Nova Scotia Historical Review

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

Nova Scotia Historical Review

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"More delicate than the historians' are the map-makers' colors."
Elizabeth Bishop

Cover Illustration:
Ile Royale--Fort projeté au port Toulouse [*St. Peters*], 1734. *Drawn by Verrier* fils

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Contents

Editorial

Regular readers of this journal are already aware of the range and richness of Nova Scotia's history. It is a past that reaches back centuries and embraces a multitude of topics. In this issue, the focus is on one particular region during a specific period, that of Cape Breton Island during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

The eighteenth century on Cape Breton began as a time when the Mi'kmaq still held domain on the island. Though there had been French and Scottish settlements the century before, they had left a negligible legacy. It was not until the founding of the colony of Ile Royale in 1713 that the French were able to establish themselves more permanently on Cape Breton. The period of French dominance lasted first until 1745, when Louisbourg was captured, and then again from 1749 to 1758, after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle handed the island back to France. The second and final fall of Louisbourg, in 1758, marked the beginning of a period of lengthy British control. Initially administered as part of the colony of Nova Scotia, Cape Breton became in 1785--thanks to the arrival of a large number of Loyalists at Sydney--a self-governing British colony. That period of separate status ended in 1820, when Cape Breton once again became part of Nova Scotia.

The articles presented in this issue explore a variety of topics, with no particular interconnecting theme other than that they cover aspects of the early nineteenth century. There are, nonetheless, certain links between individual papers that are worth mentioning. Joan Dawson and Walter Morrison, for instance, both look at the same phenomenon: the European attempt to record on paper geographical and navigational information about this part of the New World. Dawson looks at the mapping efforts of various French engineers; Morrison presents a study of two prominent British cartographers who came a few generations later. The familiar historical topic of the sieges of Louisbourg is also covered in this issue, with not one but two fresh looks. Julian Gwyn offers a sweeping overview of each siege and the role that sea power played in deciding the outcomes. In contrast to Gwyn's "macro" view of events, Michel Wyczynski gives a "micro" perspective on the events of 1758. He follows, detail by detail, the sending of a French regiment across the ocean to help defend the capital of Ile Royale.

Still with an eye on Louisbourg, George Burns and A.J.B. Johnston provide studies for quite different aspects of life in the fortified town. Burns examines the impact that smallpox had on the colony, and the efforts that were made to battle the dreaded disease. Johnston studies the soldiers of the Louisbourg garrison, with a special interest in how the ordinary enlisted men were punished. This special issue on Cape Breton concludes with a look at the transitional period after the end of the French régime. Phyllis Wagg profiles Lawrence Kavanagh, an Irish-born merchant who found personal prosperity on the island during the second half of the eighteenth century, while at the same time founding a family that would go on to play an important role in nineteenth-century Nova Scotia.

Guest Editor – A.J.B. Johnston

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Beyond the Bastions: French Mapping of Cape Breton Island, 1713-1758

Joan Dawson

The first detailed French maps of Cape Breton Island were made during the two periods of occupation (1713-45 and 1749-58) following the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht, and--with the exception of the brief occupation by the British, 1745-1749--up to the final fall of Louisbourg. Until 1713, France had concentrated what cartographical interest it had in its Atlantic coastal colonies on Port-Royal, with its hinterland of fertile Acadian farmland, and on some mainland harbours which had strategic and economic potential. Distant Cape Breton Island was considered of little importance except as a site for a few isolated fishing stations. It was chiefly visited by the many seasonal fishermen who found their way each year from Normandy, Brittany and southwest France to the familiar harbours without the benefit of detailed navigational charts.

It was only after 1713 that Cape Breton Island (renamed Ile Royale) came into its own as a subject for French map-makers. With Port-Royal lost and Acadia and all of Newfoundland in the hands of the British, Ile Royale was left as the chief French colonial outpost on the Atlantic coast, strategically essential to the defence of the St. Lawrence River and Québec. Moreover, it was now the only remaining base for the important French North Atlantic cod fishery, formerly centred at Placentia. A flurry of activity resulted as the hitherto neglected island suddenly found itself the centre of attention of military surveyors, whose task it was to establish a stronghold that would form the front line of defence for the remaining French interests in North America.

All final decisions were of course taken in Paris, and maps formed an important part of the documentation which colonial officials sent back to the French government in order to justify their recommendations and expenditures. Many of the maps produced in the period of French occupation of Ile Royale were concerned with the fortified town of Louisbourg: the selection of its site, the plans for its construction and the record of its development. These plans were drawn by or under the direction

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Joan Dawson has published widely on Nova Scotia history and cartography in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including *The Mapmaker's Eye* (Halifax: Nimbus/Nova Scotia Museum, 1989). The illustrations for this article have been provided by courtesy of Fortress of Louisbourg National Historic Park (Figures 1, 5 and 10) and the National Archives of Canada, Cartographic and Architectural Archives Division (Figures 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9).

of the engineers responsible for the planning and building of the fortress. Fortunately, many of them include other incidental information, as well as the military matters on which they are primarily focused.

It is clear from these maps that the establishment of Louisbourg was a much more ambitious project than any of the previous French settlements on the Atlantic coast of North America. After an initial period of indecision, during which time the colonial officials looked at other potential locations such as Port Dauphin (Englishtown) and Port Toulouse (St. Peters), the remote fishing village previously known as Havre à l'Anglois was finally selected. Its transformation, from a handful of fishermen's houses beside the harbour into a garrison town which was the seat of the military and civil administration of Ile Royale, was copiously illustrated by a series of plans. They showed the proposed construction, and reported its progress at frequent intervals. Many of these plans have become well known, and were consulted extensively during the twentieth-century reconstruction of the fortress. This reconstruction, together with the animation provided for summer visitors to the site, gives today's spectator a glimpse of the fortress as it appeared in 1744-45, at the end of the first French régime. But what of the rest of the island? Were there other settlements besides Louisbourg, and what did they consist of? Some of the maps made during both periods of French occupation help to answer these questions.

When the French inhabitants of Placentia were forced to evacuate that settlement in 1713, one of the most prominent residents of the place was Jacques L'Hermitte,[1] the town major and engineer. L'Hermitte was sent immediately to inspect possible sites on Ile Royale where the French sedentary fishery might be re-established. He set up the small fortified settlement which would soon be known as Louisbourg, and made a number of general maps of the area, as well as surveys of individual harbours. L'Hermitte's reports were sent to Paris late in 1713, and the following year he was appointed the King's Second Lieutenant and Engineer for Ile Royale. He held this appointment for only a short time, and in 1715 was promoted to King's Lieutenant for Trois Rivières. His cartographic expertise was called into service once more, however, in 1716, when he was brought back to

1 F.J. Thorpe, "L'Hermitte, Jacques," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* [hereafter *DCB*], II, 433-35. Various spellings of his name exist; he signed his maps "Lhermitte."

Ile Royale to conduct another series of surveys. The resulting maps include a "Carte generalle de l'Isle Royalle Levée en 1716"[2] bearing his signature, and several other harbour maps. L'Hermitte was drowned in the wreck of *Le Chameau* off Louisbourg in 1725.

After the pioneering work of Jacques L'Hermitte came the plans of Jean-François de Verville, who in 1715 was appointed Director of Fortifications for Ile Royale.[3] It was on his recommendation that Louisbourg was finally chosen as the military stronghold and administrative centre for the colony. Much of Verville's mapping efforts recorded the stages by which the construction at Louisbourg proceeded. Yet he was also anxious to fortify some of the other major harbour settlements of the island, notably Port Dauphin and Port Toulouse, and he produced maps and plans of these areas as well.

Verville had been involved in some controversy at Louisbourg, and that, along with his lengthy absences from the island, led to the appointment of Étienne Verrier as resident Chief Engineer.[4] Verrier was sent to Louisbourg in 1724, and worked under Verville until the latter's recall to France the following year. From then onwards, until 1745, the progress of Louisbourg's fortifications, and also the planning and creation of subsidiary defences, were directed and recorded by Verrier. Accordingly, the Chief Engineer produced a series of maps and plans of Louisbourg, Port Dauphin and Port Toulouse. He remained at Louisbourg until its capitulation in 1745.

Verrier was assisted in his work by Jean-Baptiste de Couagne, Pierre-Jérome Boucher, and his own son, Claude Étienne Verrier, all of whom made maps as part of their duties. Couagne, appointed Assistant Engineer under Verville, had also worked with L'Hermitte in his initial survey of the island.[5] Boucher had been at Louisbourg since 1717, when he was appointed draftsman for Verville.[6] He was chosen by Verrier to instruct

2 France. Bibliothèque Nationale [hereafter B.N.], Cartes et Plans, S.H. 131-2-4.

3 F.J. Thorpe, "Verville, Jean-François de," *DCB*, II, 648-50.

4 *Ibid.*, "Verrier, Etienne," *DCB*, III, 643-46.

5 *Ibid.*, "Couagne, Jean-Baptiste de," *DCB*, II, 154.

6 *Ibid.*, "Boucher, Pierre-Jérôme," *DCB*, III, 79-80.

his son in cartography, and Verrier *fils* (as he signed his maps) was evidently an apt pupil. Couagne died at Louisbourg in 1740; Boucher remained there until his death in 1753, except for the British occupation from 1745 to 1749.

Verville and Verrier were responsible for the planning and construction of Louisbourg, and for many tentative plans for the defence of other parts of the island. But the actual drafting of many of the maps attributed to these men and, indeed, signed by them, was frequently the work of their assistants, de Couagne and Boucher. During the second period of French occupation (1749-58), Boucher assisted Louis Franquet,[7] the last Director of Fortifications at Louisbourg, for whom he also produced a series of maps. As well, Boucher made a number of maps bearing his own signature, which remain among the most interesting and informative of the period.

The selection and development of the Louisbourg site has been analysed in great detail by McLennan and others, and it is unnecessary to tell that story again.[8] One map, however, that serves as a record of an early stage in the transition of the settlement from a small village to a fortified town is Verville's "Habitations de Louisbourg." Drawn in 1718, the plan (**Figure 1**)[9] shows the original settlement, which consisted of a cluster of buildings along the shore between Grand Étang and Petit Étang. It is oriented with north toward the bottom of the map, so that we see the settlement as from the shoreline. It gives a kind of bird's-eye view of the existing houses and gardens, some of them quite extensive, as well as the early military barracks and guardhouse. The plan also indicates future development: streets forming part of the new layout are sketched and named, a cross represents the site of a church, lots are shown set aside for the king for military purposes, and there is a market site identified. Later maps by Verville and others record the gradual implementation, often with modifications, of such early plans.

After Louisbourg itself, one of the most frequent subjects for mapping throughout the French period was Port Dauphin (Englishtown). Initially

7 *Ibid.*, "Franquet, Louis," *DCB*, III, 228-231.

8 J.S. McLennan, *Louisbourg from its foundation to its fall, 1713-1758* (London, 1918); reprinted many times.

9 France. Archives Nationales [hereafter A.N.]. DFC Amér. Sept. 146. (Fortress of Louisbourg National Historic Park; photo 1718-2.)

the location was a candidate for the capital and chief fortress of the island, but it was subsequently relegated to a subsidiary defensive role. A series of maps shows its settlement and the plans for its fortifications.

Among L'Hermitte's earliest harbour maps is his "Plan du Havre Ste. Anne," dated 1713 (**Figure 2**).[10] The map carries a note "A present Port Dauphin;" the date, "le 20e 7bre 1713;" and l'Hermitte's signature. Havre Ste Anne, called today St. Anns Harbour, had been known to the French at least since 1629 when Charles Daniel established a fort there with a dwelling, a chapel and a magazine.[11] The settlement was short-lived, but was re-established about 1650 by Simon Denys.[12] In 1713, L'Hermitte's initial survey led him to consider it as a potential site for the fortress. The location of the projected fortification is marked on his map on the point guarding the narrow entrance to the harbour on the south side. When L'Hermitte surveyed the site, he apparently found no significant remains of previous habitations, as he identified only the roadstead--now St. Anns Bay--the bar protecting the harbour, and the rivers which run into the head of the harbour. One of these is described as having a portage route to the Bras d'Or, a useful asset in wartime, providing a protected means of access. The beaches--potentially valuable to a fishing establishment for drying salted cod--and the vegetation are indicated and described in the legend. The hills are sketched in roughly, with no pretence at accuracy beyond the shore. This is clearly only a preliminary map of a possible site for settlement and fortification.

In 1715 the French government decided to follow L'Hermitte's recommendation and transfer the Placentia settlers, who had barely begun to establish themselves at Louisbourg, to Port Dauphin. This decision was reversed in 1718, but in the meantime the governor, Pastour de Costebelle, and a number of others, had already settled along the southwestern shore of St. Anns Harbour. Among them were Jean-Baptiste Hertel de Rouville,

10 B.N., C. & P., S.H. 131-7-2. (National Archives of Canada [hereafter N.A.C.], Ph/240 [Port] Dauphin 1713.)

11 René Baudry, "Daniel, Charles," *DCB*, I, 248.

12 Jean Lunn, "Denys de la Trinité, Simon," *DCB*, I, 261.

the commandant in charge of establishing defences for the community[13] and, for a short time, Dubois Berthelot de Beaucours, Second King's Lieutenant.[14]

An anonymous map of this period (**Figure 3**)[15] gives us a glimpse of the early settlement. We can see the *Gouvernement*, a group of buildings including the governor's house with an extensive garden partly planted; the other houses of the community, one or two with gardens; and from left to right along the shore, a lime kiln, a forge, a powder magazine and a barracks. The terrain is shown as mountainous from a short distance back from the shore, but with gentler slopes closer to the water, intersected by the beds of several streams running into the harbour and providing fresh water for the inhabitants. Letters "A" and "B" on the harbour refer to a legend which is no longer with the map, but may, like L'Hermitte's chart, describe the gravel beach and its vegetation.

It was Verville's intention to replace Rouville's initial defences, and his "Plan du Projet de la Fortification du Port Dauphin,"[16] made in 1717, shows an ambitious scheme for a fort, with landward bastions and batteries guarding the narrow entrance to the harbour, while a small redoubt was to be constructed on the seaward side of the harbour bar. On the mountain behind the fort site was to be a bastioned redoubt, designed to deter any overland attack from the direction of Great Bras d'Or. By 1722, when Henri-François DesHerbiers de l'Etenduère made a "Plan de la Rade du Port Dauphin,"[17] there was no sign that any such development had taken place. In 1733, however, Boucher's "Plan du Port Dauphin et de la Baye de Ste Anne dans l'Isle Royalle. . ."(**Figure 4**)[18] indicates considerable civilian activity in the

13 Pierre Tousignant and Madeleine Dionne-Tousignant, "Hertel de Rouville, René-Ovide," *DCB*, IV, 343-46.

14 C.J. Russ, "Dubois Berthelot de Beaucours, Josué," *DCB*, III, 191.

15 "Plan de l'Entrée du Port Dauphin aves les habitations," B.N., C. & P., S.H. 131-7-1. (N.A.C. Ph/240 [Port] Dauphin [1715-1717].)

16 A.N., D.F.C., No. 245.

17 B.N., C. & P., S.H. 131-7-4.

18 B.N., C. & P., S.H. 131-7-5. (N.A.C. Ph/240 [Port] Dauphin [1733].)

area. Much more topographical detail is shown, with hills, streams, rivers and lagoons, capes, coves and islands clearly represented. Both the captioning of the map and the legend give valuable information about the little community.

Looking in detail at Boucher's 1733 plan, we find coves named for limestone (Anse à la chaux) and oysters (Anse aux huitres), as well as a headland named after plaster or gypsum, (Cap au Platre). All of these names have obvious economic significance. Other names are simply descriptive: Pte aux Loups marins (Seal Point), Pte Basse (Low Point), Pte Brulée (Burnt Point), Pte Rouge (Red Point). Other designations refer to persons connected in some way with the area, such as fishermen (Pte aux Basques), or settlers (Pte Baucourt and R. de Rouville). Cap Dauphin refers obviously to the heir to the French throne. Les quatre Fils Aymond, on the other hand, is the imaginative name for the row of four hills, taken from the title of a medieval story.[19] Boucher's notes tell us that they are about 700 feet high, facing the habitations. R. de la Pucelle may be named in honour of Joan of Arc, the Maid of Orléans, or it may have had some local significance.

Perhaps the most significant caption on Boucher's 1733 map is in the area behind the bar, where we find the word *carenage*, indicating an area where a vessel could be careened, or tilted over to expose the hull for maintenance and repair. A note in the legend states that it was "a place where a frigate or corvette was built for the King; there is a point of sand at the northeast of which ships can be careened easily on their guns, there being five fathoms of water at five fathoms from land." The legend adds that "A," on the cove by Pte aux Loups marins, represents a "yard where a 26-gun frigate of 260 tons was built, and two boats for fishing or coastal trading, in 1732 and 1733." "B," at two points at the head of the harbour on the shore of Anse à la chaux, represents limestone quarries. The notes tell us that there were three coves in the harbour mouth used by "the ships. . . that go fishing at Niganiche [Ingonish]; there is a space for eight to ten of them." The small community of Port Dauphin, then, had two industries: shipbuilding and repair and limestone quarrying, besides its role

19 The four sons of Duke Aymon were known for their fight against Charlemagne, mounted on the fabulous horse Bayard.

as a harbour for fishing vessels. There is no evidence on the map of any significant military presence.

Another site with a potential for fortifications on Ile Royale was St. Peters, known to the French both as Port Toulouse and St Pierre. This area had been known since at least the 1650s, when Nicolas Denys had established a fortified sedentary fishing station there. It was one of the harbours considered as a possible chief settlement for the island when the French were forced to leave Placentia. In 1713, the family of Hertel de Rouville, the officer in charge of fortifications, was among the group established at Port Toulouse. A civilian population also resided there, their numbers increasing during the 1750s after the arrival of a group of Acadian families.[20]

Verrier's map made in 1731, entitled "Le Port Toulouse" (**Figure 5**)[21] is chiefly concerned, according to the subtitle, with the replacement of the barracks established at the beginning of the French régime. It is drawn to a small scale, showing the whole of St. Peters Bay from near River Bourgeois to Pt. Brulée. We see the community, which consisted of two settlements, Petit St Pierre on the site of Denys's old establishment, and St Pierre itself, more recently developed, with buildings clustered around the church. To the west of this main settlement were the old barracks, described as falling into ruins. The "Projet du Retabliss[ement] des Cazernes" did not involve building on that site. Instead, there were to be two sections, with "A" consisting of a bastioned fort commanding the lower lying land bordering the Bras d'Or, and "B," a battery close to the shore which would protect the seaward approaches. Other features shown by Verrier are the roads and trails linking the two parts of Port Toulouse, and a crossing to the Extremeté de l'Abrador. The old brickworks were near the settlement, while the new brickworks were south of the River Tillard near what is still known as Brick Point. The availability of local clay was of great value for military and civilian building.

