process, Mr. Commissioners, I truly hope that you will continue it, and you will put in your report a model for the whole of Canada which will be framed in such a way as to be a challenge to any of the governments, not to implement it.

Thank you very much for your invitation. CHAIR

Thank you, Mr. Manning, before calling on our next speaker, let me just provide a further footnote. I mentioned the office of director of public prosecutions in the state of Victoria, in Australia. The occupant has the security of tenure of a Supreme Court Judge and Mr. Manning was pleased to note the salary of a Supreme Court Judge. He is in charge of all prosecutions. There is no political

influence brought to bear on him, and the first occupant of 1 the office, by the way, is a well-known Melbourne defence 2 lawyer who spent his whole career at the defence bar and 3 used to spend about two months of his time away from his 4 busy Melbourne practice to go north to Darwin and Alice 5 Springs to defend aboriginal persons on a legal aid basis. 6 It showed that there may be an opening, Mr. Manning, for someone like yourself when these... 8

# MR. MORRIS MANNING

I thought you were going to take the job.

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Now, I would like to call on Serge Kujawa to conclude the discussion from the panel.

### MR. SERGE KUJAWA

Thank you. Ladies and gentleman, I have been ordered not to say anything about the dinner so I won't, but I want to point out that I was not given any Drambuie following the dinner.

I found this whole several days very interesting. I think what we were doing, without maybe even thinking about it, is attacking the whole basis of a democratic system of According to my understanding of democracy, and living. it's a long way from very perfect, democracy is the will of the people, it is the rule of all of us, but it's under the rule of law. We tend to forget the importance of, "it's

under the rule of law."

Since that is what governs our whole system, the attorney general, who has been right along responsible for law, is an extremely important person in the scheme of things, which makes me wonder why it is that the citizens of Saskatoon refused to send Ray Hnatyshn over to Ottawa to be the Minister of Justice when they had it there for the doing.

But all of the speakers so far, and I heartily agree with them, point out that whoever is administering the law is accountable to the public because, after all, the public is the final government. And you have to, if you'rE representing them in dispensing justice and making laws and dealing with laws, you have to be responsible, accountable to the public.

How can you be accountable to anybody if you are stripped of your powers? That's my number one question and Professor Edwards, it seems to me, is saying that since the attorney general is a human being, therefore not perfect, therefore, we should split up his jurisdictions into bits and pieces and that way he can't do too much harm. It also follows that he can't do any good.

I suggest that we have with our...we've equated progress and change, we use them as if they're the same damned thing, and we get our idea of the direction in which

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we should change from the United States. The United States is famous for, what, NFL plus due process. If it isn't done according to due process, then it isn't good and it isn't wonderful. We don't give a damn about justice, and we don't care about accountability. If there is due process, what else can you ask for? And yet, in a democracy, if you want your government supported, if you want your attorney general supported, then he had better convince your public that what he's doing is a sensible and just sort of a job. Not simply going through due process.

Now the government isn't running the country because it doesn't pass the final laws. We have, how many ever people are left in Ottawa running the country from the Supreme Court of Canada. They make the rules and they apply the Charter, and I have trouble with my kids, explaining to them, the perfectly logical, totally reliable, infallible even, evidence. This is not necessarily admissible at all. That has nothing to do with justice. It depends on whether due process has been followed. This is hard to sell to intelligent grade 11 kids. And I suspect that's about the level at which the vote comes down; it's not going to sell too long, generally. And I think we have to get back to where the attorney general can say, "Here is how the system runs. are a democracy, and I am willing to have you judge the way

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I do things." Unless we're doing that, we're not even in a democracy.

And we have in law, it sounds great, you know, we go by form as to the substance in law so damned much that it's unbelievable. This business that justice must appear to be done is one of the really sacred things in our law. And in a way, sure, justice must appear to be done. But if you and I are married to a pair of sisters, does that mean when we go into court on the opposite sides of a case, that we have to act like we hate each other? Isn't it a simple fact of life that any human being can understand that if you and I, or if the judge and I are old friends and we golf together, before appearing before that judge, I'm going to prepare a little more carefully, and I am going to show a little more integrity because I want him to like and respect me, more so than I would with a total stranger. Why do we totally ignore that? Why must we make it all look artificial and, therefore, justice appears to be done? That is giving the public too much credit for no intelligence.

