

DE FIEDMONT'S
JOURNAL
OF THE
SIEGE OF
BEAUSEJOUR

WEBSTER



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
Nova Scotia

From

J. Webster

Sherbrooke, N.B.,

Aug. 1/36



Jacau de Fiedmont

THE SIEGE OF BEAUSEJOUR IN 1755

A JOURNAL OF THE ATTACK ON BEAUSEJOUR

written by

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PREFACE

Jacau de Fiedmont's *Journal de l'attaque de Beauséjour* is one of the most important documents known to historians relating to the siege and fall of Beauséjour. It was not written for publication, but was a Report prepared by the author immediately after his participation in the conflict and sent to M. de Surlaville, his former superior officer in Louisbourg, who had returned to France.

It bears the impress of sincerity and truthfulness, being restrained and without distortion of facts. It is almost entirely an account of military conditions and operations, with scarcely any criticisms of individuals, who are now known to have been responsible, to a considerable extent, for the weakness of the French defences, which other writers have unsparingly exposed.

The French text from which this translation has been made appeared in the 9th volume of documents belonging to M. de Nicolai (Levis papers), published at Quebec in 1895 under the direction of the Abbé Casgrain. As it is now presented in English, the second part describing the defence-system of Chignecto in 1755 precedes the account of the siege, which seems to be more logical than the reverse arrangement in the original Journal. The translation has presented difficulties in certain parts, owing to peculiarities of style, construction and punctuation, resulting from the author's evident lack of training in the art of writing. The translator has carried out her work with great care, and has produced a clear and intelligible rendition, which adheres closely to the original text.

I am indebted to Dr. Alfred Bailey, of the New Brunswick Museum, for his assistance in the revision of the proofs.

The work appears as one of the publications of the New Brunswick Museum, on the day of the official opening of Fort Beauséjour National Park. August 1, 1936.

—J. C. WEBSTER.

INTRODUCTION

JACAU DE FIEDMONT.

Jacau de Fiedmont's father was Thomas Jacau (or Jacob), and his mother Anne Melanson, whose father, Peter Melanson, Sieur de le Verdure, was one of the first settlers in Minas. Thomas, a gunner in the fort of Port Royal, married Anne at the latter place on October 15, 1705. Three children were born there. After the capture of Port Royal by Nicholson in 1710, Thomas Jacau moved to Placentia, Newfoundland, but, after the Treaty of Utrecht, the garrison of Placentia was removed to l'Île Royale and Thomas Jacau became master-gunner at Louisbourg; he died there in 1737.

As to the birth of Louis-Thomas, sieur de Fiedmont, better known as Jacau de Fiedmont, there are two conflicting statements. M. Placide Gaudet says that it took place at Placentia in 1712 (*Acadiensis*, Vol. 1, p. 32). A later writer, M. Aegidius Fauteux, in *Rapport de l'Archiviste de la prov. de Quebec*, 1920-21, p. 210, states that he was born at Louisbourg after 1720.

There can be little doubt that the latter is more accurate, because as Jacau was an ensign in the artillery at Louisbourg in 1748, he could scarcely have been born in 1712, since it is out of the bounds of possibility that he could have held this junior rank at the age of 36, whereas it is not unlikely if he had been born after 1720.

In 1750 he was transferred to Quebec, where, in 1752, he was made a lieutenant and was sent to Fort Beauséjour. As there was no military engineer in the fort, De Fiedmont, though a gunner, had to act in this capacity as well. His position was difficult, for while he was honest and capable, the two Commandants, under whom he served, De la Martinière and De Vergor, were poor officers, and, as they had assumed charge of the Commissariat and Finance, they were far more interested in filling their pockets than in spending funds to improve the fortifications. Moreover, he encountered the opposition of the priest, Le Loutre, who was determined to complete a great aboiteau on the Rivière du Lac and employed so many of the available settlers that De Fiedmont was unable to carry out very necessary improvements at the fort. Consequently, when the attack by the British was impending in June, 1755, the defence works were very imperfect, and De Fiedmont, as he points out in his Journal, was forced to make very hurried preparations, employing farmers who were in a state of panic and resisted efforts to make them work. It is very evident that Vergor, the Commandant, was hopelessly inefficient at this time of crisis, and that the plans put into operation for resisting Monckton's force, both in the fort and elsewhere, emanated from De Fiedmont. The garrison was not large and few of the terrified settlers and their Indian allies rendered service of the slightest value. The Commandant, besides being inefficient, showed no spirit and capitulated with unseemly haste.

After the fall of Beauséjour, De Fiedmont went to Quebec and rejoined his company of bombardiers, being made a Captain in 1757. He fought bravely there in 1759, and at the Council of War called by De Ramezay to consider the course to be taken after the Battle of the Plains, De Fiedmont alone held out against capitulation and urged that the fighting should be continued. His conduct was highly praised by De Bougainville in one of his letters. In 1760, he returned to France and was made a Chevalier de Saint-Louis. In 1765 he was appointed Governor of Guiana. He became a Brigadier of Infantry and later *maréchal de camp*. This rank gave him the right to a Coat-of-Arms, awarded in 1780 (See frontispiece). The last mention of his name is found in *l'Almanach Royal*, 1792. Thereafter, there is no record of him nor of the date of his death. It is known that, in 1831, a Baron Jacquot de Fiedmont, was Prefect of the Côte d'Or, and it has been surmised that he was a son of Jacau de Fiedmont, but this relationship has not been established.

De Fiedmont sent his Journal from Quebec with a letter, dated August 20, 1755, to M. de Surlaville, Colonel of Grenadiers, who had been in command of the French military forces in l'Ile Royale, 1751-4, but had returned to France. The translation of the letter reads as follows:—

"I have no doubt that you have taken to heart the disaster at Beauséjour, which the English captured four days after the opening of their trenches. The day following the capitulation, the garrison marched out of the fort, to embark on vessels which took us to Louisbourg; there the Commandant provided us with other transportation to Quebec, where we arrived on August 18th.

I enclose the Journal of the attack and defence of that post, which gives the essential facts about all that occurred, with an account of the fight which took place last July, three leagues from Fort Duquesne. . . .

I venture to assure you, sir, that while I was employed at Beauséjour, I spared no effort to make known how very unfavorable our position was, and in every report I made on this subject it will be seen that I foresaw the misfortunes which overtook us. My conduct will show that the sole object which I had constantly at heart was to contribute to the security of that post against jealous and ambitious neighbors, and to fulfil my duties, as far as possible, in the various functions in which I was employed.

If the work of the fortifications which I had orders to undertake—a responsibility I never desired, lest I should fail to acquit myself well enough—were not executed with the solidity and thoroughness they required, it was from no lack of effort, care and argument on my part; it was not intended that they should be. It is unfortunate for me that their success was not in proportion to my zeal, and especially disappointing, because I not only lost the fruit of my labour in that region, but the opportunity for service on the Ohio, where we won advantages of every kind, and the officers who were in action there have a greater right than others to expect honours from the King.

If, in the Journal, I have omitted a few circumstances, they could

have been of very little importance; I answer for the accuracy of all that I have set down, and none of the defenders of Beauséjour can deny them, unless he were willing to mislead in the crudest manner—which, I am told, someone has already done.”

ANOTHER ACCOUNT OF THE SIEGE OF BEAUSEJOUR

Following the fall of Beauséjour, the following letter was written to M. de Surlaville by an officer, M. de Joubert, a captain in military service at l’Ile Royale. It is undated:—

The event justified our observation. We were warned, and subsequently driven from Acadia. Seven bombs, which fell into Fort Beauséjour, forced M. Vergor to capitulate. He marched out with the honours of war, on condition that he abstained from service for six months. M. de Villeray mimicked his Commandant’s defence, and surrendered Fort Gaspereau on the same conditions, without waiting for the honour of an attack. If M. de Vergor had reasoned like a soldier, he would, had his fort been in no state for defence, have burned it and withdrawn, which he could quite easily have done, because the enemy had not blockaded him. He held out for four days only, during which time he lost two officers and four soldiers.

Will such officers never be regarded with open eyes? Will the General always be dominated by private influence?

This fort, bad as it was, could have held out a little while. The attacking force consisted of (the garrison of) their fort at Beaubassin and militia, estimated at 2000 men. They crossed the Missaquash River near Buot Bridge; no cannon nor muskets were fired at the fort. The fort was surrendered without an inventory. Pichon, it is said, remained to make a list for the English. I hope so, in case it leads him to something. He hasn’t been heard from. The French troops were transported to Louisbourg by way of the Bay of Fundy.

PART I.

DE FIEDMONT'S JOURNAL

Articles comprising a description of the condition of the forts established on the Isthmus between Baie Verte and the Bay of Fundy which unites the territory of Canada and the peninsula of which Acadia is a part; the purpose of these forts and a survey of the resistance which they were capable of making when the English came to attack them.

FORT BEAUSEJOUR

In July 1750, this fort was commenced¹ on a height 2900 yards from that of the English. Between their establishment and our own is an impassable marsh, and there is a river separating us, which we regard as the boundary. This river passes 600 yards from the English fort.

The outer walls of Fort Beauséjour were constructed of posts, in the form of a pentagon; the outer slope of each face was 62 yards; the face of the bastions,² 18; the flanks 6 and the curtain³ 22. These parts were not all symmetrical, nor were the angles formed by them.

The height on which it is situated, falls almost 100 feet in a gentle slope on four sides of the fort; opposite the fifth, the ground rises gradually, almost 2 feet in every 200 yards, until the greatest elevation is reached at a distance of 900 yards from the fort, where the hill again drops away. When they began this fort, the Canadians had no other design than to accommodate a small detachment, and this appears to have been the reason for its limited capacity. The General of Canada, however, sent artillery and gave instructions that it was to be fortified against surprise—the only form of attack which was anticipated. A fosse⁴ was dug, 18 ft. wide at the top and 6 ft. deep, with a slope which reduced the width at the bottom to 6 ft. The earth taken from it was used in making a berme⁵ 6 feet wide, between the outer walls of the fort and the fosse, and to raise the level of the counterscarp⁶ and the glacis⁷ on the outer side.