20 A.H. Clark, *Acadia: the Geography of Early Nova Scotia to 1760* (Madison, WI, 1968), pp. 288-89.

21 A.N., DFC, Carton no. 5, p. 264. (Fortress Louisbourg: photo 1731-6.)

Verrier's scheme for fortifying Port Toulouse was clearly too ambitious, as an anonymous map made two years later (**Figure 6**)[22] reveals. This 1733 plan called for only a fort and shore battery on the site of the former barracks. The old brickworks remain visible on the map, as do the ruins of Denys's fort at Petit St Pierre, beside three buildings which have gardens and are clearly dwelling houses. The main body of settlers who had arrived in 1713 had established themselves somewhat to the east, along the northern shore of the next cove. Here was the Paroisse de St Pierre, with buildings--including a church, though it is not specifically identified--and a garden at the western end of the community. A cemetery stands nearby. Most of the houses to the east have gardens, and form a single row of buildings facing the water. Though only one house appears on the southern side of the brook, looking north, the actual number of houses must have been considerably greater than the map suggests.[23] Near the shore between the two parts of the settlement are shown more gardens, on a favoured southwestern slope, and a spring. The number of gardens suggests an attempt at self-sufficiency in this isolated area. At the Bras d'Or end of the road across the isthmus stands a single house, with an outbuilding and large garden, identified by the name "Petit Pas." The Petitpas were *métis* descendants of one of the original Port-Royal settlers, Claude Petipas.[24]

A map produced by Verrier *fils* in 1734[25] includes a detailed plan of yet another proposed fort at Port Toulouse, on the site of the old barracks. It was to have two landlord bastions and a battery which would cover the harbour approaches. Red ink indicates some buildings already constructed

22 A.N. Col. C11A, 126 (55). (N.A.C., NMC 34354.) The date of 1733 is suggested by René Baudry, from the reference to projects to be undertaken in 1734. The map is similar in style to others signed by Verrier, but perhaps drafted by Boucher or de Couagne.

23 A.J.B. Johnston quotes the census figures for St. Peters for 1726 as fifty-nine heads of household: "The Fishermen of Eighteenth-Century Cape Breton: Numbers and Origins," *Nova Scotia Historical Review*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1989, p. 64.

24 Members of this family had frequently acted as pilots, interpreters and agents for both French and English, and the present group were employed by French officials at Louisbourg.

25 "Plan d'un Fort projetté au Port Toulouze. . ." inset with "Carte du Port Toulouze dans l'Isle Royalle. . ." and a view of the port. B.N., Estampes, Vd 20a, Topographie, Amérique septentrionale.

in 1734. The document includes a general map of the area and a view from the bay showing the two parts of the settlement, separated by a hill on which stands a cross.

It was, inevitably, the settlements of greatest strategic importance which received the most cartographic attention. Hence, more maps and plans were made of Louisbourg than of Port Dauphin and Port Toulouse, and these lesser settlements drew more cartographic attention than the mere fishing villages. Even so, amid the flurry of schemes for bastions and batteries, some pertinent facts about the geography and history of other areas on the island were recorded. Some harbours and settlements were surveyed, not so much as potential military posts, but simply as sites which might be developed economically.

Near the northern tip of Cape Breton lies Aspy Bay, which was mapped by L'Hermitte during his second surveying expedition. His "Plan du Havre d'Aspé," (**Figure 7**)[26] dated 27 November 1716, depicts an almost completely undeveloped section of coastline. No settlement is shown, though an established human presence is indicated by the legend, which identifies various activities. "A" marks "the place where the ships build their stages for *dégrats*".[27] Clearly this spot (now White Point) was a convenient place to build stages to dry fish when necessary. This detail emphasizes the importance of the fishery to the island, even before the development of permanent communities. Meanwhile, "B" represents a lagoon where "plastre" (gypsum) could be found, at what is now Dingwall, and "C" identifies the end of Cape North. The map lacks accuracy in detail, but conveys information about contemporary use and the potential commercial and strategic value of the area. Occupied then by fishermen only on a seasonal basis, the harbour had possibilities for development as a fishery, and could also provide useful building material. Moreover, Cape North, projecting into the Cabot Strait, commanded the route to the Gulf of Saint Lawrence.

26 B.N., C. & P. , S.H. 131-7-2. (N.A.C. Ph/240 Aspy Bay 1716.)

27 *Dégrats* were subsidiary processing stations established by seasonal inshore fishermen whose pursuit of fish took them too far from their base to return daily with their catch: Nicolas Denys, *Description and Natural History of the Coasts of North America* (Toronto, 1908), pp. 324-26.

Boucher's 1737 "Plan de la Baye de Niganiche" (Ingonish), (**Figure 8**)[28] is another record of a rarely documented settlement, this one a populous community based on the fishery. Oriented with north to the right, the plan shows the shoreline from Red Head to Cape Smokey, with a rather distorted representation of the section around Middle Head. The subtitle locates the settlement in relation to other significant sites: it is "in the north-eastern part of the island, 30 leagues from Louisbourg, and about nine leagues from Cape North, which together with Cape Race, Newfoundland, forms the main entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence." Two chief areas of settlement with fishing stages are visible on the shore: one around Pte au Coq (now Kings Point) and the other at Pte au Cournau (Middle Head). A few scattered buildings lie between the two main groups. Many of the houses have gardens, and the sites are clearly chosen for their location on the narrow coastal plain, where there is some chance of growing a few vegetables. One or two stages and some other buildings are also shown on the Isle d'Orléans, now Ingonish Island. This is clearly a community whose economy was based almost entirely on fishing, a picture that is corroborated by the written records.[29] Boucher's notes, however, tell of the hardships of trying to make a living in the Niganiche area:

> The boats and the stages of the inhabitants of this bay are very much exposed to the winds and to the impetuosity of the sea, which causes them considerable losses, and they support themselves only by the abundance of the fish, which is the greatest in the island. The ships which do business here, for fish or for trading, are obliged to use the harbour of Port Dauphin which is eight leagues away.

Boucher's note on his map of Port Dauphin (see above) also refers to this necessity. Clearly, in a small, isolated community such as this, most supplies were brought in from outside, although they might be supplemented in season by produce grown in the inhabitants' garden plots.

28 B.N., C. & P., S.H. 131-6-6. (N.A.C. Ph/240 Niganiche Bay 1737.)

29 Johnston, "Fishermen of Eighteenth-Century Cape Breton," p. 66.

Boucher's 1742 "Plan de l'Entrée et d'une Partie de la Petite Bras d'Or," (**Figure 9**)[30] shows a less one-sided settlement. At Petit Bras d'Or the economic base included, potentially, fishing, agriculture, coal production and fur-trading. The settlement lay on both sides of the Little Bras d'Or River. The western side, on Boularderie Island (known then as Isle Verdronne) was the site of a fishing village, with fish stages, gardens beside many houses, and a church. On the eastern side lay the establishment of Antoine le Poupet, Sieur de la Boularderie, including a farm with several fields under cultivation. Nearby, the map shows a group of native dwellings, a rare cartographic record of the Micmac presence on Ile Royale. In fact, Boularderie was not a very successful farmer, although his son seems to have made considerable efforts to improve the farm after his father's death in 1748.[31] Nevertheless, the settlement, with its mixed economy, looks more viable to modern eyes than the isolated fishing harbours of northern Cape Breton.

A final glimpse of Ile Royale during the French régime is provided by Pierre-Jérôme Boucher, with his "Plan de la Baye des Espagnols avec les Remarques sur les nouvelles decouvertes" (**Figure 10**).[32] This undated map of what is now the Sydney area shows an apparently uninhabited Spanish Bay, with a very small settlement at L' Indienne (Lingan). It was clearly made before the arrival of the Acadians, who settled there during the 1750s[33] and whose presence is recorded in Franquet's map of 1751.[34] Boucher's key gives evidence of a variety of natural resources which would later contribute to industrial growth around the bay. At this time, however, their value was chiefly as a source of materials for the construction and maintenance of nearby Louisbourg. These included clay for bricks and an old but still func-

30 B.N., C. & P., S.H. 133-6-2. (N.A.C. Ph/240 Little Bras d'Or 1742.) See J. Dawson, *The Mapmaker's Eye* (Halifax, 1988), pp. 56-57.

31 Clark, *Acadia*, p. 284.

32 A.N., Colonies, C11A, Vol. 126, fol. 14. (Fortress Louisbourg: photo ND-31.)

33 See Johnston, "Before the Loyalists: Acadians in the Sydney Area, 1749-1754," *Cape Breton's Magazine*, No. 48, 1988, pp. 59-64.

34 B.N., G.E.F. 5909.

tional limestone quarry, at "A"; a coal "mine" (i.e. outcrop) at "B", now Sydney Mines; clay for floor and roofing tiles and pottery at "C"; and a freestone quarry at "D". At the bottom right, "E" refers to the "big cape" (Table Head) a short distance away, "where coal is found for warming the troops at Louisbourg." This, of course, was later to become the Dominion-Glace Bay mining area. In the mid-eighteenth century, the exploitation of the mineral resources of the region was only just beginning.

Maps of the entire island, such as Franquet's "Plan de L'Isle Royalle, 1751," indicate that by the end of the French régime both the coastline and the Bras d'Or lakes had been fairly extensively surveyed. Harbours such as Cheticamp and Justaucorps (Port Hood) on the uninhabited west coast were depicted in individual maps, presumably with a view to their development as fishing ports. Southern harbours such as Nerichaque (Arichat), Grand Laurembec (Lorraine), Baleine, Anse aux Cannes, the fishing settlement on Isle Pontchartrain (Scatarie Island), Manadou (Main-à-Dieu) and others were also charted individually. An unusual map by Boucher of an inland settlement, "Plan d'une partie de la Riviere des Prairies" (Salmon River), made in 1735,[35] reminds us that some settlement took place along the Mira River at a fairly early date. Maps made for other specific purposes inlcude one made shortly after the wreck of *Le Chameau* in 1725,[36] showing the site of the disaster and the locations where wreckage and bodies had been recovered. Another, made at the beginning of the second French régime, purports to show the position of coal deposits.[37]

The Louisbourg engineers, in their surveys of various other parts of the island, provided a useful record of much more than the military projects which were their chief interest. The topographical and economic details which emerge from their plans both explain the existence of civilian settlements, and shed light on their subsequent growth. Some plans show the development of communities with houses and gardens clustered around

35 Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, Atlas Colonies, Vol. III, No. 55.

36 B.N., C. & P., S.H. 131-9-10D.

37 A.N., D.F.C. Amér. sept. 221C.

a parish church, where Micmac and *métis* lived alongside a French population engaged in fishing and farming, shipbuilding and repairing, quarrying, coal-mining and brick-making. These civilian communities were inevitably overshadowed by the high-profile military presence on Ile Royale. Boucher in particular, however, with his pertinent observations about the areas which he portrayed, has left us with a fascinating picture of the settlements beyond the bastions of Louisbourg.

Figure 1


HABITATIONS
DE
LOUISBOURG
1719
Partie du Port
Partie du grand Canal

Figure 2



Figure 3


PLAN
de l'Entree du Port Dauphin
avec les habitations
St. Anne

Figure 4


PLAN DU PORT DAUPHIN ET DE LA BAYE DE S.TE ANNE
DANS L'ISLE ROYALLE
ou les fonds sont marqués de basse mer
REMARQUES
LES 4 FILS AYMOND
BAYE DE S.TE ANNE
JSLES CIBOUX
Cap Dauphin
Cap au Platre

Figure 5


LE PORT TOULOUSE
on est Representé en Jaune le
retablissement des Cazernes

Figure 6


PLAN de partie du Port Toulouze dans l'isle Royalle ou est representé en couleur jaune l'Etablissement a faire en 1720 des Casernes, le Logement du Commendant, et des Officiers. Magazin des Vivres, et dune Batterie pour la defence du Port
PARTIE
DU
PORT
Extremité de la Brador

Figure 7



Figure 8


PLAN
DE LABAYE DE NIGANICHE
Pte du Sud-ouest
J. d'Orleans
Cap Rouge
Pte au Coq
Pte a Courreux

Figure 9


PLAN DE L'ENTREE ET D'UNE PARTIE DE LA PETITE BRADOR
qui comprend l'Etablissement de Mr de la Boularderie et des Pescheurs
PARTIE DE L'ISLE VERD RONNE
REMAQUES
P.te au Boquet

Figure 10





King's Hospital at Louisbourg, 1726

A view of the principal building, together with a plan of the entire complex. Drawn by Verrier. Archives Nationales, Paris

Smallpox at Louisbourg, 1713-1758

George Burns

> That disease. . . the most terrible of all the ministers of death. . . was always present, filling the churchyard with corpses, tormenting with constant fears all whom it had not yet stricken, leaving on those whose lives it spared the hideous traces of its power, turning the babe into a changeling at which the mother shuddered, and making the eyes and cheeks of the betrothed maiden objects of horror to the lover.[1]

The world's last reported case of endemic smallpox occurred in Somalia in 1977. Three years later the World Health Organization accepted a report confirming the "Certification of Smallpox Eradication." Global abolition of the scourge had finally become a reality. From ancient descriptions of smallpox to global eradication, the battle against the disease had persisted some 3,500 years.[2] The conflict left no country unscarred, and all played a role in understanding and controlling the disease. This article examines the effect smallpox had on the French colonial town of Louisbourg during the period 1713 to 1758, and briefly describes the treatments used by Louisbourg's surgeons to control the disease. To provide a context, we begin by outlining France's role in controlling smallpox during the eighteenth century.

Before the introduction of a smallpox vaccination,[3] inoculation or variolation provided protection against naturally occurring smallpox. One of the first recorded French accounts of inoculation, the deliberate introduction of smallpox virus into the skin, was by La Motraye, an eighteenth-century traveller. In 1712, he observed as the procedure was performed on a four-year-old girl:

> An older woman took three needles and lay them side by side. She pricked the hollow of the stomach, the right breast, the navel, the right wrist, and

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1 D. Baxby, *Jenner's Smallpox Vaccine. The Riddle of Vacinia Virus and its Origin* (London, 1981), p. 14.

2 D.R. Hopkins, *Princes and Peasants* (Chicago, 1983), pp. 311-17.

3 A. Emch-Dériaz, "L'inoculation justifiée. . . vraiment?" *Bull. can. hist. méd.*, II, 2 (1985), 237-38, clarifies that during the eighteenth century, the word "inoculation" was used to refer to the practice of insertion of the smallpox virus obtained from the pustules of one inflicted by the disease. The word "vaccine" and the derived "vaccination" did not appear until after the work of Jenner, who developed a method of immunization based on the coxpox virus in the late eighteenth century.

> the left ankle. The high point of the operation consisted of mixing the blood from these pricks with liquid matter extracted from the heads of ripe smallpox pustules.[4]

The practice of inoculation met with resistance among conservative French physicians, particularly from the Faculty of Medicine in Paris. Philippe Hecquet, an influential and conservative elder of the faculty, disapproved of the procedure, arguing that it represented a certain "decadence in modern medical practice." Widely circulated, his publication, *Reasons for Doubting Inoculation* (1724), clearly expounded his opposition.[5]

While smallpox inoculation had its opponents, it also had its supporters. The mathematician and physical scientist, Charles Marie de la Condamine, and the French philosopher Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet) were among the more vocal crusaders in support of the practice. They fought persistently to gain acceptance for the inoculation procedure, though the results did not appear until the early 1750s.[6] In Great Britain, on the other hand, inoculation was accepted much sooner, as early as 1717.[7]

An official inoculation program finally began in France in April 1755. Doubts remained, however, for when Paris suffered a severe outbreak of smallpox in 1762, it was widely blamed on inoculation. Accordingly, the Paris *parlement* banned the practice in the capital and in other towns.[8] Dissatisfied over such unwillingness to accept inoculation, Voltaire wrote to the Russian empress in 1769:

> Oh Madame, what a lesson Your Majesty is giving to us pretty Frenchmen, to our ridiculous Sorbonne and to the argumentative charlatans in our medical schools. You have been inoculated with less fuss than a nun taking an enema. The Crown Prince has followed your example. . . .We French can hardly be

4 D. Diderot, éd., "Inoculation," in *Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers* (Paris, 1751-77), VIII, 758.

5 G. Miller, *The Adoption of Inoculation for Smallpox in England and France* (Philadelphia, 1957), p. 191.

6 *Ibid.*, pp. 208-13.

7 Baxby, *Jenner's Smallpox Vaccine*, p. 22.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 62.

> inoculated at all, except by decree of the Parlement. I do not know what has become of our nation, which used at one time to set great examples in everything.[9]

The French finally reinstated the procedure after Louis XVI was successfully inoculated in June 1774. Indecision, however, had resulted in France becoming one of the last European countries to introduce inoculation, the only known means of protection against the disease.

While inoculation was being debated on the European continent, many of France's overseas colonies were involved in their own struggle with the malady. Louisbourg was one such area. A seaport town located on the southeastern coast of Ile Royale (Cape Breton), Louisbourg was one of the busiest harbours on the Atlantic coast. Over a hundred fishing and trading vessels sailed into port each year. Thanks to the town's proximity to the off-shore cod banks and busy shipping lanes, it emerged as a trans-shipment centre for merchant vessels from France, the West Indies, New England, Québec and Acadia.[10] These contacts increased Louisbourg's susceptibility to contagious epidemics.

In the summer of 1730, the town was rife with rumours recounting the horrors of a smallpox epidemic in Boston, where in late July almost five hundred people had succumbed to the disease. Upon hearing this news, Louisbourg's Superior Council, the colony's high court of appeal, met in special session on 8 August. They adopted a number of resolutions ordering some recently arrived New England traders, as well as several inhabitants of Acadia, to appear before the council to answer questions. Each person was asked to give details on the nature of the outbreak in Boston.[11] As it turned out, Louisbourg was spared the harsh consequences of smallpox

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9 P.H. Clendenning, "Dr. Thomas Dimsdale and Smallpox Inoculation in Russia," *Journal of the History of Medicine*, 28: 109-25.

10 C. Moore, "The Maritime Economy of Isle Royale," in *Canada, An Historical Magazine - Louisbourg: A Special Issue*, I, 4 (June 1974), 40-42.

11 K. Donovan, "Rearing Children in Louisbourg - A Colonial Seaport and Garrison Town: 1713-1758," paper delivered at the Atlantic Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies, Mount Saint Vincent University, 26-28 April 1979, pp. 6-8.

in 1730, but within two years its inhabitants would face a deadly epidmic of their own.

On 9 August 1732, the king's vessel *Le Rubis* sailed into Louisbourg with smallpox on board.[12] The vessel contained three hundred men, including sailors, soldiers, a few prisoners and settlers, bound for Québec; of the total, 123 individuals required hospitalization.[13] The ship's captain, L'Etenduère, attributed the sickness to a group of infected salt smugglers who had boarded the ship at one point during its voyage.[14] Louisbourg was not prepared to deal with an epidemic of such proportions. Although the one-hundred-bed King's Hospital had been completed in 1730 and contained its own apothecary, bakery, chapel, kitchen, laundry and morgue, its furnishings and supplies left much to be desired. A long list of bedclothes, medical instruments, tools, utensils and other requirements had been submitted by the colony's financial commissary the previous year, yet the request was only partially filled.[15]

The Brothers of Charity of the Order of St. John of God, the religious order who administered the Louisbourg hospital, were unable to accommodate the influx of smallpox victims from *Le Rubis*. Town officials decided to separate patients requiring immediate care from those harbouring minor symptoms of the disease. Patients in greatest need were placed in the King's Hospital; the remainder were transported to a makeshift treatment centre on the north shore of the harbour. Jean La Grange, the town's surgeon-major, was instructed by Louisbourg's governor to oversee the care of the sick. Town officials were ordered to do everything in their power to support the two hospital facilities. As a means of paying the Brothers of Charity for their services, the financial commissary, Le Normant, requested that the captain of *Le Rubis* provide the hospital with supplies. These included

12 J.S. McLennan, *Louisbourg From Its Foundation To Its Fall: 1713-1758*, (Halifax, 1979 [repr.]), p. 81.

13 Archives Nationales, Archives des Colonies [hereafter A.N., Colonies], C11B, Vol. 13, le Normant, Louisbourg, 9 août 1732, ff. 124-26.