Now, Professor Edwards said something that really, it really needs to be said, that I picked up on because it is so seldom that you hear anyone say it. He says that the attorney general must show a great deal of "integrity," was the word that he used, in the application and the

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administration of justice. I couldn't agree more. But mostly we don't hear a word about that. What we hear is what we get in from the United States. Winning is not the important thing; winning is the only thing. Nice guys finish last. Who the hell cares about integrity?

And if you go to a whole lot of government bureaucracies right now, they have changed and progressed not from many, many laws; at one time, we used to think the Ten Commandments were necessary, now we've got it down pretty well to one, CYA. If you cover your...that's all you need to worry about. And if you say to someone, "Well, that's dishonest," or whatever. See, he looks at you and says...or either just the look tells you, "Well, isn't that what everyone does? Isn't that what's expected?"

We cannot sever the administration of justice from society as a whole and unless society as a whole takes on the Edwards formula based on integrity, nothing but nothing will work. And we're not working on that, and although Morris Manning points out that everything has changed and that we have computers now where we used to have ball point pens, I don't see that humanity has changed much in the last five thousand years. I see no evidence of it at all. As a matter of fact, one of my daughters here a while ago, asked if I would help her with an English essay. Well, when you have a kid that asks you for some help to indicate

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that you could be of help, you pretty well say, "Yeah, I'd just love to do it." So she handed me a couple of books and they were Greek plays. And I said, "What's this for," and she said, "well, you can't do essays on them until you read the plays." I wasn't undertaking that much, but I was stuck, so I did it. I read these old Greek plays, and if you would take those names and put in modern Canadian names, you would have an absolutely up-to-date, modern play. I see no change between us and those people except, there they had more persons asking for some integrity in the system.

Now getting on to sort of practicalities here.

There's a suggestion made about the attorney general should not be involved in policing because, after all, that gives him too much power. We should have a solicitor general that's in charge of that. That's the recommendation that's being done in a great many places. My question is, if that is so, how is the attorney general to be accountable? And the answer is, well, he is accountable as far as he goes, and the rest he sluffs off onto the solicitor general, and the solicitor general passes the buck back to the A.G. and nobody really knows what the hell is going on. Because when you are handling an investigation, a prosecution, whoever you are that's in charge, you have to be in charge of the investigation as well as the prosecution. And if

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you want something more done in the file that's been handed to you by the cops, you don't run to some other department, the sol. gen.'s department, talk to the solicitor general into giving you enough power to approach the investigator to get this done. I mean, it should be clearly understood at all times that you are in a position to get that done without all of that bureaucratise. And if you can't do it, you're not getting a proper job done and the attorney general nor anybody else working on it can be accountable. And this is a very important part of the administration of justice because here is not only the preparation of the case but it is a whole lot of guidance to the police of what you expect from them in this case and also in future If you can talk to them about, "This is not the way to take a statement. This is not the way to arrest a person. This is not the way to search. And here is what you do." You've got them on their way for the next case. If you have to go through the solicitor general's department, you usually give up because you haven't time and it's not worthwhile.

And anyway, if we are so very proud of our systems and our education and how everything works, it's always bothered me a bit that from time to time, you get a guy that spends the first fifty years of his life proving that he has no interest in the administration of justice. Does

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nothing in it. He gets elected to power and gets to the point of being the minister of justice, and he's in charge. How the hell can he be? And usually the solicitor general has even less, if that's imaginable, to do with the administration of justice; he takes over the policing of which he knows nothing.

That sort of a separation to me is entirely inconsistent with accountability which gets us right to the post of the public prosecutor, the director of public prosecutions. Sounds good on paper. He's independent, no political implications, in other words, no accountability to the public. The public can never comment to him about his calls. They can't vote against him. They can't throw him out. He's going to be there until he's seventy-five because there's nothing you can do about it. Short of him committing criminal offences, he's there until seventyfive. Now, if he happens to be or turns into a bit of a kook, you are stuck with him until he is seventy-five. Is that what you want or do you want some accountability where the public can rule itself and says this kind of administration of justice is unacceptable? Because I am a believer in the old John Diefenbaker saying that there's not all that much prejudice, et cetera, in this world. He said, I think this is his wisest saying, "That if stupidity is capable of explaining a situation, you usually need to

look no further for any explanation." Just bad, dumb calls. It's not usually dishonest.