Behind the posts which served as a revetment⁸ for the walls of the forts, a small rampart was built; this consisted of an earthwork parapet,⁹ 3 feet at the top, a banquette¹⁰ and a terre-plein,¹¹ 6 feet wide and 9 feet above the level of the ground. Under this, casemates,¹² which extended the entire length of the curtains, were constructed to protect the munitions of war, and prevent further disaster in case a conflagration broke out; were a fire to start, either by accident or by premeditated design of a treasonable nature, it would have been difficult to check, for the buildings in the fort were of wood and huddled together, and the place was, moreover, exposed to a strong and continuous wind. Storage spaces were contrived in the terre-plein for the more valuable

munitions; only in this way could they be safeguarded, for no repositories could be built of masonry, because there was neither stone nor lime in the neighborhood. In short, all the defence works, which were essential for such resistance as might be required of the fort, had been undertaken, and were far advanced when it became necessary to add others and to make certain alterations in the plan in order that the most exposed part of the wall might be strengthened to withstand artillery. These changes were, however, executed without disturbing the construction in any manner which could be avoided.

In June, 1752, the Commandant¹³ having received information that the English were determined to drive us from our position on this frontier, and that military preparations to do so were being made in Halifax, work on these new projects was hastily carried on, and such defence works as were consistent with the time available and the location of the fort, were undertaken. The first place to be re-enforced was the front which faces the prolongation of the heights on which the fort is situated, wherefrom the enemy might make effective use of their artillery; attacks on the other sides were impracticable, because an advance could only be made up the slope of the hill. An external rampart was constructed of layers of wood and beaten earth, with a parapet 15 feet deep at the top; the faces of the bastions were strengthened in the same manner and they were prolonged 6 feet beyond the angle of the shoulders, by an orillon¹⁴ which covered the flanks of the entrance. This entrance was protected by a redan,¹⁵ shaped like a half-moon and made, likewise, of wood and earth.

The curtains and the flanks could not be re-enforced beyond the existing contours, for the space between the buildings and the walls did not permit any increase in the thickness of the rampart without the destruction of what was already done.




The construction of the casemates was also undertaken; they were made with large 12 or 14 in. squared timbers of spruce, which lasts a long time in the earth, and were built with great solidity. The double roofing, of the same timbers, was gabled, but to save time, some of the timbers were laid like lintels on rows of posts encased in heavy planks; 6 or 7 feet of well-packed earth, with alternating layers of timber, was piled on top, so that munitions, and even the wounded—in case fighting took place—might be safe-guarded from the bombs. The platforms in the angles formed by the bastions, were built of solid earth, so that cannon might be fired from them over the parapet.

All this was done expeditiously, but, in July, the Commandant, having received reassuring news about this rumoured attack, dismissed the settlers from the neighborhood who had interrupted their own work to undertake that on the fort, and, if necessary, to defend it.

The defence-works have since proceeded in accordance with the later plans, but with the most intolerable delays, because of the difficulty of obtaining labourers in this locality. Projects for the safety of the fort as well as those for the comfort of the garrison were therefore unfinished when the English came to besiege us, but the more important defence-works, designed



VIEW OF THE POINT OF BEAUSEJOUR AND BUTTE A ROGER IN 1755
(From the east side of the Missaguash)
By Captain J. Hamilton



PLAN OF FORT BEAUSEJOUR IN 1752
Original in Paris. Copy in Public Archives, Ottawa.

1. Ground Plan.—

- A. Palisade of pickets.
- B. Glacis.
- C. Fosse.
- D. Drawbridge.
- E. Demi-lune.
- F. Entrance.
- G. Parapet.
- H. Elevated platform, an open battery.
- L. Flank platforms.
- M. Embrasures.
- N. Banquette.
- Q. Guard House.
- R. Small powder magazine.
- S. Soldiers' Barracks.
- T. Officers' Quarters.
- U. New Barracks.
- X. Storehouse.

2. Profile section through a curtain.—

3. Profile section through a ^{bastion} curtain.—

- a. Palisade of pickets.
- b. Glacis.
- c. Fosse.
- d. Sodded surface.
- e. Palisade embedded in the earth.
- f. Subterranean casemate.
- g. Rampart.
- h. Hand-rail.
- i. Banquette.
- l. Parapet.
- m. Platform for open battery.

to render access difficult, had, however, been completed. The rampart, up to the level of the platform, had been covered with well-fraised¹⁶ sods, the fosse though still imperfect, had a good palisade¹⁷ beyond it, parallel to the counterscarp, and outside this palisade a glacis made of earth formed a parapet above the platform of a narrow covered way.¹⁸

If we consider the size of the fort and the nature of its defences, though the latter had been made only by leaps and bounds, we can estimate the resistance of which it was capable. Its artillery consisted of about 26 pieces, of which 6 were 12-pounders, 4, 8-pounders, 14, 6-pounders and 2, 3-pounders; the range of fire covered all points, but was concentrated on the prolongation of the heights; the garrison consisted of a hundred and thirty regulars. This little fortress, because of its very advantageous situation, was only open to one form of attack, and its capture would have put our neighbours to no little expense and forced them to make extensive preparations for a siege. This might have given us time to obtain help. The enemy had considered our capacity for resistance before they decided to attack us. They were well-informed and even had in their possession an accurate plan of the fort and its neighborhood; beside their knowledge of its fortifications, they were quite aware of the nature of its construction. The method of attack, selected by a Council of War in Halifax, was based on this plan; they expected to use 32 cannon of 18 and 24-pounders, without counting the field guns, 22 mortars¹⁹ from 6 to 14 in. in diameter, and everything required for a regular siege.

The purpose of this fort was to check the English, who were advancing steadily and encroaching more and more on Canadian territory.

FORT GASPEREAU

This fort, on the shore of Baie Verte, $5\frac{1}{2}$ leagues from Beauséjour, was situated on level ground at the mouth of the river whose name it bears. It was square in shape, the outer sides measuring 114 feet each way, constructed of wood, and flanked by 4 towers of timber,²⁰ placed at the angles. At their base, their towers were pentagonal and, above the ground floor, was an upper storey in which some small cannon had been placed; this floor projected 2 feet beyond the lower storey, and was machicolated²¹ to defend the base.

The sides of the uprights and cross-bars were provided with crenelations. The curtains were of posts, behind which ran a platform to elevate the marksmen so that they might see to fire through the loopholes arranged between the posts. Outside of these was a berme, and beyond this a fosse had been dug, 15 feet wide at the top but reduced to five at the bottom by the natural slope of the ground. The earth taken from this was used for the berme and a counterscarp with a slope which extended that of the fosse; the earth thrown up for the counterscarp was disposed as a glacis. A palisade was to have been set up in the bottom of the fosse, with a drawbridge at the entrance, but the work was incomplete when the siege of Beauséjour began.




Fig. 1

1. External view of Fort.




Fig. 2

FORT GASPAREAU

Sketches by Franquet in 1751. Originals in Paris.
Copies in Public Archives, Ottawa.

2. Ground plan.

- A. Guard House for Storehouse.
- B. Storehouse for goods.
- C. Commandant's Quarters
- D. Powder Magazine
- E. Corner Blockhouses.
- F. Projected Barracks for soldiers.
- G. Projected Guard House near entrance.
- H. Palisaded curtain joining Blockhouses.
- I. Baye Verte.
- J. Gaspereau river.

The artillery consisted of 4 pieces of 4-, and 8-ounce balls; its garrison was twenty to twenty-five men.

This fort served as a depot for provisions and merchandise which came by sea from Canada and Louisbourg, to supply the various posts established along this frontier. It contained a storehouse to receive the cargoes of vessels, a small powder-magazine, a bake-house and quarters for the Commandant and the other officers of the garrison. The soldiers were lodged in the towers. A new magazine for munitions had been begun.

THE FORT OF BUOT BRIDGE

This fort was a league from Beauséjour on the bank of the Missaguash river which separated our establishments from those of the English. It appeared scarcely worthy of the name, for its shapeless form, without flanking structures, was made of insecure posts, and it did not even accommodate the guard of ten to fifteen soldiers, nor the officer in command, who lodged outside. Yet the purpose of this fort was to prevent the English from crossing the river, and to protect communication by water between Beauséjour and Baie Verte. Supplies were brought from a storehouse called the Portage depot near the head of the river, about $2\frac{1}{2}$ leagues from Baie Verte, where they were packed in canoes and transported to another storehouse at Buot Bridge, not far from the fort, and subsequently transferred to Beauséjour in carts. This fort was razed the day before the English crossed the river.




Fig. 1




Fig. 2




Fig. 3

PONT A BUOT

Sketches by Franquet in 1751

Originals in Paris. Copies in Public Archives, Ottawa.

- | | | | |
|----|-------------------------------------|----|--|
| 1. | Redoubt and environs. | 2. | Redoubt showing structure of wall. |
| A. | Commandant's Quarters. | C. | Entrance. |
| B. | Soldiers' Quarters. | | |
| C. | Redoubt. | | |
| D. | Bridge. | 3. | Profile section through wall of redoubt AB |
| E. | River Ste. Marguerite (Missaguash). | P. | Double row of pickets. |
| F. | Ruisseau à l'Ours. | E. | Earth bank behind pickets. |

PART II.