14 A.N., Colonies, C11B, Vol. 13, Maurepas à Beauharnois (Rochefort), 23 septembre 1732, ff. 275v.-76v.

15 A.J.B. Johnston, "The Frères de la Charité and the Louisbourg Hôpital du Roi," CCHA, *Study Sessions*, 48, 1981, pp. 6-9.

9,295 pounds of biscuit, twenty quintals of lard, two quarts of brandy, and two bales of blankets.[16]

Shortly after unloading the supplies, *Le Rubis* proceeded to Québec, having replaced the depleted crew with sailors from local merchant vessels.[17] In late August, fifty-nine men were released from the Louisbourg hospital and set sail for Québec aboard *La Revanche*.[18] Six of them would drown when the brigantine sank off the coast near Ingonish. On 4 September, an additional thirty-seven men left Louisbourg aboard another vessel. Fourteen smallpox cases remained, all of whom were ordered to leave the colony by year's end.[19] Some of these men chose instead to stay, and became members of the town's garrison.[20]

Pressure on the Louisbourg medical facility intensified later in 1732 when three of the Brothers of Charity died,[21] probably as victims of the epidemic. The contagion was by no means contained within the confines of the King's Hospital, for by mid-February 1733 it had spread throughout the town. Many died: sailors and passengers of the ill-fated ship, residents of the colony (see **Figure 1**), soldiers, local Micmacs, and many native people living in Acadia.[22] In letters to the French Minister of Marine, Louisbourg's newly-appointed governor, Joseph de Brouillan *dit* Saint-Ovide, expressed his growing concern for the colony:

16 A.N., Colonies, C11B, Vol. 13, St. Ovide, Louisbourg, 20 août 1732, ff. 243-44.

17 *Ibid.*

18 *Ibid.*, le Normant de Mézy, Louisbourg, 7 septembre 1732, fol. 112.

19 *Ibid.*, Maurepas à Rochefort (Rochefort), 23 décembre 1732, fol. 56v.

20 *Ibid.*, Vol. 12, St. Ovide, Louisbourg, 15 septembre 1732, fol. 263.

21 Johnston, "The Frères de la Charité," p. 9.

22 A.N., Colonies, C11B, Vol. 15, Maurepas à St. Ovide, 4 mai 1734, Vol. 61-2, ff. 603-04v. The contagion spread from the English at New York to Canada in 1731. The epidemic was at its height in Québec in 1732 and 1733, and there were counted at one time 2,000 cases in the general hospitals at Québec. For more information, see John J. Heagerty, *Four Centuries of Medical History in Canada* (Toronto, 1928), 72.

> The sickness carried by the king's vessel to Louisbourg has increased. It is a shame. Smallpox, accompanied by purpura, is infecting many people of all ages. No family in Louisbourg has avoided this sickness.[23]

> Smallpox that has reigned over Isle Royale has encroached upon the natives. . . .It is no wonder they fear it: they are defenseless. Shameful that the colony must suffer through this plague.[24]

The scope of the epidemic was such that a separate emergency cemetery was created outside the walls of Louisbourg, on the property of Jean Martin,[25] a sixty-year-old man who died from smallpox in September 1732. His sickness "was such that it did not permit transporting him to the cemetery."[26] Rather than bury certain victims of the "maladie" in the parish cemetery, Martin's property became their place of rest.

At Louisbourg, annual expenditures on patient care rose over 700 per cent, from 983 *livres* in 1731 to 6,959 *livres* in 1732 and 7,193 *livres* in 1733.[27] In October 1733, Le Normant wrote to the Minister of Marine stating that "he would probably be surprised by the increase in expenditures since the previous year." Le Normant attributed the exorbitant costs to the epidemic and to pneumonia, another illness which led to the hospitalization of many colonists that year.[28] The turmoil caused by the disease compelled town officials to deliver a proposal to the Minister of Marine, soliciting funds for a "hospital for the sick from the king's vessels." This "pesthouse" would serve as a quarantine for any vessels harbouring contagious diseases. The facility was to be located on the north-east side of the harbour, a safe distance

23 *Ibid.*, Vol. 14, Conseil, Lettre de M. de St. Ovide, 10 février 1733, ff. 8-10v.

24 *Ibid.*, Vol. 15, Conseil, Lettre de M. de St. Ovide, 9 mars 1734, ff. 10-11v.

25 Acte d'enterrement, 11 août 1733, A.N., Outre Mer, G1, Vol. 406, Reg. IV, fol. 13v.

26 *Ibid.*, 7 septembre 1732, Louisbourg, fol. 38.

27 A.J.B. Johnston, *Religion in Life at Louisbourg, 1713-1758* (Kingston, 1984), p. 76.

28 A.N., Colonies, C11B, Vol. 14, le Normant au Ministre, 11 octobre 1733, ff. 147-49v.

from the town.[29] Although it is uncertain when they were constructed, two such hospitals "for use by the king's vessels" appear on a 1754 plan.[30]

The eight-month smallpox infestation subsided in April 1733 (see **Figure 2**). The consequences of the epidemic underscored Louisbourg's susceptibility to such contagion. It later prompted marine officials to insist that all ships entering the port include in their declaration to the Admiralty Court the number of crew and passengers aboard. Another requirement was a report on the state of their health, usually in the words "all in good health."[31]

The twenty-year period following the 1732/33 smallpox epidemic witnessed a major military upheaval within the colony. In 1745 Louisbourg was captured by New England troops, and its inhabitants were deported. New England forces occupied the town from 1745 to 1748. In 1748, by the terms of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the colony was returned to France, the resettlement of Louisbourg by most of its original inhabitants occurring the following year.

Smallpox was present at Louisbourg during the British occupation period, 1745 to 1748. On 26 July 1747, the Marquis de Beauharnois, Governor-General of New France, in a letter to Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts, mentioned that smallpox had been brought to Québec from Louisbourg. The disease reappeared when the French reoccupied the town in July 1749. In a report written by Charles Desherbiers, governor of the colony, the presence of smallpox was noted on board the transports *L'Intrépide* and *Jean Elie*.[32]

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29 *Ibid.*, Vol. 15, Maurepas à St. Ovide et le Normant, no date, 1734, Vol. 61-2, fols. 585v.-86v.; *ibid.*, Vol. 15, St. Ovide et le Normant, Louisbourg, 23 janvier 1734, ff. 52-59.

30 Johnston, *Religion in Life at Louisbourg*, p. 75.

31 "Declaration d'arrivée du S. Josephe Pitrel capne du Brigantin Le St. Luc de St. Malo," original in French: "Tous en santé," Archives Charente Maritime, B, 11 mai 1742, registre 272, f. 1v.

32 Included within this time were a few cases of pneumonia in 1739/40, and one recorded death due to yellow fever in 1753. For further information see: A.N., Colonies, C11B, Vol. 14, le Normant au ministre, Louisbourg, 11 octobre 1733, ff. 147-49v; *ibid.*, Vol. 22, Bigot au ministre, Louisbourg, 29 mai 1740, ff. 149-51v. Yellow fever information: A.N., Outre Mer, G1, Vol. 408, 2e registre, f. 72, Acte de sépulture, Louisbourg, 29 juin 1753.

On 2 June 1755, the latest governor, Augustin Boschenry de Drucour, and Jacques Prévost, financial commissary, reported that smallpox,

> which is feared and usually makes great ravages in this climate has been present for 15 days. It is progressing rapidly and worries us, although there has yet to be any deaths. If this sickness ends before autumn, we hope that it will have little effect on the inhabitants and soldiers.[33]

Their optimism was soon shattered. By December the death toll stood at 111 (see **Figure 3**), and the disease did not subside until March 1756 (see **Figure 4**). It is uncertain how the epidemic was introduced into the colony. It may have come from Québec, where residents were experiencing a devastating infestation, so widespread and terrible in its ravages that for years 1755 was referred to as "the year of the great smallpox epidemic."[34]

To a certain extent the contagion of 1755/56 was of secondary importance at Louisbourg. The threat posed by the Seven Years' War, which meant off-shore privateering and the arrival of two large French military companies (over 1,000 troops), was the chief concern of the town in those years. Smallpox was simply another problem, one that had to be tolerated and treated. One of the most notable deaths during the 1755 epidemic was the Chevalier de Chabot, a captain in Louisbourg's garrison. Although Chabot "had a great deal of merit" and was highly respected by town officials, he was buried without honours. The decision was made "in view of the contagious sickness that carried him off in such a short time."[35] Similar to the case of Jean Martin in 1733, the circumstances surrounding de Chabot's death were such that the body was buried immediately.

In the spring of 1758, at the height of the Seven Years' War, Louisbourg was besieged and captured by a military force commanded by Major-General Jeffrey Amherst. The town's colonists and military personnel were exiled to France. Frequent references were made to smallpox among the British troops during the siege:

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33 A.N., Colonies, C11B, Vol. 35, Drucour et Prévost, 2 juin 1755, ff. 19-22.

34 Heagerty, *Four Centuries of Medical History*, p. 75.

35 A.N., Colonies, C11B, Vol. 35, Drucour au Ministre, Louisbourg, 18 juin 1755, ff. 75-76.

> The enemy sunk four ships in the harbour's mouth to obstruct the channel and prevent our fleets going in; the troops are growing sickly, particularly the New England men; their disorders mostly smallpox.[36]

> The troops have suffered considerably by sickness. . . .I find by inquiring the loss had been mostly among the Rangers to whom the smallpox has proved very fatal.[37]

Some members of the attacking forces were fortunate enough to have been inoculated at Halifax before departing for Louisbourg: "Francis Green repaired accordingly to his regiment at Halifax. . .and after having had the smallpox by inoculation (in the old fashioned sweating method) in April 1758 embarked with his regiment the next month for the siege of Louisbourg."[38] Others were not so fortunate. The disease ravaged and killed many New England carpenters during the siege. In a letter to William Pitt dated 28 June 1758, Jeffery Amherst expressed his regrets for the loss: "Colonel Messervy and his son both died this day, and of his company of carpenters of 108 men, all but 16 in the smallpox, who are nurses to the sick, this particularly unlucky at this time."[39]

Comparing the Major Epidemics: 1732/33 and 1755/56

Table 1 compares mortality percentages, per capita, for both major smallpox epidemics. These figures have been calculated from Louisbourg's parish record files and census data. They take into account the town civilian population only and not military statistics. Because of Louisbourg's military importance, its garrison represented a significant population group of roughly 600 soldiers in 1732 and 4,000 in 1755. Raw data recording the mortality

36 Heagerty, *Four Centuries of Medical History*, p. 75.

37 *Ibid.*

38 Public Archives of Nova Scotia, MG 1, Vol. 332D, "Genealogical and Biographical Anecdotes of the Green Family deduced from the First American Generation by Francis Green, for his children's information, 1806."

39 McLennan, *Louisbourg*, p. 265; Amherst to Pitt, 28 June 1758, Colonial Office 5/53, PRO.

rate within the military, however, was compiled on registers kept by the brothers in the King's Hospital. Many are either incomplete or have been lost. Thus, evidence presented in this report has been interpreted from the civilian perspective.

Table 1

Mortality rates, per capita, for civilian men, women and children during the 1732/33 and 1755/56 smallpox epidemics.[40]

Sex	1732/33	1755/56
Men	6.3%	4.0%
Women	9.1%	3.6%
Children	10.0%	5.0%
Total Town	8.3%	4.2%

Based on this information, it appears that the effects of the 1732/33 epidemic were far more extensive than the 1755/56 contagion. Those most affected, during both epidemics, were children, particularly in 1732 when one out of every ten children died. There was no official 'quality control' over surgeons in Ile Royale until the position of "the king's first surgeon" was established in 1735.[41] Therefore, treatment may have left much to be desired, which may account for the higher mortality rate during the first smallpox epidemic. Furthermore, it is also possible that a more effective means of disease control, such as inoculation, may have been in effect by 1755.

The use of inoculation as a preventive measure against endemic smallpox at Louisbourg is debatable. Although the procedure is not mentioned in any Louisbourg archival source, this does not mean that the town's surgeons

40 Archives du Séminaire de Québec (1752), Surlaville Papiers, Prem. Carton Poly. 55-49. "Rencensement numérique de Lsbg. par rues et totaux généraux des populations humaines et animales. . .": A.N., Outre Mer, G1, Recensement de l'Isle Royale, dossier 466, pièce 69, 1734; *ibid.*, Vol. 406, registre IV, Louisbourg, ff. 17v-59; *ibid.*, G1, Vol. 409, 1° registre: 1-91.

41 L. Hoad, "Surgery and Surgeons in Ile Royale," *History and Archaeology*, No. 6 (Ottawa, 1976).

were unaware of the practice. Inoculation was introduced to Boston in 1721, and was exercised successfully throughout all thirteen British colonies in 1750 and in Halifax by 1758. Considering the degree of contact between Louisbourg and New England, and the extent of the inoculation controversy on the continent, it is conceivable that Louisbourg's surgeons were aware of and practised the procedure. On the other hand, inoculation was not introduced to the French inhabitants of Québec until the early 1760s, a fact that weighs against any argument for its practice at Louisbourg.[42]

General treatment for smallpox was provided by a number of medical personnel in the colony. For the period 1713 to 1758, records yield the names of forty-three surgeons and apprentices found on Ile Royale, a number attributed to regulations of 1681 and 1717 requiring that a surgeon be on board every ship making a long voyage and carrying a crew of twenty-one or more.[43] Surgeon's bills provide information pertaining to treatments, medications and medical expenses. During the 1755 epidemic, for example, a series of treatments was performed on two Louisbourg residents, Pierre Lambert and his daughter Julienne.[44] These treatments correspond somewhat to those found in medical publications of the period.[45] They consisted of bleedings, washings, treatments with carminatives to relieve excess gas, the ingestion of restorative-stimulative agents, drugs to induce sweating and vesicatory plasters (to create blisters on the skin). At one point Pierre Lambert was charged for the administration of six consecutive enemas. Unfortunately such treatments proved unsuccessful. Julienne Lambert died in November 1755, while her father passed away in May 1756.[46]

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42 J. Duffy, *Epidemics in Colonial America* (Louisiana, 1953), pp. 29-35, 76.

43 Table des Edits, Arrêts, ordonnances, règlements, etc., 5 juin 1717, A.N., Marine, A3, Article 6, f. 363; Ch. de La Morandière, *Histoire de la Pêche française de la morue dans l'Amérique septentrionale - des origines à 1789*, 2 Vols. (Paris, 1962), pp. 99-105; Heagerty, *Four Centuries of Medical History*, pp. 223-24.

44 "Mémoires Des Medicaments & traitements faite & fournis à sieur Lambert et sa fille Pour maladies Pendant l'année 1755," A.N., Outre Mer, G2, 13 mai 1756, Vol. 205, dossier 393, pièce 6.

45 M.L***, ancien Médecin des Armées du Roi, M. De B***, Médecin des Hôpitaux, *Dictionnaire Portatif de Santé*, (Paris, 1760), pp. 247-76.

46 Acte d'enterrement, 23 novembre 1755, A.N., Outre Mer, G1, Vol. 409, 1° registre: 77; *ibid.*, G2, 13 mai 1756, Vol. 205, dossier 393, pièce 6.

Louisbourg suffered from the contagious smallpox virus on five occasions: 1732/33, 1745, 1748/49, 1755/56 and 1758. Both the 1732 and 1755 outbreaks were epidemics, as they claimed approximately 100 civilian victims and an unknown number of soldiers. The worst effects of smallpox were felt in 1732/33, when the disease made an impact on almost every family in the town. As for inoculation, the question as to whether or not the practice was ever tried at Louisbourg remains unanswered. The town's many contacts with France and its proximity to Québec and New England undoubtedly provided the opportunity for its medical personnel to exchange thoughts, ideas and perhaps treatments. In an era when smallpox scourged cities and towns, the inoculation procedure could have played a vital role in the struggle for survival.

Fig. 1: Smallpox 1732–1733

Comparing Deaths From 1730–1735 Louisbourg Parish Records



A.N. Outre Mer, G1, vol. 406, reg. IV.

Fig. 2: Smallpox 1732–1733

Deaths: Men, Women and Children



A.N. Outre Mer, G1, vol. 406, reg. IV.

Fig. 3: Smallpox 1754–1755
Comparing Deaths From 1752–1757 Louisbourg Parish Records



A.N. Outre Mer, G1, vol. 408 & vol. 409.

Fig. 4: Smallpox 1754–1755
Deaths: Men, Women and Children



A.N. Outre Mer, G1, vol. 408 & vol. 409.

The Men of the Garrison: Soldiers and their Punishments at Louisbourg, 1751-53

A.J.B. Johnston

The relationship between theory and practice is an intriguing aspect of any society. The contrast between those often distant realms--the ideal and the real--can be among the most fertile of research fields. Normally, however, one does not place military history in such a context. One thinks instead of religion or sociology, and the gulf that can exist between the espoused ideals and the actual behaviour of a society. Nonetheless, military history also has its fair share of differences between theory and practice. These can manifest themselves in everything from battlefield tactics to training procedures. There is always, it seems, room for exceptions. Sometimes, however, there are so many exceptions that the rules themselves must be drawn into question; if not by the people meant to enforce them, then by the historians who study a particular period of time. We examine several examples of such military "rule-bending" in this article, with the emphasis being on eighteenth-century punishment practices.

Eighteenth-century Louisbourg was a fortified town and naval base that lay within the world of the French military. In its day, which lasted from 1713 to 1758, Louisbourg, on the eastern tip of Cape Breton Island, was one of France's bastions in North America. Fortified and garrisoned at considerable expense (four to five million *livres tournois* for the fortifications; another sixteen million *livres* for other projects and services),[1] Louisbourg stood as both a military stronghold and as a fishing and commercial port of great value.[2] The focus here, however, is not on Louisbourg's place in the European struggle for North American empire; rather, it is on the *simples soldats*: the ordinary soldiers sent first to build and then defend the place. These were men who stood firmly on some of the bottommost rungs of the *Ancien Régime* social ladder.[3] Of these lowly enlisted men at Louisbourg

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1 For a summary of history of the French settlement, see J.S. McLennan, *Louisbourg from its Foundation to its Fall* (London, 1918; reprinted most recently in 1983).

2 Christopher Moore, "The Other Louisbourg: Trade and Merchant Enterprise in Ile Royale, 1713-58," *Histoire sociale / Social History* 12, no. 23 (May 1979), 79-96; and B.A. Balcom, *The Cod Fishery of Isle Royale* (Ottawa, 1984).

3 André Corvisier, *L'Armée français de la fin du XVIIe siècle au ministère de Choiseul: Le soldat*. Tome premier (Paris, 1964), 100.

we ask but two simple questions. First, who were they; in terms of their background and skills, habits and conditions of service? And second, when it came time to discipline them, which contemporary officers would have us believe was a constant preoccupation, what was the relationship between regulations and reality, between theory and practice? Thanks to the meticulous record-keeping of a single man, Michel Le Courtois de Surlaville, *major des troupes* at Louisbourg from 1751 to 1754, one can begin to find answers to these questions in some detail.