Now, if this fellow is put in there, independent as can be, not until seventy-five but just for ten years, totally separate from the political scene, first of all, how did he get the appointment without a whole lot of political pull? Second, if he's there for ten years, when he gets out, he's going to want another career. That means he wants to build up a reputation, et cetera. That means he is going to do ten years of personal politicking, just because he's human, and just because he needs to. Is that accountable to the public? If it is, I pretty much give up.

I don't know when I started. I know that I shouldn't go much longer. I want to touch on one very practical, everyday point that I think a lot of people don't realize is out there and a very major part of the administration of justice. And that is to put it in a bold, attention getting form, police, not prosecutors, run most prosecutions. That's coming from a very old prosecutor who has served a half a dozen or more attorneys general. And in most cases if you go to the prosecutor and tell him this, he'll sneer at you and say, "Well, I, of course, am totally in charge," and he may be. All I'm saying is that ninety-five percent aren't.

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And the way it works is, the police pull in a whole raft of stuff. And if you don't do everything the way they think it ought to be done, once, you'll get away with it. If you do it...see, my recommendation to Crowns is that your job as a prosecutor is to send home twenty-five percent of the witnesses the police bring in. Seventy-five percent of the chattels, which they call exhibits, are to be thrown out, and out of the seven thousand pictures that they bring to you, you use exactly three. Now, if that doesn't make them happy, if you follow that advice twice and the accused gets acquitted, the attorney general gets a report yea think, and if you think they can't do a good investigation, you should see the report they send in against you. And say, "Look it, we did all of the wonderful work in here, and the Crown failed to present all of this evidence; it's no wonder he was acquitted." Not too many young prosecutors can do that on a continuing basis and remain employed by that attorney general, so they go with the flow. It's all pensionable service and, anyway, they see people around them using the number one law which is CYA.

So there's no real incentive to show some integrity.

And unless we get people that are people of integrity in
the role of the attorney general and let them know we
expect that sort of behaviour, so they let their staff know

that this is what they are supposed to do, then we're going to faction this off into seventeen different little departments, and we're going to go by due process, and we're going to have the public not really respecting us because I keep hearing people saying, "Hey, why don't you lawyers get together and get us another Bill of Rights. A Bill of Rights for law-abiding citizens." That's the kind of respect we're not getting now, and I think we'd better work on that. Otherwise, it's form, not substance. It won't help a bit.

Well, now you know why Serge Kujawa is the scourge of the defence bar in Saskatchewan. I think, once again, Chief Justice and Members of the Commission, the panel has left you with some fairly succinct ideas which they share. We all look forward to how you go about sorting out this very real dilemma, and I want to thank our panel for giving us all sides of a very tough issue.

We have time for discussion, and I have three names down and, as chairman, I would like to ask these three persons if they would like to say something, and, naturally, we have time to hear from others as well, but Phillip Stenning was the subject of a vicious attack launched on him by Mr. Manning, and if he would like to

### MR. THOMAS BERGER cont'd

come to one of the microphones and give us his views, I certainly would be very grateful. Yes, here's Mr.

Stenning.

### PROF. PHILIP STENNING

First of all, Mr. Chairman, I must say that I know Mr. Manning well enough to know that that was not a vicious attack from him. In fact, I was about to get up here and thank Mr. Manning for being such an excellent publicist for my work. I don't think I've had such good free advertising in a long time.

I think, as someone who has been commissioned by the Marshall Inquiry to do research for them, I've had probably as much opportunity as I deserve to have my views expressed to the Commission in a number of different forums, and I don't propose today to repeat the positions that I have taken before them. So what I wanted to do to respond to your invitation is to make one simple comment about the presentations which have been made today.