THE ATTACK ON BEAUSEJOUR

For a long time our neighbours had been considering the seizure of Fort Beauséjour and the other posts dependent on it, claiming that we occupied the centre of their province of Nova Scotia. When the necessary preparations had been made to carry out this project they issued a warning to the Acadian people of Minas, Port Royal and the neighbourhood, forbidding them to go outside their districts, and even cut them off from all communication with Fort Beauséjour.

They also warned those who had taken refuge and established themselves within our boundaries, that, when they came to drive us from a region which they claimed as their own, they would be treated like traitors, as though they were English subjects, if they took up arms and joined us in opposing their design.


Notwithstanding all the announcements and warnings we received, we were not uneasy, for we knew that a good understanding and unity existed between the two Crowns; both sides had received orders during the preceding years to remain quiet until the boundaries of that part of Acadia, about which the Government was concerned, could be determined by negotiations.

March—The diligence with which the English laboured to fortify Halifax during the bitterest time of winter, having in mind, no doubt, a rupture with us in the near future had not, as yet, aroused our suspicions; nor did the arrival of two of their regiments from Virginia; we thought the troops were intended merely to reinforce the settlers, and to enable them to recover the post on the Ohio River²² from which we had driven them; we believed the increase in our military strength in Europe was due solely to the additions made by the English to their armaments, and that all these warlike preparations would be nullified by the negotiations.

April—It was known, however, that their coast-guards had captured and taken to Chebucto²³ a French ship, which had been loaded with munitions and food-supplies at Louisbourg for the King's post²⁴ on the St. John river. We also learned about this time, that great preparations for war were being made throughout New England, and that all merchant ships had been held in their respective ports; even those which habitually brought provisions to their fort in this neighborhood, early in April, were being detained until June 1st. The confidence that peace would continue was so deeply impressed on the minds of those who lived in the district, that none of these reasons sufficed to awaken the slightest alarm, and we continued to enjoy a sense of security as perfect as though we were residing in the centre of Paris.

On June 2nd we realized our mistake. At 5 o'clock in the morning a settler who lived at Cape Maringouin, in the Bay of Fundy, about 2 leagues

from Point Beauséjour, came to warn M. de Vergor du Chambon, Commandant of the Fort, that an English fleet²⁵ of about forty vessels, laden with men, had sailed into the cove on the inner side of the Cape, and was there awaiting the turn of the tide to enter Beaubassin. The Commandant, who could no longer doubt the intentions of the English, dispatched couriers to Quebec, the St. John River, Louisbourg and the Island of St. John²⁶ to solicit aid. The inhabitants from rivers dependent on this post, and from the surrounding



FORT BEAUSEJOUR IN 1755

A view from the Fort Lawrence side.

A portion of the Missaguash is in the foreground.

This view is an inset in a map made by Winckworth Tonge, engineer at Fort Lawrence

Original in London. Copy in author's Collection.

country, were summoned to the Fort, raising to about six hundred the number of men under orders to take up arms and fire on the English whenever they should attempt to set foot in the King's domain, or to make an attack on our fort.

At 5.30 in the afternoon, the enemy's fleet composed of 37 sail made its appearance; three frigates, a snow, and two other vessels, equipped for fighting, which served as an escort, anchored at the entrance to Beaubassin; the transports were run aground²⁷ close to Fort Lawrence,²⁸ the English post,

1450 fathoms from our own. The troops landed at about 6.30 in the evening and the great majority of them passed the night under arms.

A small detachment was sent out scouting.

In default of an engineer, I was placed in charge of the works; I told the Commandant how essential it was, for the preservation of the fort, that the defences, which were in abeyance, should be completed with all possible diligence, especially those on the front which was most exposed to attack. It was there that we must be prepared to make the most determined resistance. For this purpose it was necessary to carry out the plan I had made for the construction of an entrenchment outside that front facing the high ground above the ridge on which the Fort is situated, from which the enemy's artillery might be trained on us with the greatest advantage and effect. This entrenchment should be constructed with due regard to the configuration of the ground, for an easy and efficient defence; it should be of a size suitable for the number of men on whom we might count, and large enough to allow free circulation. It would afford the further advantage of presenting to the enemy a front as wide as that included in their attack; cannon placed there could cause such constant annoyance to the workers in the sap-head^m that their advance would be but slow, and the enemy would lose much time and many men. Ditches with palisades behind them, and other defence works would provide a combination of obstacles to be overcome before the main body of the fort could be attacked, and if, in the end, we were obliged to abandon this entrenchment and retire into the fort, it would be only after the English had paid dearly for their stubbornness. This undertaking was all the more necessary, because the fort is too small to permit manoeuvres, or even to contain the men on whom we must depend for its defence. Because of its present limitations, we shall be much incommoded by bombs, for our defences will be demolished in short order and with great ease by the enemy's artillery, and there is no corner in the place which is not equally exposed to destruction by bombs. To overcome this defect, the projected works outside the fort are indispensable for they would afford protection to the main structure on the side open to attack; they would cause delay, and make a prolonged resistance possible.

This post, when it was established, was no doubt designed solely as a refuge from a sudden attack, and a lodging for a small garrison. But our neighbors, whose fort is only 1450 fathoms from our own, had taken greater precautions for its safety and had in it a garrison of good troops three times the size of ours; they might, therefore, have made an attack on us at any moment; our fort, which had a palisade as its only rampart might have been taken with a few field pieces before we could summon the settlers to repel their assault and oblige them to undertake a siege.

To make certain that we should have time to receive warning and secure help, everything possible was done to strengthen the walls, especially the sections which were most exposed to attack, and whatever else might increase the difficulty of approach, although it had been necessary to conform to the existing plan. It is not the ramparts however, which, as a rule, defend a fort,

but men; if the inhabitants show good will and courage, the aggressors may encounter obstacles which will disarrange their plan and force them to abandon it. I was quite sure that there would be no hesitation about the point of attack, for there was but one side of the fort which could be approached on the level, the others being accessible only from below upwards.³⁰ I assured the Commandant that our artillery was in good condition; the greater part of it was trained along the heights upon which the enemy would certainly establish their works; I undertook to retard their advance sufficiently to enable us to perfect our own defences and to secure aid; he must, however, provide the means to work quickly, for if the assistance for which we hoped failed us, we could only save ourselves by our own courage and our own efforts; there was no time to be lost in making preparations and work should begin that very day.

The most urgent measure was to collect all the tools which could be found in the houses of the settlers, who should be required to supply carts and men to fether fascines³¹ and other materials needed for to obtain quick results; this must be done before the enemy secured control of the surrounding country; the officers of the garrison should co-operate with me in making the soldiers and settlers work, encouraging them, and insisting that they make good use of their time, for every moment was precious. It would then be necessary to destroy the houses and the sheds near the fort which might facilitate the enemy's approach, and the buildings inside the fort, as well, in order to give greater freedom in moving the artillery, and to prevent a conflagration which the enemy might create, and which would be difficult to extinguish because the buildings are of wood, and, the ground high and exposed to strong winds.

The Commandant appeared to think, that, considering the time and the situation, these measures for defence were expedient; he said that he would take steps and give orders that these works were to be constructed as expeditiously as possible, and advantage taken of every means to frustrate the enemy's enterprise, or, at least, to prolong the siege.

On the 3rd, as soon as it was day, the English encamped on an elevation which dominated their fort. The Commandant of Fort Lawrence wrote to the Commandant of Beauséjour, asking him to instruct the settlers to keep their cattle from crossing to his side of the river in future, because they were ruining the fields and fences. There was no reply. A few English crossed to our side on the pretext of recovering their cattle; they were stopped by M. de Langy,³² officer of the troops of Cape Breton, who was in charge of an observation-post³³ on our side; they had come, presumably, merely to examine the ground over which their troops were to pass.

As many men as possible were engaged in our preparations, and on the fortifications, especially those on the face of the fort open to attack on the level, in laying out new projects, and in making bake-ovens in the fosse. M. de Baralon, a cadet, acting as an officer, who commanded a detachment of seven or eight soldiers in a sorry little redoubt³⁴ of insecure and ill-spaced pickets, a league from Beauséjour, near Buot Bridge which crosses the river

which we regard as the boundary between our territory and that of the English, received orders from the Commandant to raze the redoubt and destroy the bridge over which it would be most convenient for the enemy's field forces to pass on their way to Beauséjour; with the aid of the settlers who lived in the neighborhood of his post, and who might number a hundred men, he was to oppose the English advance as much as possible. I went there to take suitable measures to prevent the passage of this river; I laid out a trench along its bank, of which a portion was already in existence, and, by taking advantage of the dykes built on the edge to protect the meadows from inundation, it would only have been necessary to make a few redans at intervals to flank this line. This called for little time or labor, but the settlers refused to work, nor would they, in spite of everything I could do or say, take up this advantageous position to withstand the enemy, who, in approaching the river, would have no cover whatsoever. Nothing would induce them to set to work; they were more intent on assuring their own retreat, than on the resistance which the work in question would have enabled them to make. They gave as their reason that, when the enemy had crossed the river and driven them from the trench, they would be too much exposed during their retreat to the wood, because there was no intervening cover, and other excuses characteristic of a people who are little adapted to warfare and who were already intimidated by the mere sight of the enemy's fleet.

They proposed to station themselves at the edge of this wood and had already begun wretched defence-works at a distance from the river which was twice the range of a musket shot. It is easy therefore to judge how little opposition the enemy encountered from such defenders, while crossing it.

M. de Baralon who commanded this post, was constrained to accept the insubordination of the settlers; he did everything in his power to make the best of the situation; from his redoubt he brought four small eight-oz. cannons mounted on pivots, known as swivel-guns, and placed them behind the worthless barricades which the settlers had made of piles of wood, stumps and bushes.

During the night, fifty Micmac Indians who had killed a few of the enemy's horses and brought away five or six with them, joined these settlers to await the arrival of the English.