The reputation of Louisbourg's soldiers (and by implication, its officers) had undoubtedly reached the highly critical eyes and ears of Michel de Surlaville well before he agreed to go there as troop major in 1751.[4] Born in Bayeux in 1714, one year after the founding of France's colony on Cape Breton (which became known as Isle Royale), Surlaville was too young to have heard much about the early irregularities at Louisbourg, or even about how its soldiers were more adept at using picks and shovels than muskets and cannon.[5] Nonetheless, the mutiny of December 1744, when the enlisted men took control of the town for several days and then remained unpunished for months, could not have escaped his notice. Similarly, he likely knew about the 1750 revolt of the detachment at Port Toulouse (St. Peters, Cape Breton), which resulted in the execution of six men.[6] In a related vein, Surlaville would also have listened to all the reasons why Louisbourg, as strongly fortified as any settlement in North America, had fallen to a ragtag army of New Englanders in 1745.[7] All this information Major Surlaville would have brought with him when he sailed to Cape Breton in the spring of 1751. In addition, as an officer who had served in several regiments of the

4 Biographical notes on Surlaville are provided by T.A. Crowley in the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, Vol. IV (Toronto, 1979), 443-45, and by Gasgon Du Boscq de Beaumont in *Les derniers jours de l'Acadie (1748-1758). Correspondances et mémoires* (Génève, 1975), 1-11.

5 See T.A. Crowley, "The Foreign Soldiers of New France: The Louisbourg Example," in A.A. Heggoy, ed., *Proceedings of the Third Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society* (May 5-7, 1977); and Margaret Fortier, *The Ile Royale Garrison, 1713-45* (Ottawa, 1981).

6 Allan Greer, "Mutiny at Louisbourg, December 1744," *Histoire sociale / Social History*, 10 (Nov. 1977), 305-36; Greer, "Another Soldiers' Revolt in Ile Royale, June 1750," *Acadiensis*, XII, No. 2 (Spring 1983), 106-09.

7 See George Rawlyk, *Yankees at Louisbourg* (Orono, 1967) and Ray Baker, "A Campaign of Amateurs: The Siege of Louisbourg, 1745," *Canadian Historic Sites*, No. 18 (Ottawa, 1978), 5-57.

Troupes de Terre, Michel Le Courtois de Surlaville undoubtedly also carried with him some of the prejudices that regular officers had about the Marine troops (the *compagnies franches de la marine*) who defended Louis XV's overseas colonies.

The soldiers that greeted Surlaville when he arrived in Louisbourg lived up to his worst expectations:

> The ranks were poorly aligned; many soldiers did not even know how to use their muskets, and besides, silence was poorly observed. They marched past without any fixed rule as to distance, poorly set up, not bearing their weapons properly; their hair tied up messily, if it was tied up at all; their equipment and accoutrements in disorder; with gaiters, garters and collars in a pitiable state; and with filthy, worn-out clothing.[8]

A more negative assessment is difficult to imagine, and yet disparaging remarks of a similar kind had been made virtually from the founding of the colony.[9] The new *major des troupes* set out to correct the abuses he observed, and in the process created some remarkably detailed documentation on the soldiers, their behaviour, and the disciplinary measures that were meted out to punish their shortcomings. The garrison of which Surlaville was troop major consisted of a single artillery company and twenty-four companies (fifty men in each) of regular Marine troops. At full strength, a condition that was never obtained, the garrison would have had 1,250 soldiers to defend the place. Of the 1,000 or so men actually there, over two-thirds were recent recruits and the rest veterans who had served in the colony prior to the defeat in 1745.[10]

In general, the soldiers at Louisbourg during the early 1750s were young.[11] (See **Figures 1** and **2**.) Average age was twenty-seven, with fully 86 per

8 Quoted in Du Boscq de Beaumont, ed., *Les derniers jours de L'Acadie*, 24.

9 When Governor de Forant arrived in Louisbourg in 1739 he wrote, "Je nay jamais vu de si mauvais soldats." France, Archives Nationales [AN], C11B, Vol. 21, fol. 53-3v, Forant, 25 septembre 1739.

10 For details on the recruiting of soldiers for Ile Royale in 1747 and 1748, see the letters to and from the Minister of the Marine in Vols. 86, 87 and 88 of AN, Series B.

11 The figures and percentages on the Louisbourg garrison are based on the document, "Signallement général des troupes de l'Isle Royale," located in the Archives du Séminaire de Québec and available in copied form at the National Archives of Canada [NAC], MG 18,F30, Dossier 1.

cent being thirty-five or less, and 19 per cent twenty or under. Such youth went against some conventional wisdom, which placed more importance on the "steadiness and experience of veterans rather than the headlong courage of youth."[12] Hence, the average age in the Prussian army of 1783 was 31.6 years old,[13] while that of the redcoats serving in America during the Revolution was about thirty.[14] French men at arms, however, tended to be somewhat younger. André Corvisier writes that half the men of the provincial militia battalions were between twenty-one and twenty-five.[15] That 52 per cent of Louisbourg's troops in the early 1750s were twenty-five or under is therefore no great surprise, especially when one considers the Ministry of the Marine's pressing need for troops to send to the colony following the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Just as recruiters scrambled to find enlistees to send to Cape Breton, so the authorities that inspected the recruits when they arrived on the Ile de Ré (off La Rochelle, where the unfit and venereally diseased were weeded out) must have bowed to the pressure and let many "boys" pass as "men."[16] According to the ages listed on a 1752 troop roll, the "Signallement général des troupes," 23 per cent of Louisbourg's soldiers had been fifteen or under when they signed up. A few exceptions to the "at least sixteen years old"[17] regulation might be expected, but not nearly one in four. Here was a clear case of the need for soldiers forcing colonial officials to ignore the most basic of recruiting policies.

If the letter of the regulations might be violated on the age question, so it could also be overlooked on the matter of minimum height require-

12 Willerd R. Fann, "On the Infantryman's Age in Eighteenth-Century Prussia," *Military Affairs*, XLI, No. 4 (Dec. 1977), 167.

13 *Ibid.*, 165.

14 Sylvia Frey, *The British Soldier in America. A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period* (Austin, 1981), 23.

15 Corvisier, *L'armée française...*, Tome second, 616.

16 On the recruitment for Ile Royale see AN, Colonies, Series B, Vols. 86 and 87.

17 Mr. de Guignard, *L'École de Mars, ou mémoires instructifs...* (Paris, 1725), Tome second, 549-50.

ments. Three different minimums were mentioned in the correspondence dealing with the recruitment for Cape Breton: 5 *pieds*, 5 *pieds* 1 *pouce* and 5 *pieds* 2 *pouces*[18] [1 *pouce* = 1.0656 inches; 1 *pied* = 1.066 feet]. Such figures were already below the standards for some French troops,[19] yet here again recruiters and the officials on the Ile de Ré found it possible, or necessary, to ignore the rules and accept enlistees who were very short indeed. Fourteen per cent of the Louisbourg troops were listed as being under the 5 *pieds* mark (about 5 feet 4 inches in English units), with the shortest soldiers being a full 5 *pouces* too short. As for the norm, nearly two out of every three soldiers stood between 60 and 62 *pouces* (5 feet 4 inches to 5 feet 6 inches), or just at the target height (see **Figure 3**).

When the recruitment for Louisbourg was being discussed within the Ministry of the Marine, one aspect in particular was singled out for attention. This was the desirability of enlisting as many soldiers as possible with "useful trades."[20] Construction work had always been one of the main responsibilities of Louisbourg's soldiers, from the 1720s onward, so there was nothing unusual about such a request. The recruiters did their best, combing the streets of Nantes and Poitiers, Bordeaux and La Rochelle, in search of young men with trades. On the whole they were successful. Approximately 51 per cent of the soldiers on the Louisbourg roll had a trade inscribed opposite their names, 105 different trades in total. Shoemakers (58) and cutters (*tailleurs*: 55) were the most common, but there were also a great many bakers (33) and butchers (17), carpenters (29) and gardeners (21), labourers (33) and masons (19). Given their relative youth, few of those men would have been masters of their chosen trades.

There was one category on the troop roll that the authorities wished had fewer entries. That was the column of deserters. In all European armies there was no greater problem than desertion. In one twenty-seven-year period the Prussian army had no fewer than 30,000 deserters, and during the War

18 AN, B, Vol. 86, fol. 378v, 4 octobre 1747; *ibid.*, Vol. 90, fol. 100, 14 mars 1749; *ibid.*, Vol. 94, fol. 273, 17 juin 1751.

19 André Corvisier, *Armies and Societies in Europe, 1494-1789* (Bloomington, 1979), 138; and Corvisier, *L'armée française . . .*, Tome second, 637-51.

20 AN, B, Vol. 88, fol. 197, 13 novembre 1748; *ibid.*, fol. 353, 13 novembre 1748.

of the Spanish Succession one of every four soldiers in the French army deserted.[21] The men who came to Louisbourg were cut from the same cloth. On the *signalement* drawn up under Surlaville's direction, 26 per cent of the Louisbourg soldiers had already received this black mark. When and where the desertion had taken place (in Europe or in the colony?), and how long the soldier had been absent before returning or being captured, was not indicated.

Within the ranks of the Louisbourg soldiers were two noteworthy minorities. The first was those who were married. As in other military units of the period, a married soldier was considered a liability, someone who neither felt the same bond of comradeship as the other men nor was as dependent on the officers and non-commissioned officers as they wanted him to be. One Louisbourg official, discussing whether or not soldiers should be allowed to marry, offered "that nothing is more contrary to the service."[22] That view echoed the prevalent thinking of the time. Women, in the words of the author of the *École de Mars*, were "a necessary evil." This assessment did not need much elaboration. It was a simple, chauvinistic declaration of the obvious: "we know the trouble that women cause wherever they are found." One or at most two married soldiers per company was considered the limit.[23] In Louisbourg, according to Surlaville's records, 5 per cent of the soldiers were married, or just about the figure recommended. The second minority category in the garrison was that of foreigners. Back in the first period of French occupation at Louisbourg (1713-45) there had been up to 150 Swiss and German soldiers, a detachment of the Karrer Regiment, in the 750-man garrison. Largely blamed for igniting the 1744 mutiny, that contingent was not sent back to Louisbourg in 1749. The foreigners that were serving there in 1752 were all in the ranks of ordinary Marine troops. They were fifty-three in total (5 per cent), coming from twenty different states or principalities. Of these men, there were twenty-one Spaniards and

21 Corvisier, *Armies and Societies in Europe, 1494-1789*, 80-71. See also Frey, *The British Soldier in America...*, 72.

22 AN, C11B, fol. 178, Soubras, 20 octobre 1715.

23 Guignard, *L'École de Mars...*, Tome premier, 684.

nine Germans, probably enough to form a couple of intriguing sub-cultures within the soldiers' barracks.

This then was the Louisbourg garrison in the early 1750s: approximately 1,000 men, most of whom were unmarried and between the ages of sixteen and thirty-five. Half of them were listed as possessing a trade, and a quarter were identified as having deserted at some time or other. Ninety-five per cent had been born in France, and all found themselves serving in a colony noted for its cool, damp and sometimes punishing climate.

All aspects of French military life in the eighteenth century were governed by the rules and regulations set down in the various "Ordonnances du Roi."[24] Using the prison and punishment records extant in Major Surlaville's papers, which cover the nineteen-month period from January 1752 to July 1753, it is possible to assess how closely the officers of the Louisbourg garrison followed the prescriptions of that *Code Militaire*. On the basis of Surlaville's stated aims and acquired reputation, it is fair to say that never before in the history of the garrison had there been so much attention paid to those regulations. Accordingly, one can determine whether or not soldiers were disciplined to the letter of the law, or whether there were exceptions based on colonial variants. In the course of such an analysis one also gains valuable insight into the everyday world of common soldiers. Though the time period covered by the Louisbourg records is short, certain conclusions are obvious. To begin with the large numbers, there were 1,195 infractions (134 infractions more than there were soldiers) recorded in the garrison during the nineteen-month period under study. This represented an average of about 63 crimes or misdemeanours a month, giving a roughly 6 per cent infraction rate. These offences were divided more or less equally throughout the year, though the figures did jump noticeably during the summer months.[25] This suggests that the longer days of the relatively short Louisbourg summer may have witnessed increased drinking by the soldiers and a corresponding rise in their on- and off-duty lapses. In terms of who decided that an act

24 The king's ordinances on military matters were gathered together by Sieur de Briquet as the *Code Militaire, ou compilation des ordonnances des Roys de France concernant les gens de guerre*, 4 tomes (Paris, 1728).

25 In 1752 the monthly totals varied between 60 and 76, with the exception of July and August, when the totals climbed to 84 and 86.

worthy of punishment had been committed, in 60 per cent of the cases where the arrestor was identified, it was an officer. Next came sergeants (28 per cent), then corporals (11 per cent), and a handful of others. Obviously, the greater the distance between ranks, the greater the likelihood of finding fault with the enlisted men.

As for the infractions themselves, their significance is most easily grasped when brought together in meaningful categories, as follows.

Alcohol (**Alc**) - infractions where drunkenness was mentioned.
Appearance (**App**) - uniform or equipment infractions.
Attitude (**Att**) - incidents of disobedience or lack of respect.
Barracks (**Barr**) - infractions in the barracks rooms.
Duty Failure (**Duty**) - missed guard mounting, absences, etc.
Fights/Disputes (**F/D**) - incidents of violence or noise.
Swearing (**Sw**) - blasphemy or swearing.
Thefts/Money matters (**T/M**) - theft or illegal sale of goods.

These groups do permit overlap. A drunken soldier who steals, for instance, will be entered in two categories, as will another who has a dirty uniform and then shows insolence to his officer or NCO when criticized for it. Despite that flaw, the categories permit one to see at a glance the general areas of infraction. At the same time, the categories also shed light on the working and living conditions of the soldiers, and on their recreational pursuits.

Beginning with the lowest totals, it is obvious from **Figure 4** that uniform violations (**App**) and bad language (**Sw**) were relatively rare in the garrison; or rather that most such infractions that occurred were not considered serious enough to warrant particular punishment. A castigating word to the wise, or an appropriate glare, were probably correction enough in most situations. Only occasionally did soldiers go so far as to seriously "take the name of God in vain," or turn up at inspection with dirty shirts or gaiters. When such offences did occur, the punishment ranged from four days to a month in prison, with the norm being eight or fifteen days. Several of the swearers and blasphemers received a full month, but even they could count themselves lucky. The king's ordinance prescribed that such offenders were to have their tongues pierced by a hot poker.[26]

26 Briquet, *Code Militaire...*, Section 1, Article XXXVI, 290.

Figure 4 indicates that there were about twice as many crimes involving money (**T/M**) as those for swearing or appearance violations. The explanation is simple enough: while there were undoubtedly more of the latter infractions than the former, theft and extortion cases could never be tolerated or handled in some way that did not lead to punishment (and hence end up in Surlaville's records). Each incident had to be dealt with. Protection of property was a priority, as was upholding the solidarity that was supposed to exist among men of arms. Soldiers who stole from each other, or sold parts of their uniform, or extorted money from civilians had to be punished, and severely. Indeed, there were probably many instances of barracks-room justice, where the offended parties took retribution into their own hands. According to the *Code Militaire*, any soldier who stole clothes, pay, equipment or food from those who lodged with him was either to be put to death or sent to the galleys for life.[27] Nothing so severe, however, at least for the crime of in-barracks theft, was exacted at Louisbourg. Nonetheless, the crime was not easily forgiven. The fortunate ones received a stay in prison, usually one or two months. The rest were forced to run the gauntlet ("passer par les verges"or "passer par les baguettes"), a punishment that was more often than not followed by a period of recuperation in the hospital. In such cases, the very comrades who had been victimized by the guilty party had a hand in dispensing justice.

The fights and disputes category (**F/D**), the next highest group, is best interpreted in conjunction with two others, alcohol (**Alc**) and barracks (**Barr**). Excessive consumption of alcohol was specifically mentioned in almost one-quarter of all offences, and was a direct factor in many of the physical fights and verbal disputes that led to soldiers being punished. Similarly, the close quarters of barracks life, where rooms were often crowded and damp, smokey and uncomfortable,[28] inevitably gave rise to arguments and quarrels. This was a reality wherever there were barracks. In Louisbourg the irritability factor was likely so much higher because of the long winters, which kept men cooped up indoors for periods they had

27 *Ibid.*, Article XXVII, 287.

28 The barracks situation in Louisbourg is recounted in Blaine Adams, "The Construction and Occupation of the Barracks of the King's Bastion at Louisbourg," 59-147, in *Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in History and Archaeology*, No. 18 (Ottawo, 1978).

never known in France. Moreover, the relative shortage of women in the town (the male/female ratio was never better than three to one) probably contributed to the sense of frustration in the men's lives. The punishments meted out to fighting or disputatious soldiers varied widely, depending on who was involved and where and when the infractions occurred. Such flexibility in terms of punishment was considered essential. When it came to general misbehaviour, stated the king's ordinance of 1750, "His Majesty is relying on commanders of places and those of the corps to which they belong to keep them in prison for all the time deemed necessary for their correction."[29] Accordingly, the Louisbourg officers generally rewarded routine barracks scuffles with eight- to fifteen-day sentences, even if the soldier who bit his sergeant on the hand may have deserved more. When a corporal pulled one of the men's hair and then bit him, he was given a full month in prison. But then one expects a bit more from an NCO. When the injuries were more serious, the enlisted men's sentences were heavier. One soldier received two months for beating another, while two *soldats* were given three months each in prison after ganging up on a third. And when one soldier attacked another with a knife--likely wounding him badly--the local officers had him shot ("passer par les armes"). In another case, where two soldiers fought each other using bayonets, the Louisbourg authorities could have used the *Code Militaire* to guide their punishment, which would have seen the men condemned to the Mediterranean galleys for life.[30] Instead, the combatants were sentenced to one month each in the local prison.

When flare-ups involving soldiers occurred within a civilian setting, such as on a street or in one of Louisbourg's many drinking establishments, the punishments tended to be more moderate than what the men would have received if the infractions had occurred in a military context. Witness the sergeant who received only four days in prison for beating up a woman, or the soldier who got the same penalty for giving a "coup de baton" to a civilian. More serious offences, like that of the sergeant who stuck his sword in a girl's back, did get heavier sentences (he was given a month

29 *Ordonnance du Roy...* (Arras, 1750), 133.

30 *Code Militaire...*, Section 1, Article XIII, 283-4.

in prison and then broken to the ranks), but not as heavy as if he had injured another soldier. On the other hand, any urban crimes that went beyond what might be loosely considered off-duty mischief, such as theft or murder, were handed over to the civilian authorities for prosecution.