As you know, I am opposed to the notion of an independent director of public prosecutions, and I'm opposed to the idea that the prosecutorial process can, in some magic way, be de-politicized in the way which advocates of that kind of independent office have suggested. But what I would like to do today is to suggest that, if for a minute we accept this as the reality of

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what's going to happen, and I strongly suspect that it is, it seems that the votes are about ninety-nine to one in 2 favour of some kind of independent office of attorney 3 general or independent director of public prosecutions, 4 then it seems to me that what the Commission has to do, and I think it's going to be a difficult task, is somehow get 6 beyond the rhetoric of integrity and fairness and 7 intervention only in exceptional cases and tell us more 8 clearly exactly which of these cases it would be 9 appropriate or what kind of cases it would be appropriate .0 for an attorney general to intervene in, in the event that - 1 we have a director of public prosecutions. Exactly what .2 the limits of such independence for such an office would 13 be. 14

And here I have great difficulty because I don't think it's possible in advance to specify what kind of cases are the appropriate ones to intervene in. I think each case has its own special circumstances and that's why I believe that the most appropriate person to make that decision is a person who is in a political position. I believe that these hard cases are political cases. But assuming that they are to be treated as the subject of an independent official, then I think we need to know when and when not it will be appropriate for an attorney general to exercise his residual, exceptional authority to intervene. And I think

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the Commission should address itself quite specifically to those issues.

And the other point I want to make is that I have great difficulty in listening to the presentations today in seeing what difference any of these changes would have made to any of the three major cases that this Commission has been looking into so carefully during its hearings and other deliberations. It's not clear to me at all that, had Nova Scotia had an independent director of public prosecutions, Donald Marshall would have been treated any differently in the justice system in Nova Scotia than he It's not clear to me that either Mr. Thornhill or Mr. Maclean or any of the others that have been discussed would have been treated any differently, and I think it's, therefore, incumbent upon the Commissioners, if they're going to adopt the kinds of what I would call somewhat idealistic solutions at the sort of top of the pyramid to explain carefully and convincingly how these changes are going to address the fundamental problems down at the bottom of the system which I see as being revealed by the kinds of cases that they've been looking into.

Thank you very much for the opportunity.

Thank you Professor Stenning.

Michael Jackson asked me at the break if he could just

say a word on this subject. He's been with us now for three days, and I'm sure everyone would like to give him a chance to be heard.

## MR. MICHAEL JACKSON

Some of you may remember, and you will be forgiven if you have forgotten that I made some statements two days ago relating to the setting the stage for change. Some matters have come up in the last couple of days which have given me some cause for concern in terms of whether we are at that threshold I talked about for, in fact, real change. And it relates to the subject we've talked about today, the role of the attorney general in the context of what we talked about two days ago, the whole question of the way the system treats native people, the indigenous people.

Some of you may be aware that a few years ago the Supreme Court of Canada rendered a decision, a decision which, in Professor Mannings' words "related to one of the great legal issues." The question of whether a document signed in 1752 was, in fact, a treaty under Canadian law, the treaty between the Micmac nation and the Crown. The case went to the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Supreme Court of Canada, after very extensive argument, in an unanimous decision, ruled that that treaty, indeed, was a treaty in law and that under the terms of the Indian Act,

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Indian people, acting pursuant to their hunting rights guaranteed by that treaty, were not subject to provincial wildlife legislation in Nova Scotia.

I teach a course in native rights, and that case is celebrated and is cited in law schools across this country. It was recently cited before the Supreme Court of Canada in another case recently argued about aboriginal and treaty rights. And the Court, in the course of its judgment, very clearly enunciated certain fundamental principles that treaties were to be interpreted in the broad and liberal way in accordance with the understanding the Indians would have given to the terms, and the ambiguities were to be interpreted in favour of the Indians.

That, in any event, the Supreme Court has enunciated as the appropriate canons of interpretation to constitutional rights, treaty rights are now entrenched in the constitution. It was with some alarm, therefore, that I learned that in Nova Scotia Micmac Indians continue to be prosecuted under the Wildlife Act on the basis that the treaty decision in Simon, the case of Simon, really was limited to its particular facts, enunciated no general principles of law.

There may well be important issues of the interpretation of the Simon case. There may be genuine issues relating to the scope of that treaty. One of the

questions I would like to raise is that in any other context in relation to the resolution of an important constitutional issue affecting the fundamental rights of a group of people who have special constitutional status, if there were unresolved ambiguities, the provincial government would negotiate. If it was another province which had won a case vis-a-vis Nova Scotia, and the government of Nova Scotia was concerned about that, it would seek to negotiate. If negotiations failed, the government would, as it has done in other situations, would make a reference to the civil courts.