I was obliged to return, having made no impression on the minds of these people. I saw places at the edge of the road through the woods from Buot Bridge to Beauséjour, along which the enemy would have to defile after crossing the river, which would have been suitable for ambuscades; the van and the rear of their columns might have been attacked before they could unite, and the enemy on the march incommoded in a thousand ways without the risk of being surrounded, or of losing many men. I described the unfavorable dispositions at Buot Bridge to the Commandant and my observations on the way back.

About 4 in the afternoon, the English left their camp in battle order; they carried out various manoeuvres, discharged a few rounds of musketry,

and returned to the fort about six o'clock. At nightfall several detachments were sent out.

On the morning of the 4th, the settlers from the rivers arrived at Fort Beauséjour; at 6 or 7 o'clock the English army set out, marching with several field pieces, towards Buot Bridge, where such a poor resistance was awaiting them. I entreated the Commandant to send me to this post with a few well-disposed men, who were eager to follow me, so that I might make more favourable arrangements and, by adapting my manoeuvres to those of the enemy, obstruct their passage of the river, and find other means to embarrass them; he did not consider this expedient. I foresaw how little opposition the enemy would encounter at the river, and realized that this would enable them at the outset, to gauge our weakness, lack of ability, and even the deficiency of courage in the settlers, and was not deterred; I contrived to have an appeal made to the Commandant by his second cousin, an officer in whom he had the greatest confidence, and Abbé Le Loutre,³⁵ missionary to the Acadian Indians; but they were no more successful than I.

M. de Langy, in command of a small observation-post of ten or twelve soldiers at Butte à Roger, had orders to join the detachment at Buot Bridge. M. de Bailleul and M. Rouilly, ensigns of Canadian companies, M. de Villeray,³⁶ ensign of a Louisbourg company, and M. de Montarville, cadet, with a hundred and fifty soldiers, also proceeded to this post, increasing its strength to more than three hundred men, including the Indians. They arrived before the enemy had reached the bank of the river, for their advance across the extensive marsh, intersected by an infinite number of small brooks and a network of trails, was very slow.

M. Duplessis-Fabert de Saint-Laurent was also dispatched with fifty or sixty men to join the others, but when they had covered a quarter of the distance they became aware that the enemy had crossed the river.

The English columns extended more than 2800 yards from van to rear; a few detachments of light troops marched in front and on the flanks. It was estimated that they numbered more than three thousand men.³⁷ They arrived at the river in this order extending a great distance along its bank, and there drew up in battle formation, and made ready their artillery, which consisted of four six-pound field pieces. As they prepared to throw a bridge across the river, our swivel-guns and musketry opened fire upon them from the entrenchment without, however, much effect. The enemy paused, and responded with cannon and musketry. Their artillery fire was directed especially at the emplacements of the four swivel-guns which were ineffective, and moreover, badly served; they were soon put out of commission. The Indians immediately abandoned the entrenchment and took up a position on a height beyond range of the cannon; nor, with two or three exceptions, did the settlers linger long before retreating into the woods; only a few soldiers remained in the entrenchment with the officers. M. de Baralon saved the swivel-guns, which were taken into the woods on a cart and sunk in a bog;

he ordered the guard-house, storehouse and the buildings in the neighbourhood to be set on fire. The officers were obliged to withdraw.

It was 10.30 before the English army advanced, but only after this post had been abandoned. During the engagement a soldier was killed by a cannon-ball, one settler sustained an injury to his leg, and another was wounded by a musket shot. The enemy is said to have lost eighty men, but it is difficult to believe that shots fired at random and beyond range could have taken so much effect. The enemy halted at the opening of the road through the woods to rest their troops, and set out on the march again toward noon; they camped 2000 or 2400 yards from Beauséjour, on the edge of the road below Butte à Mirande.³⁸

Orders were given to bring to the fort all the provisions which were in the storehouses and dwellings in the neighborhood, and to set fire to the buildings. Some cattle were also brought inside the palisades. Only a few men were engaged on the works, and a very small quantity of fascines and other material was collected, because the settlers were making use of their carts to save their portable property.

At nightfall, M. de Boucherville, cadet,³⁹ acting as an officer set out to reconnoitre the enemy's position with a detachment of sixty settlers; they abandoned him and went back to their homes at the village of le Lac, and he was obliged to return to the fort. Another detachment was sent out. The garrison and the officers were assigned to their stations and settlers were detailed to serve the artillery.

On the 5th, the settlers of Buot bridge and those who had been at the barricades and had remained in the woods since the action, joined forces and came to the fort. They reported that to establish their communication with Fort Lawrence, the enemy were constructing a bridge across the river opposite their camp. These men asked the Commandant's permission to fight in their own way, saying that the people of their village at Buot Bridge, and those of le Lac,⁴⁰ would harry the enemy unceasingly. The settlers from Baie Verte returned to their homes, and only half of the six hundred men who should have been there, were in the fort.

I could not obtain the men necessary to expedite the defences; only a very few settlers, honest folk who did their duty with much zeal, and a detachment of thirty soldiers in the artillery service, laboured without interruption; the remainder of the garrison, more than a hundred men, merely provided a few sentries. I again appealed to the Commandant about this matter; I wanted authority to force the settlers and soldiers to work; I needed men to collect palisades, and brushwood, to take the place of the fascines, which could no longer be obtained, because the enemy had spread over the countryside. A new count was therefore made of the settlers; they numbered only two hundred and twenty men. These were assigned to different sections of the works, with officers to keep them at their stations. M. de Boucherville was sent with eight settlers to bring back those who had gone to their houses at le Lac and the neighbourhood.

A detachment of the enemy were seen from the forts; they had crossed the river to round up the cattle of the settlers, which were in the meadows on our side. A few shots from our cannon were fired at these men, who retired hastily, without taking any of the cattle. M. de Boucherville returned with only two men; he reported to the Commandant, that the settlers for whom he had been sent had refused to come; they had laid down their arms and thrown away their ammunition, saying they were not disposed to run the risk of being hanged, as the English had said they would be, if they took part in the fighting. About twenty of the Indians who had been so faithless to their duty at Buot bridge, encamped near the fort. The defences did not advance as rapidly as had been hoped. In the evening a detachment was sent out which separated into several small parties.

June 6.—The arrangements made the day before to keep the soldiers and settlers at work had already ceased to function. It was impossible to get these people to exert themselves and, with the exception of a few good fellows who worked constantly on the defences, they vanished like smoke. I complained to the Commandant and three-quarters of another day was wasted in efforts to induce them to work. The English transports began to come up the river and to discharge at the bridge which had been built. A few rounds of cannon were fired at them without effect; these vessels then passed out of range. Messrs. de Baralon and De Boucherville, and a party of settlers, who were stationed on the bank, opened fire under cover of some dykes. The vessels replied with cannon, and a large detachment of the enemy deployed along the other side of the river to keep our people from interfering with their navigation and debarkation. Our men were forced to retire.

All the buildings in the fort, with the exception of the guard-house and the officers' quarters were demolished. In the evening sixteen unarmed settlers arrived from the Island of St. John, accompanied by M. Pomeroy,⁴¹ an officer of the garrison of that Island; they had been sent by M. de Villejoui⁴² who was in command there.

The Abbé Le Loutre, missionary to the Acadians and Indians, did his utmost to arouse them. He urged the settlers to work, and the savages to harry the enemy; they must make an effort to take prisoners. A settler, named Beausoleil,⁴³ reputed to be one of the bravest and most enterprising of the Acadians, promised this missionary to do everything he could to capture a few prisoners; he would reconnoitre some of the wood trails where he might more readily take them by surprise.

June 7.—It was after 7 in the morning before the men came to work, and very few of them did a hand's turn. The measures I had taken to insure diligence continued to be unavailing, as were my arguments. The scouting parties, which were being constantly sent out, employed uselessly many Acadians, who, in order to be excused from work, asked nothing better than to range about the fort and the neighboring countryside. M. de Boucherville with a small detachment of settlers returned to the fort; he reported that the English were constructing a battery of cannon on the shore close to the bridge

which they had made for communication and to facilitate their disembarkation, and that their transports were bringing up munitions and artillery. This battery, situated at a place where the river formed a re-entrant angle, would enable them to enfilade a considerable extent of the opposite bank, along which our detachments had approached, under cover of the dykes, to fire on the sailors in the vessels as they passed.

At 11 o'clock, an English deserter, a sailor from one of the transports, arrived at the fort. He said that he was of Irish nationality, but, as no information could be obtained from him, and his answers to the questions put to him were inaccurate, he was suspected of being a spy. There was, however, more reason to believe that he was feeble-minded; he was imprisoned, with iron shackles on his hands and feet. Beausoleil, who had pledged himself the night before to take a prisoner, set out at dusk with a few other settlers to join a small band of Indians.

June 8.—At dawn, Beausoleil returned alone to announce the capture of an English officer," who was being brought in by his party; they did not wish to lose him, and were therefore making a wide detour through the woods to avoid meeting detachments of the enemy.

Between 6 and 7 o'clock, the enemy defiled in order to reach a knoll on the upward slope of the same ridge on which the fort is situated, and about 1000 yards distant. A large detachment could find shelter there from our artillery, and they had realized that no more suitable base for their operations could have been found.