To return to the barracks, it is worth pointing out that many of the infractions that occurred there did not involve fighting or excessive noise. Housekeeping violations were at least as common. Many soldiers simply refused to do their cooking or cleaning duties (one even said he would rather go to prison than cook--so they obliged him). Others were too inebriated to perform the tasks. Either way, they were generally given eight or fifteen days in prison to think about mending their ways. Similar terms were handed out to soldiers who urinated in their beds (this happened about once a month), while those who defecated were given two months. Another annoying, and not uncommon, barracks infraction was that of breaking curfew or not sleeping in quarters at all. Such behaviour was really a variation on being absent without leave, a serious crime in any army. There were military patrols on Louisbourg streets to keep an eye out for errant soldiers, just as there were barracks inspections to make sure all was quiet and everyone in bed on time. Any sergeant who tried to cover up an absence was subject to fifteen days in prison.[31] Despite the virtual certainty of being caught, several soldiers opted to sleep elsewhere. Their punishments ranged from one to two months in prison, as long as the absence was only a few nights. If they stayed away much longer they risked their *découché* being regarded as a desertion. One man in the Louisbourg garrison was absent for sixteen days before returning to the fold, whereupon he was executed.

The category with the greatest number of offenders at Louisbourg was the duty failure (**Duty**). This group covers all errors of omission or commission in garrison routines, and often includes infractions that also show up in the attitude (**Att**) and appearance (**App**) categories. Common offences were missing roll call, speaking disrespectfully to officers or NCOs, and not being able to pass inspection. Minor infractions (such as having two cartouches, or none at all in a musket) were typically punished with eight-day sentences. More serious violations, such as allowing a prisoner to escape,

31 *Ordonnance du Roy...* (1750), 79, 132-5.

were given fifteen days. Unauthorized absences would earn one or two months in prison, or the death penalty in extreme cases. As alcohol abuse was a serious problem in the garrison, intoxication was a factor in some offences. More than a few soldiers showed up drunk for guard duty, a crime that the *Code Militaire* stated should be punished by making offenders ride the wooden horse for an hour a day for a month.[32] But, as with so many of the penalties recommended by the 'book', Michel de Surlaville and other officers at Louisbourg chose to come up with their own punishment. They rarely opted for the wooden horse,[33] preferring instead to have soldiers found drunk on duty spend one month in prison.

Up to this point our attention has been directed solely at the shortcomings of the ordinary soldiers. It must be pointed out that a sizeable percentage of infractions, most of which can be labelled duty failures, were also committed by NCOs and drummers. Indeed, in the eyes of the officers, the number of lapses by sergeants and corporals must have been distressingly high. In June 1753, after a year and a half of Major Surlaville's policies to tighten up discipline in the garrison, fully one-third of the month's infractions (19 of 58) were committed by NCOs and drummers. The following month, July 1753, the situation was no better: 22 of 64 offences were by sergeants (8), corporals (7), drummers (3), and *enspessades* (4). One captain that month, Merville, felt obliged to put three of his NCOs in prison. For drummers, the most serious failure was missing a prescribed drum call. Practically all garrison routines were based on hearing the appropriate drum beat at the right time, so any default was both easily noticed and readily punished. In June 1752, one drummer failed to beat the nightly retreat and received a month in prison for his oversight; another drummer the same month missed beating "la Générale" and spent over two months in prison as a result. Corporals found themselves in trouble much more often than drummers, though their lapses were usually of a minor nature. But a serious mistake--such

32 *Code Militaire*..., Section 1, Article XI, 283. This punishment device (*cheval de bois*) was a wooden structure, usually constructed in the shape of a horse. It had a narrow beam upon which offenders sat without being able to touch the ground. Weights were sometimes added to their legs to increase the pain.

33 Archives Departmentales du Calvados, F1891, Fonds Surlaville, "État des Soldats...qui ont été fustigé ou monté sur le Cheval de bois."

as impertinence, being drunk on duty or allowing the men to drink in their "chambre" until 11 o'clock (for which one corporal got three months in prison)--sometimes led to a demotion; that is, being broken to the ranks of the *simples soldats*. The same threat existed for the sergeants, though it is difficult to know how often that punishment was carried out. All too often the entries mentioning sergeants indicate only that a misdemeanour was committed. The nature of the infraction and its punishment were regularly left out. Some examples that do exist reveal one sergeant receiving eight days in prison for failing to carry out an order; another receiving the same sentence for allowing a soldier to sleep in the guardhouse overnight instead of sending him to prison; and a third who got a month in prison for telling falsehoods to his captain.

Finally, what of the punishments themselves? Which were the most common, and what does the quantitative evidence tell us about the Louisbourg garrison under Michel Le Courtois de Surlaville? A glance at **Figure 5** reveals the obvious preference that local officers had for eight-day, fifteen-day and one-month prison sentences. The first two were meted out for more or less routine infractions, while the one-month stay behind bars was the standard for more serious offences. Clearly, an effort was being made to standardize punishment in these three categories. At the same time there remained flexibility in sentencing if an officer or NCO wanted it. If he felt that a particular crime (or a particular individual) deserved better or worse than the norm, then he could mete out a four- or a nineteen-day sentence, or alternatively a two- to four-months' confinement.

Table 1
Soldiers' Punishments: Corporal compared with Imprisonment

Imprisonment (from 1 day to 4 months)	1026
Gauntlet (*passer par les baguettes. . . verges*)	12
Executed (*passer par les armes*)	2
Dungeon* (*cachot*)	16
Not Indicated	145

*Dungeon totals are separated from other prison figures because a stay in the *cachot*, with its increased dampness and no light at all, was obviously a more severe physical punishment than a routine prison term.

When one examines **Table 1**, which compares imprisonment totals with the figures for those who received some type of physical punishment, another aspect becomes obvious. This is the apparent preference for discipline by confinement rather than by corporal punishment. It is of course possible that there were some "routine" whippings or wooden-horse mountings that went unrecorded during the nineteen-month period covered by the documents in the Surlaville papers. Yet, if a one-day prison term was worth noting (and there were twenty such entries), then one wonders how many relatively minor corporal punishments could have gone unnoted, by a man who appears to have kept track of virtually everything that went on in the garrison. And even if the 145 entries (see **Table 1**) for which no punishment was indicated were in fact all floggings or wooden-horse mountings, the numbers still show an overwhelming preference on the part of the Louisbourg officers for imprisonment. Some traditional corporal measures were still being exacted, but on the whole it seems clear that periods of detention had taken over as the principal means of repaying or discouraging unwanted behaviour. Add to that evidence the many examples noted above of Louisbourg punishments that were less severe than those called for by the *Code Militaire*, and the picture becomes clearer still. What we see is a recognizably "modern" approach toward punishment, where the body, as Michel Foucault put it, is no longer the "major target" of discipline and penal repression.[34] Instead, but for exceptional crimes that still called for the public spectacles of running the gauntlet or execution, the inclination was for out-of-sight confinement. These prison "sentences" ranged anywhere from a single day to four months, though most lasted eight days, or fifteen days or one month.

Close analysis of Michel de Surlaville's Louisbourg garrison records reveals repeated instances of colonial military men ignoring official regulations. To begin with, certain policies and rules were often broken or bent at the time of recruitment, in terms of the age and height of the men accepted. Consequently, many of the soldiers sent to Louisbourg during the 1750s were both younger and shorter than what was called for in the regulations. Then, once the men were in the colony, garrison officers and NCOs at Louisbourg regularly showed a willingness to punish the soldiers as they

34 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison* (New York, 1977), 8.

saw fit, rather than as officially stipulated in the *Code Militaire*. When the *Code Militaire* spelled out a physical punishment, the decision was frequently taken locally to overlook the regulation. Instead, the preferred method of punishment was for fixed prison terms.

The preferences of Louisbourg officers for imprisonment over corporal punishment might seem on the surface to reflect "modernist" thinking on their part. This was soon to be the era, after all, when more moderate ideas on punishment would begin to emerge in Europe. Reform-minded critics such as Cesare Beccaria in *On Crimes and Punishments* (1764) would soon be calling for the abolition of the death penalty and other modifications to criminal procedure. Different writers in other countries followed suit with their own denunciations of severe physical punishments. Does the Louisbourg evidence foreshadow these very developments? I would argue that it does not. It is undeniable that the Surlaville data reveals a predilection for moderation when it came to punishing soldiers for routine infractions. That preference, however, probably had less to do with the influence of new ideas than with the reality of the situation at Louisbourg. There was always a shortage of troops on Cape Breton and the Louisbourg officers and NCOs undoubtedly decided, for practical reasons rather than philosophical ones, to inflict as little punishment as possible on the men they had. Why maim or execute a soldier, unless the infraction absolutely demanded it, such as in the case of treason or desertion. It might be six months or more before a recruit would arrive to take his place. How much better, they must have reasoned, to make a disciplinary point through an eight- or fifteen-day prison sentence. When the nearest recruits were an ocean away, it was essential enough to practise fairly moderate punishment. These measures had to be strong enough to be seen as a deterrent, yet not so severe as to reduce manpower. Such practical considerations, ever the concern of the military man on the ground, probably held as much sway with the Louisbourg officers as any wind of philosophical change blowing across the ocean.[35]

35 John H. Langbein, in *Torture and the Law of Proof: Europe and England in the Ancien Regime* (Chicago, 1977), demonstrates how the elimination of judicial torture owed more to practical considerations than to ideological principles.

FIGURE 1
Ages of Louisbourg Soldiers, 1752



Source: NAC, MG18, F30, Dossier 1

FIGURE 2
Enlistment Ages
of Louisbourg Soldiers, 1752



Source: NAC, MG18, F30, Dossier 1

FIGURE 3
Height of Louisbourg Soldiers, 1752



Source: NAC, MG18, F30, Dossier 1

FIGURE 4
Soldiers' Punishments at Louisbourg, 1752-3
By Category



Source: NAC, MG18, F30, Dossier 1, 2, 3; ASQ, Polygraphies 55 & 58

FIGURE 5
Length of Prison Sentences
Louisbourg Garrison, 1752-53



Source: NAC, MG18, F30, Dossier 1

French and British Naval Power at the Two Sieges of Louisbourg: 1745 and 1758[1]

Julian Gwyn

Fortress Louisbourg on Ile Royale was one of the most heavily fortified towns in eighteenth-century North America. Yet it was twice besieged and twice taken in the space of fourteen years, first in 1745 and again in 1758. In each case the loss of the intended French stronghold depended directly on the relative use of sea power by Britain and France. The importance of sea power was equally demonstrated in the less well-known years of 1746 and 1757. In 1746 the French sent a large naval force to Nova Scotia to recapture Louisbourg at the very moment when the British were hoping to launch an expedition up the St. Lawrence River to strike at the heart of New France at Quebec. The arrival of a French force at Chebucto harbour immediately threw the British on to the defensive and plans for an attack on Quebec were set aside. The second instance, in 1757, occurred when the French concentrated a large naval force in Louisbourg harbour, thereby undoing Anglo-American plans for besieging the fortress that very summer. In such dramatic ways, naval power proved to be the key to the colonial domination of the strategically vital Atlantic region of North America.

Historians, whether writing from a French or British viewpoint, have either ignored the naval role in North America in the era before the American War of Independence, or assumed the inevitability of the ultimate defeat of French power in North America.[2] It suited French-Canadian historians to adopt the 'weakness of France' theory to explain *"la guerre de la conquête,"* which, they argued, devastated French-Canadian society.[3] This theory emphasized the numerical weakness of the population of New France when compared to that of British America, while ignoring the numerical

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1 An address, based on an earlier version of this paper, was given to a session of the Ninth Naval History Symposium at the Naval College, Annapolis, Maryland, 19 October 1989.

2 From many examples I will cite only W.H.G. Kingston, *Popular History of the British Navy from the Earliest Times to the Present* (London: Gall & Inglas, 1876) which takes no note of any British naval operations or role in North American waters before 1778.

3 See Guy Fregault, *La Guerre de la conquête* (Montreal: Fides, 1955) and Michel Brunet, *Les Canadiens après la conquête 1759-1775* (Montreal: Fides, 1969).

superiority of France herself over Great Britain. These views were strengthened by the myth of Britain as a nation with an invincible navy and France as a nation with her eyes fixed only on her land frontiers. My interpretation is rather different. It insists on considering events and ideas as contemporaries, on both sides of the English Channel and on both continents, North America and Europe, looked at them. A careful reading of the French and British records of the period demonstrates that before 1759 there was in Great Britain little confidence that, either diplomatically or in the clash of arms, they would be able to contain their principal rivals, France and Spain. As late as 1758, when British politicians committed themselves wholeheartedly to the American campaign, the Cabinet was not sure whether there were ships enough at home to prevent a French invasion of England.[4] Similarly, a British assumption of easy conquest at Louisbourg in 1758 or at Quebec a year later, simply cannot be found in any contemporary British or American evidence.[5]

An American scholar recently claimed that ever since the naval battles off La Hogue in 1692 and off Toulon in 1704 the French would never again willingly engage the British navy in a major sea battle.[6] If this were true, the British remained ingorant of such changes in circumstances. Another American scholar, perhaps more judiciously, was prepared to say only that

> If any pattern emerges from the naval history of the eighteenth century, it is that British officers generally fought more boldly and more competently; British captains handled their ships, British admirals their squadrons, more aggressively and more expertly. . . .British naval doctrine called for aggressive tactics, whereas French squadrons generally went to sea, not to fight, but

4 A good treatment of English politics during the war is Richard Middleton, *The Bells of Victory. The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct of the Seven Years' War 1757-1762* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), and Stephen Baxter, "The Conduct of the Seven Years' War" in *England's Rise to Greatness 1660-1763*, edited by S. Baxter (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

5 We are usefully reminded that even in 1759, owing to earlier military failures in North America since 1755, "those in Britain had become pessimistic about the prospect of. . .Wolfe's expeditionary force taking the city." See Philip Lawson, *The Imperial Challenge. Quebec and Britain in the Age of the American Revolution* (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989), p. 3.

6 John Robert McNeil, *Atlantic Empires of France and Spain. Louisbourg and Havana 1700-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), p. 7.

> to accomplish a particular mission; the anxiety of the French commanders was to preserve their ships so that the mission might be carried out. The difference in objectives led to a difference in behaviour.[7]

So much of British policy after the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) was driven not by bold policy initiatives, but in reaction to both French and Spanish pressure. This often took the form of a greatly feared encirclement of British America by the French, a particularly acute anxiety in the 1740s and 1750s. The British attacks on Louisbourg can properly be seen as defensive reactions within this context. Or, as in the Caribbean, it could take the form of British anxiety about the aggressive Spanish *costa guarda* policy in the period 1713-39.[8] In view of the fact also that from the accession to the British throne of the Hanoverian dynasty in 1714 until the battle of Culloden in 1746, the greatest worry of successive British ministries arose from the threat of Jacobitism.[9] Historians will look in vain before 1745 for evidence of significant British adventures in continental or colonial affairs.

It is well recognized that throughout the colonial period the principal instrument of British power was the navy, while that for France this role was played by the army. Much has been made of this. It is generally forgotten that though the size of the French fleet was usually somewhat smaller than that of the British, it was only in specific years, and owing to war losses, such as 1747-48 and from late 1759 to 1762, that this was of grave importance. By contrast there are plenty of examples to be drawn from the period of the aggressive use of French naval power. In August 1740, for instance, a time of peace between France and Great Britain, but in the midst of an Anglo-Spanish war, France sent two powerful squadrons to the West Indies, totalling thirty-three warships, with orders to destroy the British fleet then in the Caribbean and to invade Jamaica. Only the sudden death of the Holy

7 Daniel A. Baugh, *British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 145, 146.

8 See the work of Richard Pares, *War and Trade in the West Indies 1739-1763* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936).

9 Jeremy Black, *Natural and Necessary Enemies. Anglo-French Relations in the Eighteenth Century.* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), and his "Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole" in *Britain in the Age of Walpole*, edited by Jeremy Black (London: Macmillan, 1984), 145-70; and especially Paul S. Fritz, *The English Ministers and Jacobitism Between the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).

Roman Emperor, which had such a dramatic impact on European politics, resulted in the withdrawal of these remarkable orders. In another instance, in 1759, two French fleets were sailing off the Portuguese coast and in the Bay of Biscay under orders to invade England, when they were defeated by their British rivals. To contemporaries, at least before 1759, the British navy was not the invincible instrument later historians have made it, nor was the *Marine français* a pathetically weak link in *Ancien Régime* France.

Recent administrative histories of both the British and French navies in the colonial era have shown how unwieldly ships and fleets could be. Both fleets were led by officer corps who were under no obligation to serve, and depended on seamen who, for the most part, served against their will in miserable conditions. Neither corps of officers appears to have been a hearty band of brothers. The British corps of naval officers, at least from the 1740s, was characterized in part by serious rivalries, ill-will and considerable litigation, frequently arising from disputed actions at sea, brought by officers against each other. "In the navy," one contemporary noted about French officers, "they all hate one another."[10] The French corps was characterized by a "vicious factionalism," where officers came largely from the provincial nobility in the hinterlands either of Toulon or Brest. Insubordination was endemic and went unpunished. There was a feeling of inferiority, as French naval officers were but a small group in a "large French military establishment,"[11] and to make matters worse, they were poorly paid when compared to military officers. Like their British counterparts, French naval officers involved themselves in all sorts of trade, both legal and illegal, to supplement their incomes, while the hope of prize money in wartime became the dominant attraction in the service for both officers and men. Yet despite their shortcomings, neither the French nor British navy experienced difficulty in finding officers. In Britain it was a career of considerable appeal to the sons of gentlemen of modest means. As for ordinary seamen, both navies faced the same problem: neither could find enough seamen to supply

10 James Pritchard, *Louis XV's Navy 1748-1762. A Study of Organization and Administration* (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987), p. 66.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 55.

the "wartime needs of both the navy and the merchant service."[12] For Britain, perhaps 65 per cent of the thousands of men who served as ratings during the Seven Years' War served not from any patriotic sentiment, but because they were forced to enlist by a press gang. Such impressment was "universally hated."[13] Men avoided service in both fleets, not only because the pay was uncompetitive with the merchant service and work ashore, but also because the working and living conditions, the harsh discipline and the unusual risk of death from disease deterred them.[14]

The French navy, numerically smaller than that of the British, was not obviously inferior until late in 1759, a year after the second siege of Louisbourg. French warships were widely reckoned to be "the finest in the world."[15] Some British warships, by contrast, were among the most unwieldy. The French, through their Hydrographic Office, excelled in map- and chart-making. Incidentally, important scientific expeditions were carried out in 1750-51 which produced the "first accurate surveys of the coast of Nova Scotia based on astronomical observations,"[16] at a time when the colony was ostensibly British. As far as the dockyards were concerned, those in France "were among the largest industrial establishments"[17] in Europe, with the smallest employing almost as many workers as the largest in Great Britain.

It was in the financing of the navies where the British had a distinct advantage.[18] Rich though France was, and richer as she was becoming in

12 Baugh, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

13 N.A.M. Rodger, *The Wooden World. An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 148.

14 Pritchard, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 126.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 27, and Kenneth Donovan, "The Marquis de Chabert and the Louisbourg Observatory in the 1750's," *The American Neptune*, XLIV (Summer 1984), 186-197.

17 Pritchard, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

18 *Ibid.*, pp. 184-205; P.G.M. Dickson, *The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688-1756* (London: Macmillan, 1967); J.F. Bosher, *French Finances: From Business to Bureaucracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

the eighteenth century, her public finances went unreformed during the *Ancien Régime*. So where the French navy was invariably in financial difficulty, Britain through the institutionalizing of the National Debt was able from the 1690s onwards to raise funds much more effectively. This enabled successive British administrations to raise more regiments, build and commission more warships, grant more and larger subsidies to her continental allies and American colonial governments, than would have been possible had she been obliged to pay for her wars through taxation alone, the method followed by France. In the wars of 1702-13 and 1739-48, more than 31 per cent of British revenue was raised through public borrowing, and in the war of 1755-63 more than 37 per cent. Fiscal failure thus left France, a country of far greater population and wealth, with both a naval and a military force that in wartime was much smaller than it need have been, had a successful system of public finances been developed.