In this case, Nova Scotia, on the assumption that it may have legitimate concerns about the Simon case, has chosen to invoke the most intrusive process, the criminal process, the process which in terms of the balancing of resources, gives the state the pre-eminent role. It seems to me that what we have here, using Esmeralda Thornhill's definition of racism, of discrimination with empowerment so that discrimination is fueled by the power of the state. I am drawn reluctantly to the conclusion that to the extent that the attorney general's office has chosen to prosecute the Micmac because it disagrees with the Simon case, is, in fact, an example of racism.

Relating to the last speaker, our senior prosecutor, who eloquently said that the rule of law is a cardinal

principle of our constitutional regime. It seems to me that the Province of Nova Scotia, in taking the view it has of the *Simon* case, as being a decision which speaks only to one individual is, in fact, undermining the rule of law.

It's with some diffidence I've risen to make this point, but it seems to me that in the context of this Commission which has given such a powerful focus on the question of how the attorney general ought to be exercising his or her powers, the continued prosecution of the Micmac, I think, should be a cause of concern for all of us as to whether, in fact, change is about to happen in Nova Scotia. Thank you.

CHAIR

Mr. Manning would like to...

#### MR. MORRIS MANNING

Your comments are most appropriate, in my view, because they raise another example of an area where the Commission can look in order to determine whether the attorney general, as a courtroom advocate, should be independent from his cabinet colleagues.

I've recently come into this area in the last year and a half by reason of being retained on an Indian land claim, and was struck in my research of the material to note the difference between the way in which the Supreme Court of Canada and other provincial appellate courts have dealt

# MR. MORRIS MANNING cont'd

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with Indian land claims across the country as distinct from the way in which the American Supreme Court has dealt with similar claims.

And it struck me that one of the reasons for the different approaches is obviously the position taken by counsel for the Crown and where there's prosecutions under provincial statutes for breach of provincial laws and the defence is raised that this is not a breach of the law because there's an overriding constitutional law or value or a treaty which make this not a crime, we find that the role of the attorney general changes into a political, as well as an advocacy role, and it highlights, and your comments, I think, are most apposite because they demonstrate that in those prosecutions as well as in the civil claims themselves, it is of the utmost importance that this feeling, the concept of racism or discrimination not be there. And the only way it can not be there is to have the person who is putting forward the legal position that the courts in this country take very seriously. courts, make no mistake about it, as the Commission well knows, when counsel for the Crown stands up to speak, counsel represents the greater public interest, not the individual interest or the group of individuals. And when that counsel speaks, that counsel should be of assistance to the court to see that justice is done and that the

# MR. MORRIS MANNING cont'd

interpretation that's placed on the laws is one that is coming from an independent perspective and not one that has, as its root, political expediency.

It's very difficult for me to imagine a Crown counsel arguing on behalf of the government in a case where there's a land claim or where there's a defence that there is, in effect, a treaty. It's very difficult for me to envisage that counsel not having anything to do with the attorney general or the ramifications. I mean, after all, if you're claiming that you own a piece of land that has within it a town or a large tract of land with a lot of resources, you're going to be dealing with cabinet colleagues. And those cases highlight the necessity for complete independence in order to be free of this concept of racism or discrimination, both in theory or in practice, and, as well, to be of greater assistance of the court.

CHAIR

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Mr. Kujawa, you wanted to add something.

#### MR. SERGE KUJAWA

Assuming that Professor Jackson is correct that the attorney general is wrong in law and/or is prejudiced, he has said it, others can say it, "There will be an election before long, and he can be voted out and a great improvement put in his place." But let's say you have a director of public prosecutions who could be equally wrong

on those things. He's going to be there until he's seventy-five years of age. Which do you want? Where is the accountability? That's the issue.

CHAIR

Thank you Mr. Kujawa. Professor Slattery.