The settlers and the Indians, who were scattered about the neighborhood, fired at the English from behind the chimneys of the houses between the fort and the knoll, which had been burned. I discharged a few rounds of cannon in order that the party bringing in the prisoner might be warned and take greater precautions; for the enemy were near the fort and might cut them off, or, they themselves might advance to meet them, believing them to be our own people. The English made a feint of retiring. Soon after, our little party, with the prisoner, was sighted, coming across the marshes under protection of the fort. It was surprising that the enemy made no effort to cut it off; they could have done so, if they had wished to sacrifice a few men to our cannon, for no measures had been taken to insure the arrival of the prisoner. This was a grave error on their part, which offset our own; for we should have prepared an ambuscade among the bushes on the edge of the marsh, a place very well adapted to cover the approach of the detachment, which ran the risk of being cut off. The enemy, apparently, believed that we had taken this precaution; otherwise, I think they would not have lost so good an opportunity to rescue their officer. The prisoner arrived about 10 o'clock, and was received with much consideration and politeness; he was left free on parole within the fort. He obtained permission from our Commandant, to write to his own. M. de Vergor also wrote to assure the latter that he would procure for this officer, who had fallen into his hands, all the comforts possible.

M. de Baralon was dispatched with these letters at 2 in the afternoon. An advance-guard of the enemy led him into their camp, after having bandaged his eyes. He was escorted through a large crowd of people into the presence of the Commander. While awaiting the replies, he walked about the Camp with some English officers; they also took him to see the park of artillery; he noted several that appeared to be 18- to 24-pounders, and a few mortars, which were being unloaded from the vessels.

Our prisoner said that he had been captured on the way from his camp to Fort Lawrence to see his wife; he assured us that we had to deal with a strong force which would employ a large quantity of artillery in the siege; this included more than 32 cannon of 18- to 24-pounders, and 22 mortars of different calibres, of which some had a diameter of 14 inches.

June 9.—A day even less eventful than those which preceded it. It rained, and less work was done. All our workmen withdrew because of the bad weather; the enemy, however, continued to discharge from their vessels cannon, bombs, trains of artillery and everything which might be needed in their undertaking.

June 10.—At daybreak a detachment of a hundred and eighty men set out under the command of M. de Vannes; they laid in ambush on the small knoll where the enemy had been seen on the preceding evening, but the latter did not return that day; the party came back between 7 and 8 o'clock without having had an opportunity to fire a single shot. The detachment rested, and very few men were engaged on the fortifications. Summons were sent to settlers, who were in their homes at le Lac and other places, to come to the fort. The courier who had been dispatched to the St. John river, brought the answer to a letter he had taken to Father Germain⁴⁵ asking for Indians from his district. The missionary replied, that he was not sending them, because he believed that the fort would be captured by the English before help could get there. This reply caused great surprise; we persisted in our request for help and the courier was sent back immediately. The settlers of le Lac, and its neighborhood, came to the fort.

June 11.—Summons to Beauséjour were also sent to the people of Baie Verte, who had returned to their village to conceal their movable property in the woods. The number of labourers has diminished each day. I redoubled my appeals, but they were regarded merely as importunities. I despaired, thereafter, of achieving the external defence works I had projected. The need for their immediate execution was obvious. Of what avail was it to summon the settlers if they were not usefully employed for the preservation of the fort? However disinclined to work, they would have done better if more coercion had been used. It was apparent, moreover, that these people were not adapted to harry the enemy, and the repeated sorties they made were a great waste of time. The only defences which had been completed were the platform, and blindages⁴⁶ to protect a curtain which was exposed to attack; the salient angles of the bastions, and other works, were raised to provide cover from enfilading fire from the height opposite. Part of this was faced with

large casks laid horizontally one upon the other and fastened together securely with pins, forming coffers which were filled with wood, well-beaten earth and other material suitable to withstand cannon-balls. The gunners were employed in making merlons⁴⁷ for the barbette⁴⁸ batteries, using rolls of blanketing and other material instead of gabions.⁴⁹

June 12.—It was somewhat surprising that the enemy allowed us any time for preparation, and that they had not yet taken up their positions for attack; there was nothing to prevent their doing so. It was believed therefore, that it was their intention to capture Fort Gaspereau before attacking Beauséjour, in order that all relief in the form of munitions and men which might come to us by Baie Verte, might be intercepted, certain that if any came by the Bay of Fundy, it could not escape their warships. If re-enforcements arrived at Fort Gaspereau, and could not reach Beauséjour because the enemy were masters of the country, they might render the capture of that fort more troublesome than that of Beauséjour. The approach is difficult for even the lightest artillery; and if the bridge and the causeway⁵⁰ between the fort and the head of Baie Verte, were destroyed, the enemy would have been obliged to reconstruct both in order to reach it, because the intervening ground is marshy and intersected by an infinite number of small brooks, and entirely impracticable even to men on foot. Having overcome this difficulty, it would have been necessary furthermore, for them to traverse the wood surrounding the fort, which is well-adapted to ambushades.

At 4 in the afternoon, however, the enemy were seen marching towards the place they had selected as best fitted for their base of operations. A sortie was made of more than two hundred and twenty men, soldiers, Acadians and Indians; it is not possible to give the exact number, because it took place without any supervision beyond the mustering of those who wished for an opportunity to shoot the English under cover of stumps and bushes; but the enemy, who awaited them in better order than was shown by the attacking force, had already taken possession of these same bushes and, if a few shots, fired too soon for their advantage, had not revealed the location of their ambushade, our people would have become so involved that they would have been cut off and surrounded; with no way open in any direction, few could have escaped. The Micmacs, who took part in this skirmish, gave fresh proof of their cowardice; they did not fire a single shot unless they were three times out of range. Seeing that nothing was to be gained but hard knocks, the party retreated to the fort. M. de Bailleul was wounded during the advance toward the bushes. A few rounds of cannon were fired at the English. The enthusiasm for frequent sorties, which had invariably manifested itself before our adversaries had become such near neighbors, began to diminish as the need for it increased; the customary sallies no longer took place at dusk.

On the night of the 12th-13th we threw fireballs at the places where it was surmised the enemy might be engaged on defence works; all appeared quiet where they had established their position.

June 13th.—At daybreak the enemy were seen at work on their first parallel, 450 fathoms from our palisades. On the right, it appeared to begin at the knoll on the slope of the height; the other extremity, among the bushes, was quickly abandoned when our cannon were trained on it. A battery of mortars had been set up in a hollow among these same bushes, to the left of their trench, and, at 6 or 7 o'clock in the morning, they began to throw seven or eight- in. bombs. This further increased the difficulty of completing the defences, even those of the fort itself, for the men abandoned their labor to escape the bombs, and crowded into the casemates, and could not be prevailed upon to come out. There were, however, twenty or twenty-five in number, who continued to work without interruption. The entrance to the fort, facing the point of attack, was blocked and the curtain on that side reinforced. This was accomplished quickly because M. de Langy, an extraordinarily brave officer, was kind enough to share with me the supervision of this work. About 10 o'clock, twenty Abenakisst Indians arrived; they sang a war song, and promised to take prisoners. Only one man had been killed by a bomb. The settlers, who had been detailed to serve the artillery, no longer wished for such employment. A few more Micmacs are said to have reached Baie Verte, but they did not come to the fort, nor did they make any attack on the enemy. On the night of the 13th-14th, a detachment of settlers made a sortie, which was no more successful than usual. However, it kept the enemy on the alert, and they ceased firing. At nightfall, bombs and fire-balls were thrown along the line of the enemy's trench.

June 14th.—We had no occasion to fire our cannon. The English increased the number of their mortars; they had possibly five or six different calibres in their battery; at dawn they began firing 6-, 7-, 8- and 12-inch bombs without any effect. Two soldiers, however, were wounded, although slightly. Our artillery continued to check the advance of the enemy's defence works. There is reason to believe that, had measures been taken to execute all the works projected for our defence, and good use had been made of the time at our disposal, it would have sufficed not only to complete them, but for help to have reached us from every direction; this would have revived the courage of the settlers. The enemy's enterprise would have been frustrated, even if they had not lost a large portion of their field forces, and we might, perhaps, have captured their fort which is near by.

I reported to the Commandant that the casemate occupied by the English officer and several other persons, whom we did not wish to have exposed to danger, might be demolished by the new bombs which the enemy were firing, and that it would be well to change this officer's quarters so that no accident should befall him. This the Commandant was willing to do, but the English officer asked permission to stay where he was, saying that he should not be so safe in his own camp. He was allowed to remain there. Moreover, almost every one believed this casemate to be the one most capable of resisting the impact of the bombs, because it had a terrace 10 or 12 feet thick above it, while the others had much less; the latter were however, more

substantial because heavier timbers had been used in their construction and they had been built with greater care.

14 to 15 June.—At nightfall the enemy ceased firing. We threw fire-balls and bombs into their works. At 10 o'clock the Commandant received a letter from the Governor⁸² of Louisbourg, in reply to one he had written asking for assistance. The Governor informed him that he could not send any. The settlers, who had been beguiled by assurances of help, believed we could do nothing without it. To cap our misfortunes, the bad news became known to them almost at once, and the majority resolved to abandon us; we noted that eighty had disappeared.

June 15th.—The enemy, driven from their trench by our artillery began to bomb us; our fire was then directed on their defence-works and the place where their battery, which was concealed by bushes, seemed to be. The interruption of their fire led us to believe that we had done some damage. Our own had, in any case, delayed their operations to such an extent that their first trench, which was only three hundred yards long, was still unfinished. They had attempted, during the night, to open a way to its centre by advancing two zigzag lines, but these had been merely outlined. Our defences also progressed, but in an intolerably slow and laggardly manner. Every measure which might have prolonged the siege was regarded as something which would increase the loss of life; no one gave any thought to the good results they might produce. The opposition and the insurmountable obstacles, encountered by those who wished to multiply the enemy's difficulties, and contest the ground with them foot by foot, may therefore be imagined.

The repeated sorties had, as yet, resulted in the capture of one prisoner only; this did not compensate for the detriment to our defence-works caused by the continual absence of so many men. With minds so ill-disposed, it was easy to foresee the fate of the fort. Its preservation now depended on prompt aid from Canada; a frail hope, which, being subject to the wind and other uncertain elements, would be long delayed, nor could it, indeed, be depended upon at all.