Expenditure on the British navy before 1745, the year Louisbourg was first besieged, had included the erection of dockyards abroad. Yet the best was at Port Mahon on Minorca, which the Spanish had actually built before the port was captured in 1708. The ones the British themselves established were not great successes. San Antonio on Jamaica was largely ignored by naval officers, while English Harbour, Antigua, was "reckoned fatal to crews of any ship that lay there during the hurricane season, from yellow fever."[19] That Britain had established no dockyard in North America is perhaps the clearest evidence of how little American affairs counted in British strategic calculations before 1745.

As for the French, they had no naval base in the Antilles, where they could refit, repair or replenish French squadrons or individual ships. Recourse was made instead to merchant contractors and to commercial wharves in the region. In France itself there was the great arsenal at Toulon on the Mediterranean. In addition there was the captured base at Port Mahon on Minorca, after it was taken in 1756. In North America a naval base was established at Louisbourg, where a large careening wharf, capstans, capstan house, storehouses, forge, masthouse, boat yard, cooperage, gun wharf and magazine, living quarters and harbour defence batteries were built. At

19 Rodger, *op. cit.*, p. 99. Baugh had called it "a superbe hurricane anchorage," *op. cit.*, p. 352.

Quebec, facilities both for building and repairing vessels were established; and several warships were built there drawing on the abundance of natural resources of the region. This was long before the Admiralty in London ever committed itself to such an experiment in British America.[20]

Before 1745, in contrast to France's policy of great interest in North America in general and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence in particular,[21] that of Great Britain was ambivalent. The Admiralty's chief concern north of the Caribbean was first the protection of the Newfoundland fisheries, and second the defence of the Carolinas against the Spanish, based in Florida and Cuba.[22] Even after the successful capture of Port-Royal (renamed Annapolis Royal) in Acadia in 1710, the tragedy which engulfed the 1711 expedition in the St. Lawrence on its way to Quebec undid the momentary interest the British Admiralty had in extending its concerns to this large region. After the addition of the vast Hudson Bay region and peninsular Nova Scotia, by the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, one might have expected a strategic interest. Yet such a policy would necessarily have involved the navy in new and extended responsibilities, something which was not desired. For the next generation British naval policy hardly changed. Occasional summer cruises by warships off the American coast or in the waters off Newfoundland or Nova Scotia remained the typical pattern. Such brief cruises did nothing to lessen French influence in the Atlantic region. The Acadian population was expanding and the French fishery was prospering. In fact, until the outbreak of war with France in 1744 the British navy was incapable of preventing French fishermen, with the support of their Micmac allies, from landing where they pleased to dry and salt their catches. These very Micmacs on several occasions frightened New England fishermen off the coast when they attempted to do the same on what was supposed to

20 Julian Gwyn, "Shipbuilding for the Royal Navy in Colonial New England," *The American Neptune*, XLVIII (Winter, 1988), 22-30.

21 Frederick J. Thorpe, *Remparts Lointains. La politique française des travaux public à Terre-Neuve et à l'île Royale, 1695-1758* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1980).

22 Julian Gwyn, "The Royal Navy in North America, 1712-1776," in *The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth-Century*, edited by Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), 129-147.

be the coastline of a British colony. Without appropriate orders, the navy did nothing to alter the situation.

Not until the early 1740s did there emerge in Britain a desire to match the power of France in what is now Canada. By that time the fortifications at Louisbourg and elsewhere on Ile Royale were well advanced. Nonetheless, the new British thinking urged a renewed focus on Cape Breton and Canada. To that end a forward strategy was outlined for America, which included the creation of a North American squadron, the deployment of many more warships, and the building of armed vessels on Lake Ontario and of warships in New England and New York.[23] Economic motives outweighed all others as monopolies in the fishery and fur trade, together with an unmatched supply of naval stores, were seen as conferring enormous advantages on Britain. Several colonial American officials and merchants made the same points with the Lords of Trade, the Secretary of State and other important politicians and correspondents in England. Thus the British government was summoned to initiate a policy to counter long established French ambitions in North America.

The time of the establishment of a British North American squadron,[24] and hence a new naval strategy, was triggered early in 1745 by a New England initiative to mount an expeditionary force against Louisbourg, and by a concomitant appeal by the New Englanders for British naval assistance. This American policy was in itself a reaction to the French attacks in 1744, out of Louisbourg, on Canso and Annapolis Royal. The idea of a 1745 counterstroke on Louisbourg was born in Massachusetts, which received the active support of the other New England colonies and of New York.[25]

There was little reason to expect that the New Englanders' expedition would succeed. In British experience, cooperation between the army and navy was poor at the best of times, and the recent example of a fiasco off

23 Such was the advice of Captain Peter Warren. See *The Royal Navy and North America: The Warren Papers, 1736-1752*, edited by Julian Gwyn (London: Navy Records Society, No. 118, 1975), nos. 25-26, 30 & 34.

24 *Ibid.*, no. 43.

25 For the 1745 siege see Julian Gwyn and Christopher Moore, *La Chute de Louisbourg. . . 1745* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1978), and George Rawlyk, *Yankees at Louisbourg* (Orono: University of Maine Press, 1967).

St. Augustine in Florida only confirmed that cooperation between British and American forces was likely to be no better. "It is the general observation that the land and sea forces when joined upon the same Expedition seldom or never agree," wrote Governor Shirley of Massachusetts to William Pepperrell, the commander of the New England forces gathered in 1745. "But I am persuaded it will not be so between you and Commodore Warren, as any misunderstanding might prove fatal."[26] In a succession of letters, Shirley counselled Pepperrell to give Warren no cause for reasonable complaint. Peter Warren, the commander of this modest, newly established North American squadron, had fifteen years' experience on the North American coast, and having lived in Boston, he knew some of the principal military and political figures involved in the expedition. Perhaps not surprisingly, Warren's letters to England, as he made his way northwards from Antigua, were full of foreboding. He commented that "the Navigation is bad, the weather is foggy," and he felt that the naval units assigned to the task, combined with the lack of artillery and general military training among the colonials, diminished the chances of success.[27] Yet he was confident about his ability to cooperate effectively with Pepperrell, a man of limited military background, but nonetheless a figure who commanded widespread New England respect. Despite such doubts, Warren assured Pepperrell of his determination "to promote the success" of the expedition.[28]

Upon reaching the rendezvous point at Canso, Warren saw that the New Englanders had a considerable naval force, though most vessels were no larger than armed schooners. Though Warren himself had never sailed east of Canso, there were many among the New Englanders who were familiar with Louisbourg harbour and the surrounding waters. As his orders allowed him, Warren took seven of the largest vessels directly under his command and used the remainder to carry messages throughout the siege to Canso, Annapolis Royal and Boston, and even to help blockade Louisbourg harbour.

26 William Shirley to Pepperrell, 10 April 1745, Belknap Papers 1744-1745, Massachusetts Historical Society.

27 To his friend, George Anson, recently appointed to the Admiralty Board. See *The Warren Papers*, p. 63.

28 Warren to Pepperrell, 23 April 1745, Massachusetts Historical Society *Collections*, 1st series, I (Boston 1806), 21-2.

Once the commanders had grown accustomed to using proper naval signals, they carried out Warren's orders with enthusiasm and dispatch. This greatly pleased the commodore, who took the opportunity later to speak highly of them and their crews.

There were no French naval warships at Louisbourg when the New Englanders and Warren's small squadron appeared off the coast. The garrison numbered nearly 700 regular soldiers and there were about another 700 men from among the merchants, shopkeepers, fishermen and artisans capable of bearing arms. These French defenders were protected by fortifications which appeared formidable to the New Englanders. Begun in 1718, the fortifications on the landward side were protected by two bastions and two demi-bastions, with a ditch, covered way and glacis. A curtain wall ran for three-quarters of a mile connecting the bastions, with one end anchored on the rocky coast and the other on the harbour side. The mouth of the harbour was almost a mile across, and the channel between ten and twelve fathoms deep. It was protected first by a thirty-six-gun battery on an island near the middle of the entrance, and by numerous scarcely submerged reefs which effectively reduced the entrance by half. If a hostile force managed to force its way past the island battery, it would come under fire from a battery of thirty-six *livres* cannon located on the north shore of Louisbourg harbour, known as the Royal Battery. This battery, known to the British as the Grand Battery, commanded not only the harbour's entrance but also every part of the harbour itself. Strong though it was as a coastal defence, the Royal Battery had its weaknesses. Part of the walls were dominated on the landward side by nearby hills, from which a besieging force, once it got ashore, could fire directly on the walls with impunity. The maritime climate had also had its impact. Even well-built walls, because of the cycle of frost and thawing, threatened to fall into disrepair. A system of revetting, by which planks were clamped over the stones, had been devised, but these could not possibly withstand shelling. In 1735, when the threat of war with Britain loomed, the Minister of Marine observed that the town would receive reinforcements from France if there was any evidence of a British expeditionary force against the colony. Without such a threat, it was felt there was no need to winter French warships in the harbour. This policy was in effect in 1744-45.

For the French, the 1745 siege brought with it a series of disappointments. The Anglo-American forces, by contrast, despite the evident stress, managed to hold together. Beyond Louisbourg harbour to the south and east was commodious Gabarus Bay, which Warren and the New Englanders used as an anchorage and organizing point for their assault on the fortified town. The British landing was opposed by no fixed battery, but only by a small body of troops sent too late to repulse the onslaught. Making their way inland toward the town, the New Englanders advanced to the Royal Battery, which had been abandoned and its guns unsuccessfully spiked by French gunners. Occupied at once by the Americans, it served to harass the French garrison for the balance of the siege. The news of this crucial battery falling so easily was greeted by Warren: "I am glad to find so Glorious a Spirit in our Americans. It will greatly recommend them to their Mother Country."[29] The commodore suggested that the New Englanders should next attack the Island Battery, for which enterprise he would furnish them both men and boats. Warren prepared a plan, which called for 700 to 800 men, of whom 500 would be soldiers and the balance seamen. It called for a feint against the walls of the town an hour or two before the attack went in. Immediately upon the attack being made, the squadron would sail into the harbour and fire on the less heavily defended harbour-side of Louisbourg, and thereby accomplish "the sudden reduction"[30] of the place. Warren went ashore to consult with Pepperrell's war council and offered £500 as a reward for those who took part in the assault. For three successive nights a heavy swell lashed the harbour, preventing the attempt. When at last on 5 June the attempt was made, the French defenders of the Island Battery bloodily repulsed the Americans with ease. In the meantime, with the help of British gunners sent ashore from the warships, the New England officers began to erect siege batteries. Shell and shot rained on the town and its walls, damaging many buildings and turning parts of the King's bastion and Dauphin demi-bastion, as well as the Porte Dauphin west gate into piles of rubble. At much the same time, another battery, erected near the

29 Warren to Pepperrell, 2 May 1745, *Louisbourg Journals, 1745*, edited by Louis Effingham DeForest (New York: Society of Colonial Wars in the State of New York, 1932), pp. 189-90.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 193.

lighthouse, bombarded the Island Battery. Soon after it opened fire, it made the French battery almost useless.

Warren's overriding fear throughout the siege was that a French squadron, more powerful than his own, might arrive. A January 1745 letter to him from Governor Shirley of Massachusetts, describing the plan to attack Louisbourg, had been captured by a French vessel in the Antilles. The news of the intended assault was conveyed to France, and the authorities there took immediate action. Yet when the Anglo-American force arrived off Louisbourg, there were no French warships in the harbour. The frigate *Renommée* (32 guns) had been sent out, but because of ice conditions it had been unable to enter Louisbourg harbour in late March and returned to France, a full month before the invaders reached Gabarus Bay. The *Vigilant* (64 guns) was also sent out with troops and ammunition for the garrison. Leaving Brest on 15 April, she took two British prizes on her passage, sending them ahead to Louisbourg. It was from one of these recaptured prizes that Warren learned of the imminent arrival of what he believed was a squadron of four ships of the line and a frigate. He strung out his squadron for several miles northeast of Louisbourg's harbour mouth, as he believed the French generally made their landfall in this latitude. He was thus surprised when the *Vigilant* appeared from the southwest. Though the French captain had been told to proceed directly to Louisbourg, he allowed himself to be drawn into a trap by one of Warren's frigates. The battle raged for about five hours, with the *Vigilant* striking its colours only when its sails and rigging were in tatters and it had suffered sixty casualties among its 500-man crew.[31] The only other French attempt to break the blockade and siege of Louisbourg was the dispatch from Brest of a small squadron, which got no farther than the coast of Newfoundland before learning of the port's surrender. After taking a number of prizes among British and New England vessels, it returned home in October without ever having reached Ile Royale.

Aside from vessels sent from France, Warren also worried that ships from Quebec, Ile Saint Jean or the Antilles might bring reinforcements or supplies for the French population. As it turned out, only a couple of small vessels

31 This account has been reconstructed from the officers' naval logs of the vessels involved, Public Record Office at Kew [PRO]: ADM 51.

got a limited quantity of supplies into the harbour during the siege. The British squadron, on the other hand, managed to take numerous prizes during and after the siege, which incidentally laid the basis of Warren's subsequent fortune.[32]

The British and New England naval force was not just of direct use aboard their ships, but also on shore. By early June, New England military strength was being dissipated. There were approximately 400 sick, while another 600 were detached to search the hinterland of Louisbourg for two parties of French and Indians expected from Canada. So many men were taken up with building trenches, manning the guns, serving the supply train and guarding the base camp on Gabarus Bay that Pepperrell could not have mustered 1500 men to launch an assault on the crumbling walls, had such a decision been taken. Indeed, when the plan to erect a battery at the lighthouse was decided upon in June, more than 300 New Englanders were involved in its preparation. In addition, the New Englanders by then had lost almost 300 men: some were killed, others wounded and still others lost as prisoners. When the *Vigilant* and some of the smaller prizes were taken, they were manned by whatever New England seamen could be spared. For his part, Warren sent guns, gunners and marines ashore and whatever supplies he felt could be of service to Pepperrell.

Until the arrival of British naval reinforcements on 20 June, and the first firings of the lighthouse battery on 21 June, it was quite unclear how the siege would end.[33] On the 20th the *Chester* (50 guns) brought news that naval reinforcements from England were soon expected. Early in March, word had been received in London that a force of French warships and transports were fitting out at Brest. At the time, Canada was thought to be their destination, or perhaps Louisbourg to raise the siege. Admiral Martin put to sea from Plymouth late in March, and within a week had certain news of the French squadron's sailing, though with no clear idea of its destination. Chasing westward for four days, and finding nothing, he detached the *Chester* (50 guns), the *Sunderland* (60 guns) and the *Canterbury* (60 guns). As it turned

32 Julian Gwyn, *The Enterprising Admiral. The Personal Fortune of Admiral Sir Peter Warren* (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974).

33 *The Warren Papers*, p. xxi.

out, the French force was sailing for the Antilles to safeguard a convoy of merchantmen back to France in August. With the certainty of British naval reinforcements about to join him, Warren for the first time began to relax. He wrote of the "present prospect of success. . .and give the Ladys of Lewisbourg a Gallant Ball." On 21 June the lighthouse battery at length opened fire with such good effect that the French gunners fled their now exposed positions. In a few days, the principal obstacle to the squadron's entry into the harbour had been effectively silenced. The attacking forces now planned a common assault by land and by sea. Warren went ashore and addressed the assembled troops by saying, "He'd rather leave his body at Lewisbourg than not take the city." He reminded his listeners that their general "could not take the city with the land forces, neither could he with the sea forces, without the assistance of each other."[34]

As it turned out, the planned assault never occurred. Neither the New Englanders nor the Royal Navy was put to the test at Louisbourg. Yet the threat of an onslaught convinced French commandant, Louis du Pont Duchambon, and his war council to capitulate.[35] The defenders received the right, in view of what Warren called their "gallant defence,"[36] to march out with the honours of war; that is, bearing their arms, with drums beating and flying their colours. They were allowed to take whatever possessions they could carry, except for the high officials who could depart with two wagon loads of their effects, without being inspected. The garrison and inhabitants were deported to France.

News of the fall of Louisbourg was greeted grimly in France, and with great acclaim in British America, the West Indies and Great Britain and Ireland. Bonfires were lit in celebration. The guns of the Tower of London resounded. Poems and loyal broadsheets were printed, loyal greetings drafted, public houses and even streets were renamed. For a fortnight after the news officially reached England, the name of Louisbourg was on everyone's lips.

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34 DeForest, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

35 See *Papers of Jonathan Law, Governor of Connecticut, 1741-1750*, Connecticut Historical Society *Collections*, XI (Hartford, 1907), 304-06. A manuscript copy is in PRO, CO5/44, fol. 69-70.

36 Warren to DuChambon, 16 June 1745, o.s.; *ibid.*, p. 223.

Such popular acclaim surprised the British politicians. The King expressed his "highest satisfaction,"[37] and Pitt called it a "national success,"[38] advising Pelham, the prime minister, never to restore it to the French. Unsympathetic to the war and deeply concerned with its spiralling costs, Pelham considered it a serious obstacle to peace. Others saw it as the basis of new enterprises in North America, and a powerful lever to bring about peace. All this attention lasted but a fortnight, suddenly to be supplanted by the disturbing news of the French-aided landing of the Young Pretender in Scotland. The Highland rebellion and subsequent invasion of England sent the London stock market crashing.[39]

Though the capture of Louisbourg had raised initial hopes in British political circles about extending conquests in North America, French strategy and the Jacobite uprising prevented this from happening. Even in December 1745, when the Pretender's forces began their long retreat from Derby, domestic political concerns in Great Britain prevented effective planning for the 1746 campaign in either Europe or elsewhere. Only in March 1746 were Warren's suggestions of using Louisbourg as a base of operations for the conquest of Canada given serious consideration.[40] At first, essentially defensive orders were prepared. A large naval force was to be concentrated at Louisbourg, whose British garrison was to be augmented by a further 1,000 in addition to the two regiments sent in 1745 from Gibraltar and which had wintered in Virginia. Within a month these orders were altered and agreement given to an ambitious assault on Canada. The plan envisaged, just as Warren and others had suggested, a two-pronged attack, one via the St. Lawrence to seize Quebec, and a second based on Albany via Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River to Montreal. The navy would convoy the 4,000 troops and artillery train from England, and the

37 Harrington to Bedford, 4 August 1745, Bedford MS Letters, X, no. 39, Bedford Estate Record Office, London.

38 Pitt to Bedford, 2 August 1745, *ibid.*, no. 33. See also Pitt's remarks to Pelham, 17 August 1745, Newcastle MS 447, Department of Manuscripts, University of Nottingham.

39 F. McLynn, *France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1981).

40 This next section derives from the introduction to *The Warren Papers*, p. xxxvi-xl.

expedition would be strengthened by whatever troops the garrison of Louisbourg could spare, together with levies raised in New England. Warren was to command a naval squadron consisting of seven ships of the line, three frigates and the usual auxiliary vessels. To this would be added the "sea militia" of armed colonial vessels. The force was to be ready to sail from Louisbourg by the beginning of June 1746.