## PROF. BRIAN SLATTERY

Yes, my name is Brian Slattery and I teach at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto. I was struck by something that John Edwards said at the very beginning which struck me, and it's very appropriate and right, and, yet, in a sense, little realized. And it links with the point that Michael Jackson has just made. Professor Edwards said that the attorney general and, indeed, one might say other members of the government, has not only the power but the duty, the constitutional responsibility to uphold the constitution. And, in particular, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

But, of course, there are constitutional duties which go beyond the Charter of Rights amd Freedoms, some of which, are embodied now in Section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982. And Section 35, as we all know, states that the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed. The point that I want to make is that it is commonly thought that that section is addressed exclusively to the courts. So that if people feel, the native people, Metis, Inuit,

Indian people feel that their aboriginal and treaty rights have been violated, well, they can go to court. Or, at any rate, if they are brought to court, they can raise Section 35 as a defence. And, of course, they may and they do. But I think that is only to see one very small part of what ought to be the proper function of Section 35. It's as if, to make a point I made in a workshop earlier on, it's as if we thought that when the 1867 Act was passed setting up the federal government and provincial governments, that one had to go to court in order to get a federal government set up. Well, that's simply ridiculous. Of course, we know that federal government was just set up. It was set up by those people who had the constitutional responsibility to do it.

That's making the point in a more general and obvious context, but I think it holds true also in this context that there has been virtually nothing done, at least, in the parts of Canada that I'm aware of, and I'm told also here in Nova Scotia, on the governmental side and by the attorney general, to figure out, in effect, what are the aboriginal and treaty rights of the people of their province and to act accordingly. And I would have thought that one of the first major steps in that process is to consult with the people in question. What, in their view, are their aboriginal and treaty rights. This is not something that should be left to the courts alone. It's

too big a task. It's a task beyond the court. In the context of prosecutorial discretion, it is the constitutional responsibility of the attorney general not to prosecute when there are genuine aboriginal and treaty rights. And I don't think that any effort of that kind has been made.

I would also like to make the point that that unwillingness to act is not necessarily, in itself, racism. In fact, it's something deeper and more difficult to eradicate than racism. Racism is a definite act directed against an identified group. This is non-recognition. It is unwillingness to act because of total non-recognition of anything special about native people. Any special rights. How do you fight against non-recognition and inaction. A very difficult problem, indeed.

Thank you.

#### CHAIR

Thank you, Professor Slattery. I would like to ask...we are just about at the hour of closing, and I would like to ask Bill MacDonald, the Deputy Attorney General of Nova Scotia, to come forward and say a few words.

# MR. BILL MacDONALD

Thank you, Mr. Berger. And I just want a word or two.

Last night I reported to the Attorney General on the

proceedings Thursday and Friday. I told him that this has

## MR. BILL MacDONALD cont'd

been an important learning exercise for me and that I
thought all of the people attending this conference
regarded it as a very, very useful exercise. I dealt with
some detail, but it was a brief report, and I will be
speaking with him again at much greater length on a number
of the subjects that have been raised here.

He did ask me, though, to express to all of the panelists and all of the participants at the conference his personal thanks for your contribution to the administration of justice in Nova Scotia, and I think to the administration of justice in all jurisdictions in Canada. And that is especially significant since everybody has been participating here without remuneration.

I want to, now that I'm here, as well, express my own personal thanks because I have found this to be a very beneficial experience.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

## CHAIR

Thank you, Mr. MacDonald. Well, before we go any further, I just have one or two things to say in closing and then I will ask Chief Justice Hickman to come forward and offer some closing remarks. But could I, on your behalf, thank this morning's panel, Mr. Kujawa, Mr. Manning, Dick Vogel who, of course, has left us and Professor Edwards. They have given us both sides. Do we

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want the attorney general politically accountable, but subject to political pressure or do we want an independent director of public prosecutions who is set up in a way that makes him quite independent of the attorney general and any political pressure, or do we want something in between. I confess that when I came, I hadn't made up my mind, and now I'm thoroughly confused and I think it's a tribute to the eloquence of this morning's panel whom I thank on your behalf.