A soldier deserted; this caused no surprise because he had been released from prison after a long confinement for rape and other misdemeanours. The Acadians no longer thought of anything, except the precautions to be taken for their own preservation from bombs; they crowded into the casemates, although only one of them had been killed in the course of the day. This had caused a tumult among them. Their most trusted leaders, acting as spokesmen for all the others, declared that, since there was no hope of help, and no means of resisting so much force, they were unwilling to sacrifice themselves in vain; that, inasmuch as they could not save the fort, they preferred to abandon us. It is rumoured that something even worse was said, which occasioned a court martial; at this, it was decided to issue an order forbidding them to make such statements, or to leave the fort, under penalty of being shot, and, moreover, having their lands and property confiscated. Although the majority of these people have shown little courage, I am convinced

that they have received evil counsel from those who would be little disturbed by the loss of this fort.

Our continuous fire on the head of the enemy's sap, incommoded them so much, that they were unable to proceed. From this it is easy to estimate, if our defence works had been prosecuted with vigour, what would have been the loss of time and the sacrifice of men involved in an effort to establish a single battery of cannon which was capable of causing us inconvenience.

June 15. 16th.—During the night several discharges of musketry were heard. We had no doubt that it was the Abenakis Indians, with a few Acadians, making an attack on the outposts of the English camps; this kept the enemy on the alert all night and prevented them from carrying on their work.

June 16th.—At daybreak, the enemy went to work on their trenches but they did not stay in them long; our cannon soon drove them out. Toward 9 o'clock, they began to bomb us; one went through the roof of the casemate occupied by the English prisoner. He, an officer of the garrison, and two other men were killed.⁸³ Others were slightly wounded. This disaster increased the disorder which reigned in the fort. The settlers went in a body to the Commandant, to demand that he should capitulate, saying that, if there were any opposition to the decision they had reached in this matter, they would no longer respect the garrison, whose threats they did not fear in the least, and would turn their arms against the officers and the soldiers, and deliver the fort to the English. I was with the battery, and did not witness this scene. The Commandant assembled the officers, to consider what suitable course could be followed under the circumstances; he asked me whether the casemate, in which the powder was kept, was safe from the large bombs. I said, "yes," although the impact of these bombs exceeded in violence that of our ordinary 12-in. bombs, which the casemate had been made to resist. The largest bomb which the English could throw would not break through if it should fall on top, but, unless the damage was repaired, I would not answer for it, if others fell on the same place.

It is probable that, having witnessed the destruction of the casemate which they supposed to be most capable of withstanding bombs, all were convinced that the one which contained the powder was much less secure, and attributed my denial to obstinacy, believing that, in reality, I thought as they did. It is true that, had this been the case, I should not have spoken otherwise. So possessed were they by the idea that the powder was not safe, that, in the minds of the great majority, it seemed to be the most urgent reason for entering into negotiations with the English. No part of the fort, however, was considered safe from bombs; the bomb which had destroyed the casemate had thrown down a curtain alongside it; the garrison was too weak to overcome the threats of the settlers; the fort, furthermore, was not capable of the least resistance; there was no hope of help, and, still less, of holding the post. The garrison, at least, should be saved, and an endeavour made to obtain honourable terms for them, which could not be expected if the request were deferred, for the enemy, aware of our situation, would make only very unfavourable terms.

We should in any case succumb, and there was too much at stake for an obstinate determination to prolong the defence. This fort, in any case, had been established only to protect the settlers and, although they had behaved badly, the Commandant felt it was his duty to sacrifice a little of his glory to their happiness and tranquility; he would be answerable to the Government, etc.

The Commandant gave M. de Vannes a letter for the Commander of the English army, in which he asked for a suspension of all hostile acts for 48 hours so that a decision might be reached. Orders were, in consequence, sent to the detachments outside to remain inactive. The English Commander^m replied, that if we were inclined to capitulate he would grant honourable terms, provided no time was lost in submitting terms and exchanging hostages; for this purpose he would give us until 2 o'clock in the afternoon. The Council of war decided on the following articles of Capitulation.

Article 1

The Commandant, officers and staff in the service of the King, and the Garrison of Beauséjour are to march out with arms, baggage, drums beating, fuses burning.

Article 2

Preceding the garrison, the Commandant shall have 6 cannon of the largest calibre, 1 mortar and 50 charges for each piece.

Article 3

His Britannic Majesty shall furnish supplies necessary for the transport of this force to Baie Verte, where the garrison will embark in a French vessel to go wheresoever they please.

Article 4

The garrison shall take with it 200 quarters of flour and 100 of bacon.

Article 5

The time necessary to go from this post to Baie Verte and from Baie Verte to their destination shall be accorded to the garrison.

Article 6

The Acadians shall not be molested for having taken arms, for they were forced to do so under pain of death, and no injury shall be done them.

Article 7

The Acadians shall be free to enjoy their own religion, to have priests, and no constraint shall be placed upon them.

Article 8

Such Acadians, as desire to do so, shall be permitted to withdraw to the territory of the King of France, and shall be allowed a year, counting from the day of this capitulation, in which to reach a decision.

Article 9

During this year the French shall be permitted to provide the Acadians with the means for their withdrawal.

Article 10

All the articles of Capitulation which may be expressed in an obscure manner shall be interpreted to the advantage of the French and executed in good faith.

These articles were sent to the English Commander, with a letter, in which he was informed that M. Bouilly would remain with him as an hostage in place of whomever might be sent on his behalf. M. de Vannes did not return to the fort until about six o'clock in the evening. He brought with him an English officer in exchange for the hostage. The English Commander sent the terms and conditions which his General's instructions permitted him to offer, and gave assurance that, if they were accepted, the garrison would be treated with most distinguished honours. A Council of War assembled and the letter and the following conditions were read.

Article 1

The Commandant, staff officers in the King's service, and the garrison of Beauséjour shall march out with their arms, baggage and drums beating.

Article 2

The garrison shall be sent directly to Louisbourg at the expense of the King of Great Britain.

Article 3

The garrison shall have sufficient provisions to last until their arrival at Louisbourg.

Article 4

The Acadians, inasmuch as they were forced to take up arms under pain of death, shall be pardoned for the part they have taken.

Article 5

The garrison shall not bear arms in America during a period of six months.

The above terms are accorded only on condition that the garrison shall surrender to the troops of Great Britain at seven o'clock in the evening. It was decided in the Council of War to write again to ask time for consideration. M. de Vannes was dispatched to the English army with a letter saying that it was not possible for our Commandant to settle anything in the half-hour which remained to him, and requesting that he be given till the following morning. M. de Vannes brought back this letter which he had not time to deliver to the English Commander. The officer in command of the entrenchment shewed him an order, and, at 7 o'clock, he again opened fire on the Fort. We were requested to return their hostage, and to take back our own.

The Council of War assembled, and, in view of the impossibility of

receiving help, the letter from M. Drucour, the weakness of the garrison, the insecurity of the casemates, especially the powder magazine, etc. almost all were in favour of accepting the Capitulation.

The Commandant, officers and garrison signed the Capitulation, June 16, 1755.

The English took possession of the Fort at 7.30 in the evening on the fourth day after they had opened their trench. Their troops passed the night under arms, and did not touch any of the merchandise or the King's property which, because all the buildings had been destroyed, were scattered about the fort; when, however, they saw that our own people were pillaging, the English officers could no longer restrain their men. They did, however, safeguard a portion of it. Our garrison marched out the following day to embark on the transport vessels for Louisbourg.

The English Commander wrote to the Commandant at Fort Gasperreau offering him and his garrison of twenty men the same conditions accorded to the Commandant at Beauséjour, which were accepted without any deliberation. Two of our largest cannon were split, one from its mouth to within six inches of the trunnions, the other from its mouth half-way down the bore. These pieces had frequently been discharged uselessly, in spite of my care to economise ammunition, for the gunners received orders to fire. The cannon were also much eaten by rust, which corrodes and causes the lining to scale, thereby diminishing the resistance of the metal. We were unable to find out the total loss of the English; it was only known that one of their engineers had his thigh cut by a cannon ball while he was laying out their lines, and that the men in the mortar battery had been seriously incommoded by ricochet balls from our cannon, because they had failed to protect themselves with a good epaulement; and there were no recesses, the mortars being merely sighted and covered with brush; two of these had been broken by our cannon.

List of wounded and killed:—

Killed

- 1 M. Raimbault, officer from l'Ile Royale, by the bomb.
- 1 Soldier killed in the trench by a cannon ball.
- 1 M. Fernand, interpreter, by the bomb.
- 1 M. Billy, clerk, formerly an officer, by the bomb.
- 3 Acadians, of whom 2 were killed by the bomb.
- 1 Frenchman, in a skirmish.
- 1 Abenaki Indian chief.
- 1 English officer.

Wounded

- 1 M. de Bailleul, by a musket shot.
- 2 Settlers.
- 2 Soliders, merely bruised from bursting bombs.
- 2 M. de Saint Laurent and M. de Montarville, slightly injured; the former when the casemate was demolished, and the latter suffering contusions from the explosion of a bomb.

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
This is, approximately, what took place during the siege of this unfortunate post. If I have omitted a few particulars it is because they are of little consequence. Several journals written after the capitulation, are not very accurate; the great majority of the details given are about fictitious incidents or events are described in an entirely different manner from that in which they occurred. Eye-witnesses, who were capable of reflection, have suspected the writers of disloyalty, because of the clause stating that the most urgent reason for the surrender of the Fort was the poor construction of the defences, which were not capable of withstanding any attack whatever. It seemed obvious, that if access had been as easy as it was represented, the English, who knew the weakness and strength of both the fortifications and the situation, and who had in Halifax an exact plan on which their method of attack was based, could have saved themselves much expense and trouble. On the other hand, it has been shown that the besiegers made very little progress after they had taken up their position, because the fire from the fort forced them to keep their distance; they did not gain an inch of ground in the direction of our palisade during four days of trench-making, nor were they able to establish a single battery of cannon. I do not mention the difficulties they might have encountered had we made good use of our time and men to augment them. There are many things in all that has been said and written about the attack and the defence of this fort which are very suspicious.