The plan came undone almost immediately and the force never sailed from Spithead for America. A major factor in the British decision to abandon the scheme was the outfitting of a French fleet to recapture Louisbourg and to take Annapolis Royal. In one bold campaign, the French thereby hoped to recover a significant part of the territory lost by the terms of the peace treaty of Utrecht. This French fleet, under the command of the duc d'Anville, sailed from Rochefort in June 1746, despite British attempts to prevent its departure. The fleet consisted of at least ten ships of the line, three frigates, two sloops, two fire-ships, fifteen transports and nineteen supply ships. It was the largest naval force hitherto concentrated in North American waters by either power. Its rendezvous was to be Chebucto harbour. As it turned out, the French fleet experienced a difficult crossing and did not reach the shelter of the great harbour, then uninhabited, until September. The fleet was so shattered by the heavy winds and seas it had encountered, and so ravaged by disease, that hundreds of seamen and soldiers died. No attempt could be made against either Louisbourg or Annapolis Royal. Five weeks after the French fleet had reached Chebucto harbour it sailed back to France, unimpeded by the British fleet.[41]

The failure to destroy d'Anville's fleet, or even to inflict on it any serious damage, meant that any British expeditionary force sent in 1747 into the St. Lawrence risked being blockaded there by a superior French force in the Gulf. The Admiralty believed that it had too few ships available to blockade the French in their Atlantic ports, and also undertake a new expedition to Canada. This realization spelled the end of the Cabinet's flirtation with an American strategy--the first since 1711--which the fall of Louisbourg had suggested might be possible.

41 James Pritchard is researching a new study of the 1746 French campaign at sea. Until it appears recourse should be made to Guy Fregault, 'L'expedition du duc d'Anville,' *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française*, II (juin 1948), 27-52.

As for the French, the loss of Louisbourg, however embarrassing, had not proved to be the key to the continent, which so many historians have mistakenly claimed it was. French trade continued to sail almost unimpeded to Quebec. For instance, in 1747, even as France suffered a serious naval defeat by Admirals Anson and Warren off Cape Finisterre (Brittany), a frigate convoyed six vessels safely to Quebec and another ten unescorted French merchantmen made their passage safely to Quebec and back to France. Moreover, two ships of the line, the captured *Northumberland* (70 guns) and a frigate arrived in Quebec to help protect the town from attack. They too returned to France safely. Nor were the French obliged to evacuate the Acadian population of Ile Saint Jean, which the terms of the capitulation of Louisbourg required them to do. The capture of Louisbourg had not cowered the Acadians there, nor anywhere else, and for the most part the British navy left them in undisturbed possession of their lands. Even on Ile Royale itself, a few families remained undisturbed throughout the remainder of the war.

If Louisbourg was seized in part by naval power, it was recovered wholly by the success of the French army in the European campaign in 1748. Virtually ignoring its losses at sea in 1747--a second sea battle had occurred off Cape Finisterre in October--France re-established the balance of power by besieging the great fortress of Maestricht in the Austrian Netherlands. Lest France improve her bargaining position at the peace negotiations by its capture, the British agreed to a ceasefire based on conditions which included the mutual restoration of wartime conquests. In this way Ile Royale was recovered by France. Taken as a result of a briefly established local command of the Nova Scotia coast by the British navy, it had been lost to the French for four years until 1749, simply because a couple of French ships of the line, readily available in Brest and Rochefort, had not been dispatched early enough in 1745 by the Minister of the Marine. It was an error the French vowed not to repeat.

The period of peace which followed saw the French regain naval superiority in the region of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, even though British policy toward the area had significantly altered. The perceived need in England to cut costs kept naval units at a minimum until 1755.[42] For the navy it seems clear that

42 "The Royal Navy in North America, 1712-1776," *op. cit.*, 136-38.

after 1749 Nova Scotia was considered in broader terms than a mere fishery, an attitude which had characterized pre-1745 policy. In 1749 the British government applied to the region a policy it had developed more than fifteen years earlier for South Carolina. There, Georgia had been created as a new military colony, and Savannah built at the expense of British taxpayers as a local colonial capital, all for the protection of newly-flourishing South Carolina. Georgia had also been given the necessary naval protection. Now, the colony of Nova Scotia was to be properly established along similar lines. Instead of being a weight around the neck of the colony of Massachusetts, Nova Scotia became a first line of defence. The town of Halifax was established on the west side of Chebucto harbour in 1749 and Dartmouth on the east side a year later. Some 2,600 English settlers accompanied the governor, and the two British regiments evacuated from Louisbourg settled in tents on the new site. Foreign Protestants, mainly German and Swiss, settled a little farther to the west where they established the town of Lunenburg. Small forts were built and manned in the heart of the Acadian-settled regions on the Chignecto isthmus and on Minas basin.

While the British were establishing themselves in peninsular Nova Scotia, the French were not idle. To the surprise and discomfort of the British in Nova Scotia, not only did the French return to Louisbourg in force in 1749, but they also began to fortify the mouth of the St. John River on the Bay of Fundy. In addition, they built a fort on the west side of the Chignecto isthmus at Beauséjour, which was in itself an attempt to limit British claims in Acadia. These French initiatives led directly to the second siege of Louisbourg. Meanwhile, the British governor of Nova Scotia appealed to the Admiralty for vessels to carry out his responsibilities, and two extra sloops were sent him in 1750.[43] When a French armed brigantine was seized in the Bay of Fundy, the French reacted by increasing their naval forces at Louisbourg. Despite the arrival of British warships in Nova Scotian waters, the French retained local naval superiority for the next four years. As a result, French ships sailing as far as the St. John River were never again stopped by the British. Nor could the small British force interdict the illegal trade

43 For details see W.A.B. Douglas, "The Sea Militia of Nova Scotia, 1749-1755: a comment on naval policy," *Canadian Historical Review*, 47 (March 1966), 22-37.

by the Acadians, who lived within the limits of Nova Scotia, with either Ile Royale or Ile Saint-Jean.

The year 1755 marked the beginning of a decisive change to both French and British power in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. It was first decided locally in Halifax and Boston to deal with the Acadians.[44] British naval units supported an expeditionary force mounted in Massachusetts to attack the French fort at Beauséjour. The campaign was a success. The fort fell and then the fortifications at the mouth of the St. John River were razed. This led directly to the independent decision to deport to several American colonies as many of the Acadians as was possible. This series of events occurred before the Admiralty in London was informed. Yet quite independently, the Admiralty sent a squadron under Vice-Admiral Edward Boscawen into the Gulf of St. Lawrence to intercept a French supply convoy on its way to Quebec.[45] Without a declaration of war on France, the attack was made. It accomplished only a small part of its objective, taking but two French warships. Yet in the process many British naval officers gained familiarity with the fogs, ice packs and dangerous currents of the Gulf waters. Though Boscawen missed most of his target, he was reinforced by a squadron under Rear-Admiral Francis Holburne. The arrival of these naval forces in American waters meant that Halifax found itself in an altogether unprepared state of being used as a naval base. In the end, the British had little to show for their aggressive policy in 1755, for the following year the French were again in a commanding position in the Gulf region, and they were greatly strengthened by military victories at Oswego on Lake Ontario and at Port Mahon in the Mediterranean.

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44 Boscawen was party to the decision to deport the Acadians, as were Rear Admiral Mostyn and several of the naval captains in Boscawen's squadron. See W.A.B. Douglas, "Admiral Edward Boscawen, 1711-1761," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, III (1974), 70.

45 The most satisfactory accounts of the naval campaign in the Gulf of St. Lawrence are in W.A.B. Douglas, "Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy, 1713-1766" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Queen's University, 1973) and Lawrence Henry Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution* (15 vols.; New York: Knopf, 1959), VI, 99-126; VII, 90-117. Douglas shows as well how pathetically slow naval officers and the Admiralty were to understand Warren's early emphasis of the need for a "forward" policy in North America. Professional naval opinion continued to believe that any naval units assigned to North America, beyond a few station ships, needlessly drained away forces needed in European waters, where the bulk of French naval power was centred.

The year 1757 saw the British at length concentrate adequate naval and military forces in North America to challenge French power. Yet frustration and expense greeted most British efforts. As far as naval operations were concerned, elaborate plans were laid for a new assault on Louisbourg. A rendezvous was set for Halifax with Holburne sailing his squadron from its home base in Portsmouth, while Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Hardy convoyed transports carrying troops from the Mohawk frontier via New York. Holburne's squadron did not reach Halifax until 9 July, too late to risk an attack on Louisbourg. The French, for their part, countered by dispatching a squadron of four warships from Toulon to Louisbourg and two other squadrons from Brest. This splendid force created an insuperable problem for the British at Halifax, throwing them at once on to the defensive. The appearance of Holburne's squadron off Cape Breton in August and September was not intended to entice the French armada to battle, but to note their movements. His only achievement, however, was to subject his fleet to serious damage when it was battered by a hurricane in late September. Most vessels were dismasted, and the *Tilbury* (60 guns) was driven ashore with the loss of many to drowning. Were it not for considerable sickness among the seamen and marines aboard the French ships in Louisbourg harbour, the French should have drawn great satisfaction from the way the 1757 British campaign at sea had unfolded. An American historian, Lawrence Henry Gipson, accurately characterized the campaign in this way:

> The year 1757 had been one of continued military successes for the French in North America. Everywhere they had been on the aggressive except on Cape Breton Island, where a strongly defensive posture served their purposes much better. Their raiding parties had depopulated much of western Virginia, western Maryland, western Pennsylvania, and western New York; they had conquered and destroyed Fort William Henry and had become the undisputed masters of Lake Ontario and Lake George as well prepared to receive Lord Loudon's great expeditionary force directed against Louisbourg that he gave up the attempt without striking a blow. Further, they had been successful in maintaining contact with France. During the summer of 1757 forty-three ships had eluded the British fleet and arrived at Quebec by way of the strait of Belle Isle, bringing thirty-five hundred troops from France, with war stores and goods.[46]

46 Gipson, *ibid.*, VIII, 167-68.

That there would be such a marked turnabout in 1758 in naval affairs thus was as great a surprise to the British as to the French. British military and naval commanders forcibly impressed the politicians in London of the need, if the mistakes of 1757 were not to be repeated, to ensure that naval units with the necessary troops be in American waters early enough to undertake a successful campaign. To do this, enough warships would have to winter in North America, refit there and be ready to cruise in the Gulf region as soon as ice conditions permitted. In the winter of 1755-56, four warships and two sloops had wintered in Halifax, despite the lack of a careening wharf there. Now, in September 1757, William Pitt, the British Secretary of State who was struggling to keep the administration he jointly headed with the Duke of Newcastle from collapsing, took up an idea first suggested to Boscawen apparently by Captain Joshua Loring, a former privateer captain from Massachusetts who had commanded naval vessels off Nova Scotia. The idea was to establish a naval base at Halifax and thus obviate the need to use Portsmouth as the base for the North Atlantic squadron. Although the careening wharf was not completed until 1759, eight warships wintered at Halifax in 1757-58.

In early 1758 the British government decided that, as part of their North American strategy that season, Louisbourg would be attacked with a force of 13,000 troops, with 1,000 more in reserve in Halifax, supported by a very strong fleet, with some 14,000 seamen and marines on board, under Boscawen.[47] Although most of the troops were already in America, much of the fleet was at Spithead. Boscawen sailed from his moorings off St. Helens on 18 February, but did not reach the safety of Halifax harbour until 10 May. Hardy had left England earlier with a squadron of ten warships and had arrived at Halifax in mid-March, when he sent Commodore Philip Durrel to collect the transports, packed with troops and supplies at New York.

For their part, the French fully expected the British, after their severe disappointments in 1757, to make a second attempt on Louisbourg. So they immediately laid plans for an impressive naval concentration again at

47 Of the several published accounts of the 1758 siege the more reliable include Gipson, *op. cit.*, VII, 167-207, and J.S. McLennan, *Louisbourg from Its Foundations to its Fall, 1713-1758* (London: Macmillan, 1918), pp. 236-93.

Louisbourg in 1758, and for the resupply of the garrison there and at Quebec.[48] Yet they retained no naval units at Louisbourg over the winter, partly owing to food shortages and to an epidemic of typhus among the seamen. They also knew from experience that their ships would invariably arrive in the Gulf long before any British warship in the spring. So when, in March 1758, the Louisbourg garrison learned from Micmac scouts that the British had wintered several warships at Halifax, they did not feel as if the end were in sight. Already they had been informed that French ships were on their way to Ile Royale. Unfortunately for them, not all their plans developed as intended. The frigate *Magnifique* reached Ile Royale by the end of March 1758, but was prevented by ice and fog from getting into Louisbourg harbour. Unwisely, the *Magnifique* returned to France, having to bury at sea almost the entire crew before reaching Brest in mid-May. Convoys were prepared at Brest, Rochefort and Bordeaux, yet they too encountered difficulties. The naval force from Rochefort, while in the final preparations to sail for Louisbourg, was surprised early in April by a small British squadron under Rear-Admiral Edward Hawke. No vessels were lost, but to escape capture the French escorts jettisoned guns and stores to lighten the ship. The historian, Ruddock Mackay, may exaggerate when he claims that as a result, the "fate of Louisbourg had been sealed on the coast of France;"[49] nonetheless this French squadron of five ships of the line and two frigates was delayed by several weeks from sailing, and when it got to sea it made for Quebec, not Louisbourg. Two French squadrons did manage to reach Ile Royale, but only one got into Louisbourg harbour.

48 This account is constructed from fourteen manuscript journals of the siege, written by French officials and officers, all of which are available on microfilm at the National Archives (Manuscript Division), in Ottawa. There is a list of these in Michel Wyczynski, "L'Edition critique du Mémoire de François-Claude-Victor Grillot de Poilly (1er juin-27 juillet 1758)" (MA thesis, University of Ottawa, 1977): 179-86. Of special interest from the naval viewpoint are the journals of the senior naval officer, Marquis Charry Desgouttes, the copies of all his orders given before and during the siege, the journal of one of his captains, chevalier de Tourville. The journal of the military engineer, Grillot de Poilly, which Wyczynski critically edits, is the most detailed. De Poilly is especially critical of the dispositions of the squadron during the siege, which led McLennan to write unnecessarily harshly of the "ineffectiveness" of the French naval officers: *op. cit.*, p. 294, a view which has influenced others.

49 Ruddock F. Mackay, *Admiral Hawke* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 191.

Altogether, twelve warships arrived over several weeks from mid-April to early June: the warships *Prudent* (74 guns), *Entreprenant* (74 guns), *Capricieux* (64 guns), *Célèbre* (64 guns), *Bienfaisant* (64 guns), *Apollon* (50 guns), and the frigates *Aréthuse, Comète, Echo* and *Fidelle*, and two sloops, the *Chèvre* and *Biche*. It was a force of almost 4,000 officers and men. A second squadron of five warships and a frigate arrived at Port Dauphin to the northwest of Louisbourg harbour, carrying an infantry regiment (the Cambis Regiment) and supplies. Boscawen's expeditionary force, which on 1-2 June sailed into Gabarus Bay, and Hardy's squadron off the harbour mouth, prevented this important additional reinforcement from getting to Louisbourg. Had this second French squadron been able to join the French ships already arrived, it is a matter of speculation what that would have done to British plans. It was an extraordinary bit of luck for the British--the difference of a day or two from the French perspective--rather than the result of settled British naval policy. The failure of this second squadron to get into Louisbourg meant that a counter-attack on the approaching British fleet was much more difficult for the French to achieve. For this second squadron was ordered by the governor of Louisbourg to sail to reinforce Quebec, while the infantry regiment on board, the Cambis Regiment, was disembarked and sent on foot to Louisbourg, which it had no difficulty entering.

To the British this meant that for the first time since 1755 they, and not the French, had local naval superiority off the Atlantic coast of Ile Royale. That superiority meant that from early June 1758 the port of Louisbourg was virtually closed to French shipping, although a couple of small supply vessels managed to get past Hardy's squadron anchored off the harbour entrance.[50] Earlier, at the end of April, Hardy himself had taken the frigate *Diane;* and later, when the frigate *Echo* tried to escape the harbour for Quebec, she too was taken as a prize. Two French frigates, the *Comète* in June and the *Aréthuse* in July, managed to make their escape and carried back to France the despatches of the governor, the military and naval commanders, as well as the intendant.

50 The account from the British side is reconstructed from the thirty naval captain's logs, the journals of the admirals and that of Commodore Durrel. Also used were five journals kept by military officers, the Boscawen-Amherst correspondence, and James Wolfe's letter. All this material is available on microfilm at the National Archives (Manuscript Division), Ottawa.

For their part, the British naval force was able to land the troops, though not without considerable losses. The heavy surf on the selected landing beaches into Gabarus Bay delayed the attempt until dawn of 8 June. Over a hundred boats sank or were smashed on the rocks by the heavy seas. Much of this damage occurred after the French defenders, who with great discipline had remained concealed until the last moment, poured down a terrible fire, once the covering British naval guns fell silent. At length the French were driven from their defensive positions, fleeing first to the cover of the forest and then inside the walls of the town. All morning long on 8 June the British fleet continued to land troops and supplies. Days were spent in landing guns and ammunition, during which time the French gunners, both within the fortress itself and on board the naval vessels in the harbour, were able to fire on the British troops. The British could not initially respond, as they were building roads, filling bogs, dragging guns, digging ditches and establishing batteries. Not until the night of 20 June was the first British battery ready for action. This first siege position was established at the lighthouse which, despite its importance in the 1745 siege, the French had failed to fortify.

Some modern military historians believe that once the assault landing had been made, the loss of the fortress with its garrison was a foregone conclusion. None of the contemporary British or French accounts, it should be remembered, expressed that view.[51] Drucour, the governor of Louisbourg, was the only one of those who have left their views to posterity to write that if help from France failed to arrive, the fortress would fall. He was nevertheless determined to prolong the siege into the summer, thereby preventing the British "de faire d'autres entreprises" in North America.[52] In this Drucour was entirely successful, and the role of the French squadron was decisive. On several occasions the naval officers requested the French council of war to allow them to make their escape. On each occasion the

51 Julian S. Corbett, *England in the Seven Years' War. A Study in Combined Strategy* (2 vols.; London: Macmillan, 1907), I, 313 noted that once the landing had been made, "the fate of Louisbourg was finally sealed." See as well J. Mackay Hitsman and C.C.J. Bond, "The Assault Landing at Louisbourg, 1758," *Canadian Historical Review*, XXXV (December 1954), 314.

52 Journal of Augustin de Boschenry de Drucour, Archives Nationales (AN), Colonies, C11B, 38, fol 57-103v, National Archives, Ottawa: Reel F167.

request was turned down. In the first instance, on 9 June, the naval commander asked for clearance to sail out of the harbour to attack the port of Halifax, which he believed would have so alarmed the British squadron that they would have rushed to respond, thus ending the siege. The war council rejected this bold plan, even though it had the sympathy of every naval captain and it was generally admitted that at this early date, with the British preoccupied by landing their stores and guns, a more favourable moment could not have been selected.