Might I, as Chairman, say that I appreciate the effort that has gone into this gathering. The panelists have all made a first rate contribution and all of you folks who have stayed with us for the past three days have, I think, made a very important contribution. I reminded you at the outset that we were speaking to Chief Justice Hickman and Mr. Justice Poitras and Mr. Justice Evans, the three Commissioners. We wanted to, in a polite way, inform them and educate them and enlighten them. I don't know whether we've succeeded or not, but we've done our best and we're grateful to them for making this whole forum available to all of us. And we wish them well in their endeavours, and with that, I should like to call on Chief Justice Hickman to close the conference.

# CHIEF JUSTICE HICKMAN

Mr. Chairman on Thursday morning when I opened this

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consultative conference, I expressed the hope that there would be frank and uninhibited dialogue between those in attendance. Now at the end of two and a half days of splendid discussion, I am able to say, without reservation, that the Royal Commission's hopes and aspirations in that regard have been realized. We are, indeed, grateful.

It was decided by the Commission at an early stage of our deliberations that it would be of enormous benefit to us if we could devise a conference which would bring together people with particular expertise and experience in the criminal justice system who possessed a passionate belief in their cause. This consultative conference which was formulated to meet that objective has more than adequately discharged that mandate, in my view.

We knew it would be virtually impossible to elicit the real concerns and experiences of natives and blacks with the criminal justice system simply by calling witnesses to appear before formalized public hearings to give viva voce evidence in such a restrained atmosphere. We wanted knowledgeable persons to have the public opportunity to let it all hang out in a manner which would arouse the conscience of the citizens of Nova Scotia and beyond, while at the same time providing the commission with practical recommendations based on experience and research. And in that regard, we have not been disappointed.

Those Canadians from all areas of this nation as well as some from outside Canada who have, without any remuneration or fee, come to Halifax and allowed us the benefit of their expert and professional advice have, in my view, rendered outstanding service to the Province of Nova Scotia. For that, we, as Commissioners, thank you most sincerely.

On Thursday, led by outstanding panelists, supported by enthusiastic workshop participants, we were given graphic but well-researched descriptions and examples of the concern of native people with the criminal justice system which has been imposed upon them by the dominant society. Their realistic recommendations, based in part on centuries of caring traditions, will give us valuable insight when wrestling with the vexing problems as we work on the Commission Report.

Yesterday, highly articulate and extremely intelligent blacks shared with us their understandable frustrations with the criminal justice system which daily intrudes upon their private lives without, in their view, providing equal treatment under the law. Again, their meaningful recommendations and passionate pleas for justice will be carefully and sympathetically reviewed by all Commissioners as we try to shape realistic recommendations.

Today, we've had the good fortune to hear submissions

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from Canadians with years of experience in the area of prosecutorial decisionmaking by attorneys general. And I'm certain I speak for both my fellow commissioners when I say their expert opinions will be extremely helpful.

The ultimate responsibility for law enforcement rests with Her Majesty's Attorney General who must perform his or her awesome duties without fear, favour or affection. It follows, therefore, that the independence of that office must not only be enhanced and strengthened, but must be so structured that all Canadians will perceive it as an institution of total independence from outside influences and the guardians of their rights and liberties under the rule of law.

On behalf of the Royal Commission, I thank all who have participated in this public consultative conference.

I'm sure you will all agree, we were fortunate, indeed, to have Mr. Thomas R. Berger chair all our public sessions.

His leadership has been outstanding. His experience in dealing with legitimate concerns of minority groups and his involvement in several, important Royal Commissions eminently qualified him to lead and guide our deliberations. This he has done and I extend to you, Mr. Berger, the sincere thanks of the Royal Commission for your splendid, splendid help.

All members of the Commission are extremely grateful

to our staff for their efforts in organizing this event.

It has been efficiently managed, and I thank all who are so involved.

I haven't the same courage of some other speakers; I thank the press for the knowledgeable coverage that they have given our public hearings during the past year or more and the coverage they have given this conference. It was deemed essential by the Commission that a public awareness of the problems in the criminal justice system be graphically brought into focus which was brought graphically brought into focus by the wrongful conviction of Donald Marshall, Jr. And in regard to that and in pursuit of that objective, the press, in my view, has played a meaningful role during the past year and a half, and I thank them for it.

Once again I thank all of you for participating and attending this consultative conference which I now declare to be at an end.

Thank you so much.

12:30 p.m. - CONFERENCE ENDS