Some have thought it their duty to inform the public that, if this fort surrendered so soon, it was only because it was not possible to carry the defence farther. This kind of justification for the defenders of Beauséjour seems to me misplaced; even supposing they required to destroy a false impression, they could only do so by saying things that were probable, and not by trying to prove that we could not have held out for an instant in the fort. If we had had no more than a simple palisade for our defence, we should still be to blame for the time we lost in fortifying ourselves and in making our preparations for a vigorous resistance. On this occasion we lacked ability rather than courage. But courage alone is not sufficient for defensive action. It calls for intelligence, care, constant effort and toil, and more skill and intrepidity than offensive warfare. A man should always consider himself most unfortunate if, after having done everything possible to resist the enemy, he is forced to surrender. The only consolation for him who loves his profession is that he is constantly acquiring experience, and fitting himself to do better on other occasions. This is my hope.

APPENDIX

EXPLANATORY NOTES REFERRING TO THE TEXT

1. **Date of commencement of Fort.**—This date is an error, probably made in the transcription. While a small French force was established on Point Beauséjour in 1750, the first order to build a fort was issued on November 8, 1750, by the Marquis de la Jonquière, Governor-General of Canada. On April 12, 1751, another order was given to Lieutenant de Léry to construct a fort there and another at Gaspereau.
2. **Bastion.**—A work projecting outward from the main enclosure of a fortification, making an angle, usually acute, towards the field. It consists of two faces and two flanks and an opening towards the centre termed the gorge.
3. **Curtain.**—That part of the rampart between the flanks of two bastions.
4. **Fosse.**—The ditch or moat outside the rampart of a fortification.



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|------------------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Rampart. | 6. Covered way. |
| 1a. Rampart, superior slope. | 7. Terre-plein. |
| 1b. Rampart, exterior slope. | 8. Banquette. |
| 2. Fosse or moat. | 9. Berme. |
| 3. Glacis. | 10. Parapet. |
| 4. Scarp or escarp. | 11. Plane of site. |
| 5. Counterscarp. | |

5. **Berme (berm).**—A ledge at the top of the scarp outside the rampart.
6. The counterscarp is the wall outside a fosse; the scarp or escarp is the inner wall next the rampart.
7. **Glacis.**—The natural or artificial sloping ground from the top of the counterscarp or covered way.
8. **Revetment.**—A facing of stones, fascines, posts or other material to sustain an embankment.
9. **Parapet.**—An elevation of earth, earth and logs, or stone, to protect the soldiers from the fire of the enemy. In some cases, in addition to the parapet on the main wall, there was one outside the fosse, within the glacis.

10. **Banquette.**—A raised way or platform on the inside of the parapet on which soldiers and guns are stationed.
11. **Terre-plein.**—The top of an elevation behind the parapet for cannon. In large forts it was used as a way for soldiers around the inside of the rampart.
12. **Casemate.**—A bomb-proof chamber, built of timber and earth, as in Beauséjour, or of masonry or concrete.

13. **Louis du Pont Chambon, Sieur de Vergor**, was the eldest son of Louis Du Pont du Chambon and Jeanne Mius d'Entremont. He was born at Placentia, 1712. He entered the **regiment de la Marine**, and, in 1737, was a junior Ensign in l'Ile Royale. In 1750, he was made Captain and transferred to Canada, where he received the Cross of St. Louis.

In 1754 he was sent to Fort Beauséjour as Commandant, through the influence of Bigot, Intendant, whose creature he was. Their intimacy had begun at Louisbourg when Bigot was chief Commissary. De Vergor's family were very poor and they valued the assistance which Bigot could give to the young officer. So, when de Vergor went to Beauséjour, Bigot arranged that he should not only be in command, but should have charge of the supplies and finances. This brought him into intimate relationship with Bigot, and he profited accordingly. Indeed, prior to de Vergor's departure, Bigot had written to him, saying "Profit, my dear Vergor, by your opportunity; trim,—cut—you have the power—in order that you may very soon join me in France and purchase an estate near me."

At Beauséjour, he neglected to strengthen the defences, being too much occupied with his schemes for making money. However, it is certain that he was unfit for the command, being incapable in all respects. His secretary de Courville recorded that he lacked ability and education, and was excessively avaricious. It is not surprising that he made such a poor appearance when the fort was besieged by Monckton's force in June, 1755. His defence was weak and very short. When he surrendered on the 16th it was evident that his concern for his own safety and well-being was a paramount consideration. (It is interesting to note that his father Duchambon, was in command at Louisburg, when it was besieged by Pepperrell and Warren in 1745, and was forced to capitulate).

In 1757 de Vergor was tried by Court-martial at Quebec, but was acquitted. In 1759 he was again serving in the army. When Wolfe's attack threatened, de Vergor was in command of 100 men at a post overlooking the Anse au Foulon. When the British climbed the heights in the early morning of Sept. 13th, only about thirty men were in position, de Vergor having allowed the rest of his troops to go to their homes. The post was easily captured and the Plains were open to the enemy. De Vergor has been accused of a base betrayal of his country by his performance on this occasion, but this has not been definitely established. He remained at Quebec until 1761, and sailed to France in the latter part of the year. He retired from the army in 1764, receiving a pension. The date of his death is not known.

14. **Orillon.**—A projection at the shoulder of a bastion to cover the flanks.
15. **Redan.**—A work having two parapets forming a salient angle. The term **Ravelin** is probably better understood.
16. **Well-fraised.**—This means that the sods were held by pins driven through them. Fraise is a term used in fortifications to mean a row of pointed stakes in the outer side of the rampart, horizontally placed or pointing upwards and outwards.

17. **Palisade.**—A row of tall heavy stakes, pointed on top, standing close together in a row, embedded in the earth. Sometimes, there were two rows, one behind the other.
18. **Covered way (Covert way)**—A banquette running along the top of the counterscarp, protected by an embankment whose outer slope forms the glacis.
19. **Mortar.**—A short cannon, used to throw shells of large calibre with low velocities and at high angles so as to drop on the object from above.
20. **Towers of timbers**, i. e., block-houses (See illus.)
21. **Machicolation.**—An opening in the floor of a projection parapet or the floor between the corbels. Through it an enemy attacking below could be fired upon. In the block-houses of Fort Gaspereau the projecting floor of the upper story had these openings.
22. **Ohio river.**—In the spring of 1754 an advance party of Colonial troops, part of a force commanded by George Washington, started the building of a fort at the junction of the Alleghany and Monongahela rivers (forming the Ohio). On April 17, a great fleet of canoes carrying about 500 French came down the Alleghany from Canada, attacked the Americans and drove them away. The French then continued building the fort, and established themselves in it, naming it Fort Duquesne, in honour of the Governor of Canada. Modern Pittsburg is on the site.
23. **Chebucto.**—Now Halifax.
24. **French post.**—This was the fort built on the site of Charnisay's original fort on the west side of St. John harbour, where Boishébert was in command.
25. **English fleet.**—Monckton's expedition left Boston, where it had been organized, on May 22nd. Captain John Rouse being senior naval officer in command.

Naval Vessels Taking Part.

H.M.S.	Success	20 guns	Captain John Rouse
H.M.S.	Mermaid	20 guns	Captain Washington Shirley
H.M.S.	Sirene	20 guns	Captain Probe

Merchant Vessels

Rig.	Name	Tonnage	Master
Sloop	Prosperous	75	Joseph Bragdon
"	Molley	77	John Doggett
"	Elizabeth	97	Nathaniel Mulberry
"	Victory	92	William Rodderrick
"	Leopard	88	Thomas Church
"	Endeavor	84	Irnett
"	Dolphin	78	Nathaniel Harryman
"	Seaflower	81	Samuel Harris
"	Swan	84	Jonathan Lovett
"	Mairmaid	82	Samuel Lincoln

Rig.	Name	Tonnage	Master
Schooner	Neptune	100	William Fond
Sloop	Industry	86	George Goodwin
"	Victory	77	William Grow
"	Hannah		Richard Adams
"	Three Friends	68	Thomas Curtis
"	Yorke	87	Nathaniel Preble
"	Endeavour		James Nickols
"	Phenix		Nathaniel Littlefield
"	Jolley	40	Jonathan Davis
"	Saly and Molly		James Purrington
"	Fortunatus		John Clap
"	Biddeford		Benjamin Daniel
"	Ranger		Francis Perry
Brigantine	Swallow		William Hase
"	Falmouth		Pope
"	Pegasus		Nathaniel Malcolm
Schooner	Molly	with ammunition and stores	Nathaniel Gordon
Sloop	Endeavor		Edward Bacon
Schooner	Greyhound		Hodgkins
"	Merrimack		Samuel Coverly
"	Lawrence (With Monckton and staff)		Hector Macneil

On May 26 the fleet reached Annapolis Royal, where they were joined by four small vessels with a detachment of artillery. Thence they departed for Chignecto, 41 sail in all.

26. **Island of St. John.**—Now Prince Edward Island.

27. **At Galop's Cove,** between the Missaguash and La Planche rivers.

28. In September 1750, Lieut.-Col. Charles Lawrence arrived at the site of Beaubassin, which had been destroyed by fire, by orders of the priests, Germain and Le Loutre, having with him a large force of soldiers and workmen and abundant supplies. The building of a fort started at once, and advanced far enough to permit a garrison to remain during the winter. The fort and necessary buildings were not completed for a considerable period, for, in 1752, Winckworth Tonge, an ensign of engineers, was sent to complete the work according to the original design. When finished, the fort was a quadrilateral, consisting of four bastions connected with curtains. Around the wall was a high palisade and a deep fosse. After the fall of Beausejour, the fort was dismantled in 1756. At the present day, only a small part of the fosse remains.

29. **Sap-head**—An approach in the form of a narrow trench, usually in a zig-zag line to lessen the effect of enfilade fire. The advanced end or head is protected by earth thrown up.

30. **"feu plus mortin (sic) et de moindre effet."**—The translation of this is uncertain. It is probably "the fire (would be) more spent and of less effect."

31. **Fascine.**—A bundle of branches tied together, usually about six inches in diameter. Used to keep up the earth in trenches; also, as battery walls instead of earth or stone.

32. **Levraux de Langy.**—Ensign of Foot at l'Ile Royale.

33. **Observation-post.**—Butte à Roger, a knoll on the east of the ridge of Beauséjour, near the marsh, about three-quarters of a mile from the fort. Below it was the great Missaguash marsh and river, with Fort Lawrence beyond. (It is on the north side of the main highway between Amherst and Sackville, and a marker has been placed at the base; on the summit are remains of earthworks, and a cellar).
34. **Redoubt.**—Situated on an elevation to the right of the Ruisseau à Ours (a stream which has almost disappeared in modern times), 140 yards from the Missaguash river. It was built of timbers, of triangular shape, having a round tower at each corner connected by a palisade. The two long sides measured about 130 feet, and the short side about 60. Near it was a house for the officer and another for his men. A drawing by Franquet is shown on page 17. He had a poor opinion of it, as did de Fiedmont. No trace of it exists to-day, but on the right bank of the river, east of it, near the bridge, definite remains of trenches and earthworks can be traced in a small area; these were evidently made by order of de Fiedmont, who refers to the work in describing the Pont à Buot post. Owing to the unwillingness of the settlers to work, he made little headway with these river defences.
35. **Jean-Louis Le Loutre.**—Born in France. Came to Louisbourg in 1737 as a missionary to the Indians. In 1738, he settled at Shubenacadie, having given a pledge to the Government of Nova Scotia that he would maintain good order and keep the French inhabitants faithful to their allegiance to Great Britain. He did not keep this promise long but gradually became the implacable foe of the British and a secret agent of France, using all his influence to stir up the Indians and to induce the Acadians to move from the peninsular part of Nova Scotia to the part now known as New Brunswick, claimed by the French as their own territory. During succeeding years he pursued this policy with great vigour. In the spring of 1749 he moved to Chignecto, taking charge of Beaubassin church for a time. When the French forts were built there the successive Commandants were instructed to co-operate with him. He brought many Acadians to this region and endeavoured to settle them on farms, and developed a scheme to reclaim land on the upper part of the rivière du Lac by building a huge aboiteau on the river, money for this purpose being provided by the French Government. He also, built a church near the fort. During the siege in 1755 he was with the garrison, and escaped just before the capitulation, making his way to Quebec. Thereafter, he sailed for France, but was captured at sea and taken prisoner to England, being sent to Jersey, where he was held until 1763. He then settled in France, working in the interests of refugee Acadians who had returned to Brittany. He died in 1772.
36. **Benjamin Rouer, sieur de Villeray (1701-60)**—Entered the army as ensign in 1733; became a captain in 1751. In 1753, commanded at Fort Gaspereau on Baie Verte. During the siege of Beauséjour he had twenty men under him; when summoned to surrender on June 17, he did so. For this he was criticised by several, among whom was Drucour, Commander at Louisbourg. Villeray wrote to the latter in justification of his action.
- He was tried, with Vergor, at Quebec, and was acquitted. Afterwards he went to Louisbourg in command of his company. In 1758 he was taken prisoner of war when the fortress fell, and was transferred to England. When set free he went to France, and died at Rochefort in 1760 after the King had awarded him the Cross of St. Louis.
37. **Three thousand men.**—This is an exaggeration. John Winslow, in a letter to Governor Lawrence written just before the fleet reached Chignecto gives the number of men and officers as 1950. When the attack began 300 regulars of the Fort Lawrence garrison were added to the New England troops.

38. **Butte à Mirande.**—Named after a Portugese, Manuel Mirande, a native of the Azores, who married a daughter of Jacques Bourgeois, (from Port Royal), pioneer settler at Beaubassin, who arrived about 1671. Mirande became a farmer; his house is shown on De Meulles' map of 1686. The name Butte à Mirande is found on a crude map in a manuscript of de Courville's Memoirs. It was an important point during the siege of Beauséjour in 1755, for it was the main encampment of Monckton's army. Immediately below it the British made a bridge across the Missaguash, so as to shorten the river route from Fort Lawrence; the site was probably near the modern Anglican church of St. Mark's, somewhat less than a mile and a half from the fort. The hill is now known as Mt. Whatley.
39. **Cadet à aigulette,**—a sub-cadet.
40. **Le Lac.**—Situated at the head of the Rivière du Lac (now Aulac) above the point where it was crossed by the old French road from Baie Verte to Beauséjour. (The site of this crossing is now Rye's corner. The lake was of considerable size in the French period, but has entirely disappeared because of the building of aboteaux below it. The bed of the lake is now rich farm-land).
41. **Pomeroy.**—Réné de Gédéon Potier, sieur de Pommeroy, sub-lieutenant of Marine.
42. **Rousseau de Villejouin.**—Ensign in 1723, Captain in 1741; Chevalier de St. Louis, 1748. Commandant in l'Ile St. Jean, 1754. In 1758 he was ordered to collect all the youth capable of bearing arms and to join Boishébert, with some Indians, at the Miré river, for the purpose of trying to relieve Louisbourg. This effort ended in failure. Villeray's efforts were praised by Boishébert in the latter's Journal. In 1763, Villeray was made Governor of La Desirade. (de Fiedmont wrongly terms him "ensign" in his Journal).
43. **Joseph Brossard or Broussard dit Beausoleil.**—Born at Port Royal, 1702. In 1725, he married Agnes Thibodeau, and his brother Alexandre married her sister Marguerite. In 1727, they settled in Shepody, but later, moved away, Alexandre settling at the village of Petitcodiac, and Joseph, six miles farther up the river at Le Cran (now Stoney Creek, opposite Dover). He was brave and resourceful, and was the hero of several daring exploits.
44. **Ensign Alexander Hay,** of the 40th reg't.
45. **Charles Germain.**—A jesuit priest who was sent as a missionary to the St. St. John river Indians in 1745. He frequently visited Beaubassin to co-operate with the Abbé le Loutre against the British. For several years he was an important agent of the Quebec Government. He assisted de Ramezay in his plan to attack Col. Noble in 1747, and proposed an attack on Annapolis Royal in the same year. In 1757 he went to the Miramichi, where he was active in getting supplies from Quebec for the refugees. After the fall of Quebec he induced many French and Indians to submit to the British. In 1761 he was granted a pension for his services in trying to quiet the Acadians and Indians on the St. John river. He finally retired to St. Francis in Quebec, taking eighty Indian families with him. There he died in 1779.
46. **Blindage.**—A protection, especially an earth covered screen.
47. **Merlon.**—The solid part of a parapet between two embrasures.

48. **Barbette.**—The solid earthen platform on which guns are placed to fire over a parapet.
When the parapet was so low that no embrasures were made in it and the guns were fired directly over it, the battery is termed a barbette battery.
49. **Gabion.**—A hollow cylinder of wicker-work, strap-iron, etc., filled with earth, used in numbers for giving protection, supporting earth-walls, etc.
50. **Causeway.**—When Fort Gaspereau was commenced, there was no road from it to the village of Baie Verte. Franquet, in 1751, reported that communication was by water. Later a road was made in an almost straight line, nearly two miles long. The Baie Verte end was near a stream (now Mill Creek) and for a mile and a quarter the ground was so marshy that the road had to be built on piles, four rows being driven, about eight feet apart; the upper exposed ends were six feet above the ground and were joined with timbers on which planks were laid, thus forming a dry causeway. A few remains of the piling still exist.
51. The Abenaki Indians were not natives of Acadia but belonged to the valley of the Kennebec in Maine.
52. **Governor of Louisbourg.**—Augustin Drucour (Drucourt), 1700-62, began his career as a *garde de la Marine* in 1719. Captain, 1751. Governor of l'Île Royale, Feb. 1, 1754. He capitulated to Amherst in 1758, returning to naval service in 1759.
53. **Those killed in the casemate were:—**
Ensign Hay, British officer, prisoner.
M. Raimbault, officer of l'Île Royale M. Fernand, interpreter.
M. Billy, clerk, formerly an officer.
Two Acadians.
54. **Hon. Robert Monckton.**—Second son of Viscount Galway. Born 1726. Entered army and had considerable service in Flanders and Germany, becoming a Lieut.-Col. in 1751. Sent to Nova Scotia in 1752 and became Commandant at Fort Lawrence for a time. In 1753, he quelled an insurrection of Germans in Lunenburg, N. S. Early in 1755, sent to Boston to command troops raised by Governor Shirley, of Massachusetts, destined to attack Fort Beauséjour. Besieged and captured the fort in June, 1755. Remained there until November, re-naming it Fort Cumberland. In December of the same year, made Lieut.-Gov. of Nova Scotia, under Governor Charles Lawrence. In 1758, he remained in Halifax while Lawrence took part in the siege and capture of Louisbourg. In 1759, he was senior Brigadier-General under Wolfe, and was badly wounded in the Battle of the Plains. Later he went to the American colonies and became Governor of New York in 1761. In the autumn he commanded a successful expedition against Martinique and other islands in the West Indies. In 1763, he returned to England, and died in 1782.