When the French frigate *Aréthuse* escaped from Louisbourg on the night of 15 July with a fresh wind, it took to France despatches which spoke of "la triste situation" facing Louisbourg.[53] Without help from France or from a relief column from Quebec, reported the despatches, the garrison and the warships would fall to the British. As it turned out, the British managed to capture only one more French warship, but the story from the French viewpoint was not heroic. On the night of 27-28 June, the naval captains attempted to block the harbour entrance by sinking five vessels, having first cut off their masts and removed their guns and stores. Sacrificed were the *Apollon*, the *Chèvre*, the *Fidèle* and the *Biche*, along with a merchant ship, *La Ville de Saint Malo*. The British discovered the sunken obstacles on the 29th, when the fog lifted. Henceforth, the siege became largely an exchange of cannon fire, and much of it from the British side directed against the French warships in the harbour. The French responded by ordering most of the crews ashore, and removing much of the powder as well. Despite their exposed positions, the French warships took relatively few hits and suffered only a few casualties, until the afternoon of 21 July, when a red-hot cannon ball ignited some powder on the *Célèbre*. There was an explosion and the ship was soon in flames. As the *Célèbre* burned a great wind was generated, which spread first to the sails of the *Entreprenant* and then to the *Capricieux*. All three burned to the waterline and sank. As the fires spread, the officers and ratings made their escape into small boats. Meanwhile around them fell a hail of shot, which was terrifying for those who had to endure it, yet it took but a small toll. "Je vis brûler trois beaux vaisseaux," lamented

53 Journal of the principal naval officer, Jean-Antoine Charry, Marquis Desgouttes, in Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, Dépôt des fortifications des colonies, Amérique Septentrionale, Mémoire 240, "Extrait du siege de Louisbourg a commencer du premier juin . . .", National Archives, Ottawa: Reel F557.



A View of Louisbourg During the Siege of 1758. Drawn by Capt. Ince, engraved by P.C. Canot (National Archives of Canada / C-5907).



The Burning of the Prudent *and Capture of the* Bienfaisant. *Drawn by R. Paton, engraved by P.C. Canot* (National Archives of Canada / C-7111).

the naval commander.[54] Finally, on the night of 25-26 July, the British naval officers decided to attack the two surviving vessels, the *Prudent* and the *Bienfaisant*. A force of 600 naval officers and seamen, approaching in boats and divided into two groups, rowed quietly at nightfall into the harbour, having first spread spruce gum to prevent their oarlocks from making noise. They reached the Royal Battery around 1:00 a.m. and found their targets an hour later. They stormed aboard, overpowering the much reduced French crews and forcing those they did not immediately kill or wound into the holds. The *Prudent* was aground with five feet of water in her hold, so she was set afire. The *Bienfaisant*'s cable was cut and she was towed to the farthest point of the harbour and run aground. The British seamen, according to one of the officers, "behaved with the utmost resolution, calmness and intrepidity without the least disturbance or confusion."[55]

The loss of these two ships had a profound effect on the French defenders, who now saw "toutes nos défences ruinées."[56] Morale plummeted within the town, and the fatigue, which until then had been borne without complaint, suddenly for many became unendurable. The war council, after receiving discouraging reports from the chief engineer on the state of the defences, proposed articles of capitulation similar to those offered to the British when Port Mahon had fallen in 1756. These were refused by the British, who insisted on a surrender without the honours of war. The Louisbourg war council, after some discussion, in view of the presence in the town of many women and children whose lives would be put at grave risk if an assault occurred, recommended acceptance of whatever terms the British offered. Thus at length did the British acquire, in the words of the French naval commander, "d'une place qui a coûté bien des hommes, des vaisseaux et de l'argent du Roi."[57] In total 2,606 naval officers, seamen

54 *Ibid.*

55 PRO, ADM 51/111, entry in log of Captain Balfour, given command of the *Bienfaisant*.

56 "Mémoire sur l'état de Louisbourg en 1758" by Mathieu Henry Marchant de la Houlière. Archives des Colonies (Paris), Ministère de la France d'outre-mer, Dépôt des Fortifications des colonies, Amérique Septentrionale, No. 235, National Archives, Ottawa: Reel F557.

57 Journal of Marquis Desgouttes, *op. cit.*

and marines were made prisoner, along with 3,031 troops and militiamen. The fortress itself was found to be mounting 221 cannon and 21 mortars, plenty of shot and ammunition, and a large quantity of food.

The loss of Louisbourg understandably altered opportunities for both the French and British. For the British navy the long drought of victories was over. An important success had been accomplished. French power in North America, at least in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, had been checked. The sudden weakness of the French was made manifest when in September a large British naval force raided all the French settlements along the Gaspé coast, burning houses, boats and fishing flakes and seizing all the fish caught that summer.[58] It was too late to attack Quebec, though plans were immediately laid for that purpose for the following year. The wisdom of wintering and refitting part of the fleet at Halifax had been recognized and was repeated during the winter of 1758-59. Although some French warships and a large convoy of merchantmen got up the St. Lawrence River to Quebec in 1759, before the British navy, the force was too weak to prevent the British from establishing themselves off Quebec, once they had learned to navigate their way up the river. Although the naval losses at Louisbourg, however serious to the town's defence, were relatively small, the French navy, unlike the navy of 1746, failed in 1759 to seize the initiative lost the year before at Louisbourg and thereby throw the British navy again on to the defensive. Instead, the campaign of 1759 transformed what had largely been a British defensive strategy in North America into one which contemplated a series of new conquests, hitherto unimagined by British naval officers or politicians. The naval role in the taking of Louisbourg, in 1745 and 1758, characterized as it was by uncommon cooperation between the naval and military forces, proved to be enormously useful experiences for the officers involved, and which they applied elsewhere over the next few years.

The news of the fall of Louisbourg in 1758 was wildly acclaimed in Great Britain and its colonies. In England, in

58 Julian Gwyn, "Admiral Sir Charles Hardy, 1714-1780," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, IV (1979), 327.

> the press, in verse, and in pamphlets the victory was chronicled and celebrated and the value of the conquest extolled.... More formal expressions of triumph came in at least fifty addresses of congratulation,...a little later the standards captured there were ceremonially paraded to St. Paul's.[59]

Church bells in Boston rang for hours and a day of public prayer and thanksgiving was appointed by the Massachusetts Council. Newport, Rhode Island, celebrated with fireworks, and in Halifax a vast quantity of rum was consumed as the king's subjects there, as well as the troops and seamen, gave vent to their relief. In general, there was a sense, not of gloating, but of Britain's glory and honour, lost in 1756 when Port Mahon fell, now re-established where it had stood before the war. Avoiding all temptation to exaggerate, the governor of Massachusetts understood correctly the real value to Britain and to British America of this success:

> By the reduction of the island of Cape Breton, and its dependencies, the key to the enemy's only port is given to us. We have again the uninterrupted possession of the North American seas, and the powers of trade are again restored to his Majesty's subjects.[60]

Some contemporaries even suggested that it was more France's loss than Britain's gain. As Port Mahon was to the French a place they did not need, but which must be denied the enemy, so too was Louisbourg, a port almost useless to the Anglo-Americans, but one which with its fortifications was too dangerous to allow the French. A discussion began at once whether Louisbourg and Ile Royale should be retained by Britain or restored to France with its fortifications laid waste. The French were at first bent on its reinstatement in any peace. In Britain and British America the discussion, both public and private in 1758-59, showed the ambivalence of all those delighted by this longed-for naval success. There was no talk of utterly annihilating the French fleet or stopping the French army in Germany in its tracks. That both these things occurred after 1758, undoing much of France's future

59 Marie Peters, *Pitt and Popularity: The Patriot Minister and London Opinion during the Seven Years' War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 125.

60 Address to the Massachusetts General Court reported in the *Boston Weekly Newsletter*, 5 October 1758.

bargaining position and allowing the British to enter peace negotiations with an unusually strong bargaining hand, could not have been predicted at the end of 1758. Historians must read carefully these contemporary documents, so that they do not write as if either British naval supremacy was inevitable, or even that the naval campaign of 1758 saw the turn of the tide against France. However important, it was no more than the restoration in the Gulf of St. Lawrence of the *status quo* which had formerly existed between 1745 and 1749, and a much needed boost to British and American morale.



Water-colour, ca. 1758.
Courtesy Canadian Parks Service, Ottawa

The Expedition of the Second Battalion of the Cambis Regiment to Louisbourg, 1758

Michel Wyczynski

On 25 September 1757, a hurricane scattered and damaged several British warships a few kilometres off Ile Royale. The vessels had been charged with escorting and protecting an English invasion fleet for the purpose of attacking the French fortress of Louisbourg. The commander of the escort vessels, Vice-Admiral Francis Holburne, decided to turn back. He ordered the remains of his squadron to be brought together and the damaged vessels to be towed without delay to Halifax.[1] The invasion attempt thus ended in total failure due to weather conditions, which could be severe and unpredictable at that time of year.

The incident gave Augustin Boschenry de Drucour, the governor of Louisbourg, a year's reprieve. The leader of a French squadron in port at the time, Emmanuel-Auguste de Cahideuc, Comte Dubois de La Motte, seized the opportunity to demonstrate to the governor that the fortress garrison was not strong enough to fight off effectively a landing of British forces.[2] The naval commander pointed out that to ensure the defence of Louisbourg against such an attempt, Drucour had to employ, in addition to the Louisbourg garrison, 800 sailors detached from the warships of Dubois de La Motte, 520 Indians, 150 Acadians and thirty Canadians.[3] These elements were not permanently posted in Louisbourg and might not be there in future years. The French naval officer added that the governor of the fortress could count himself lucky that in 1757 he had 1,500 additional men to occupy and suitably defend the numerous coastal positions located in the area around Louisbourg. The arguments raised by Dubois de La Motte

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1 Holburne's squadron was made up of sixteen warships: *Newark*, 80 guns; *Grafton*, 88 guns; *Bedford*, 64 guns; *Invincible*, 74 guns; *Terrible*, 74 guns; *Northumberland*, 70 guns; *Oxford*, 68 guns; *Nassau*, 64 guns; *Captain*, 64 guns; *Kingston*, 60 guns; *Tilsbury*, 60 guns; *Defiance*, 60 guns; *Sunderland*, 60 guns; *Centurion*, 52 guns; *Somerset*; and *Nottingham*. Public Record Office, Admiralty 2, Out-Letters, vol. 133 (List of Holburne's fleet), fol. 291; vol. 1331, List of the Vessels under the Command of Holburne in North America, fol. 169; Adm. 50, Admirals' Journals, vol. 7, Journal of Vice-Admiral Francis Holburne, 24 September-15 October 1757, fol. 287-293.

2 Archives des Colonies [hereafter A.C.], Série C^{11}B, Correspondance générale, Ile Royale, vol. 37, Louisbourg, 30 septembre 1757, fol. 18. The strength of Drucour's garrison totalled 2300 military personnel.

3 *Ibid.*, Lettre de M. de Bompar au ministre Moras (1757), fol. 309v.

concerning the strength of the garrison turned out to be accurate, as the events of 1758 would demonstrate.

In light of the near assault on Louisbourg in 1757, the time had obviously come for the French to review the military situation in depth. On the advice of his squadron leader, the commander of his land forces, Mathieu-Henry de La Houlière, and his *ordonnateur*, Jacques Prévost, Governor Drucour composed a memorandum asking the authorities in France for additional troops to strengthen the Louisbourg garrison. In their letter, Drucour and Prévost specified that they preferred reinforcements from the naval troops to those from the land battalions. They supported this argument with financial evidence: maintenance of such troops would be less expensive for the King.[4] In a letter dated 11 February 1758, the Minister of the Colonies announced that the King had approved the request, but decided nevertheless to send two land battalions, namely the second battalion of Foreign Volunteers (*Volontaires Etrangers*) and the second battalion of the Cambis Regiment.[5] These battalions were dispatched respectively to the ports of Brest and Rochefort, where they prepared for their crossing to Louisbourg, which would come in the spring of 1758.

The Cambis Regiment had been created on 23 January 1676 and raised at Messina, in Italy, on 23 October 1676, by Louis-Victor de Rochechouart, Duc de Vivonne. From the time of its creation until its participation in the siege of Louisbourg, the Cambis Regiment had had seven colonels and distinguished itself brilliantly in numerous sieges, campaigns and battles.[6]

4 A.C., Série $C^{11}B$, vol. 37 (1757), Mémoire de Drucour et Prévost au ministre des Colonies, 30 septembre 1757, fol. 18-22.

5 A.C., Série B, Lettres envoyées, vol. 107, Lettre du ministre des Colonies à MM. de Drucour et Prévost, Versailles, 14 février 1758, fol. 362-362v. The reasons that led the King to decide to send land battalions to Louisbourg were both logical and practical. First of all, it would be impossible to raise 1050 men in so little time and to integrate them into the contingents of colonial troops. Secondly, it would be preferable to send land troops, for their assignments at Louisbourg would only be temporary. Once the conflict was over, the battalions would be repatriated and would thus not be a burden on the colony. This, therefore, would enable Drucour to save considerable sums that otherwise would have been used to house, supply, feed and pay the two battalions.

6 For further information on the history of the Cambis regiment, the following sources are indispensable: Louis Suzanne, *Histoire de l'ancienne infanterie française* (Paris, 1858), vol. 8, p. 205-207; André Corvisier, *Les contrôles des troupes de l'ancien régime* (Paris, 1970), tome II, pp. 41-43; *Sixième abrégé de la carte générale du militaire*

The first and second battalions of the regiment had not taken part in any campaign during 1757.[7] They had been quartered with other regiments on the coast of Brittany, where they were defending Breton territory from a possible landing attempt by the British. Now they were being sent to fulfill much the same role overseas, on Ile Royale.

When the second battalion of the Cambis Regiment received orders to proceed to Rochefort, there was much to be done in a short time before the regiment could be ready to sail. The military authorities in Rochefort hastened to arm and equip all members of the battalion, in addition to providing them with extra items such as tents and cooking pots for the forthcoming campaign. Each officer was issued, for the crossing, two sea mattresses, two pairs of sheets and a blanket.[8] It appears that this material was subsequently lent to them for their stay in Louisbourg, for Jacques Prévost, the *ordonnateur*, did not have enough bedding to accommodate suitably the members of the battalion.[9]

In addition to the bedding, the battalion commander received a dozen garrison towels; the other 38 officers received half a dozen. The non-commissioned officers and each of the 685 soldiers were given a hammock and a blanket. Sieur de Beaujour, a merchant of Rochefort, was charged by the military authorities with providing each of the 685 soldiers with a knitted cap, a pair of woollen stockings, a pair of shoes and four shirts.[10] Besides this personal outfit, de Beaujour provided the second Cambis battalion with the following items: 1500 spare caps, 515 pairs of woollen stock-

de France sur terre et sur mer jusqu'en décembre 1739 (Paris, 1740), p. 90; *État militaire de France pour l'année 1758* (Paris, 1758), p. 163; *État militaire de France pour l'année 1759*, Guillyn, Paris, 1759, pp. 244-45; Archives de la Guerre, Service historique de l'Armée, Archives historiques, Série X, Archives des Corps de troupe, xb, carton 6, Régiment d'infanterie de Cambis, 1749-[1759].

7 *Histoire de l'ancienne infanterie française*, vol. 8, p. 207.

8 Archives Maritimes [hereafter A.M.], Port de Rochefort, Série E, Services administratifs, Sous-série 1 E, liasse 158, Rapport joint à la lettre de M. Moras, 25 février 1758, fol. 93-97.

9 A.C., Série C[11]B, vol. 38, Lettre de Drucour et Prévost au ministre des Colonies, Louisbourg, 3 mai 1758, fol. 8.

10 A.M., Port de Rochefort, Série E, Sous-série 1 E, liasse 158, Rapport joint à la lettre de M. Moras, 25 février 1758, fol. 93-97.

ings, 2315 pairs of shoes, 2260 shirts, 1500 soldier's handkerchiefs, 1500 pairs of gaiters and 1200 haversacks. Sieur Hébert, another Rochefort merchant, supplied the battalion with 40 pairs of sergeant's breeches, 650 pairs of soldier's breeches, 700 sleeveless vests, 1000 neckstocks of black estamin, 1000 *aubras* of black thread ribbon for pigtails, 600 pouches (each for 30 cartridges), 600 powder flasks, 500 leather grenade pouches, 100 sergeant's waistbelts, 25 sergeant's sword blades, 50 grenadier's sabres, 12 sabre handles, 600 pewter spoons, two spoon moulds, 1000 wooden-handled knives, 100 razors, 24 razor stones, 100 pairs of scissors, 1200 pipes, 600 pairs of iron buckles and two barrels, each containing a complete cobbler's outfit. The military depot at Rochefort added to this equipment 10 spare drum shells, 20 goatskins for drum heads, 1200 *livres* of smoking tobacco and three medicine chests.[11]

The members of the second battalion destined for Louisbourg included a colonel, a battalion commander, an adjutant, two ensigns, 17 captains (including the captain of the grenadiers), 17 lieutenants, a sub-lieutenant of grenadiers, and 685 soldiers, including 34 sergeants, 51 corporals, 51 lance-corporals and 17 drummers. The soldiers and non-commissioned officers were divided into 16 companies of musketmen of 40 men each, and one company of grenadiers with 45 men. In a 1758 document located in the Archives maritimes of the Port de Rochefort, one finds a brief description of the uniform worn by the men of the Cambis Regiment. The *justaucorps* or waistcoat was white, adorned with a red collar and cuffs. The vest was red and the knee-breeches were white. The cuffs and pockets of the waistcoat had three buttons in an alternate silver-gold-silver pattern. The hat was black and had silver and gold lace trimming.[12]

The move of the second battalion of the Cambis Regiment from the coast of Brittany to Rochefort, along with the preparations for the voyage, did not go unnoticed by the British. Two letters, dated 24 February and 3 March 1758, prove that the British espionage service was well aware of the role, duties and destination of the French military unit.[13]

11 *Ibid.*, fol. 93-97.

12 *Ibid.*, fol. 97.

13 Public Record Office [hereafter P.R.O.], ADM 1, Admiralty and Secretariat: Papers, Intelligence, vol. 3944, 1st Series, 1758, Paris, 24 février 1758, p. 69; Paris, 3 mars 1758, p. 88.

Once the vessels that were to transport the Cambis Regiment to Louisbourg started gathering in the port of Rochefort they had to undergo inspections, repairs and other preparations before a long crossing could be undertaken. Comte Du Chaffault de Besné was chosen to convoy the unit and its equipment. His squadron included the following vessels: *Le Dragon*, 64 guns, Du Chaffault de Bresné, captain; *Le Belliqueux*, 64 guns, Martel; *Le Sphinx*, 64 guns, Vendes Turgot; *Le Hardi*, La Touche de Tréville; *Le Brillant*, a vessel of the Indies Company, Saint-Médard; *Le Zéphyr*, frigate, Chevalier Darzac de Ternay; *La Brave*; *La Mignonne*, Sauvage; *Le Rhinocéros*, flute, Bardet; and a snow from Saint-Malo.[14] The ships were fitted out and victualled quickly and efficiently. As preparations were going on, port personnel noted with concern that since March, several English squadrons had been endlessly patrolling the waters a few leagues from Rochefort.[15] Their mission was to harass, intercept, capture or destroy any French vessel en route for the colonies. It was in such an atmosphere that the vessels of the squadron of Du Chaffault de Besné, with the second battalion of the Cambis Regiment on board, weighed anchor on the morning of 21 March 1758 and left the port of Rochefort. Six days later, on 27 March, they moored offshore at Ile d'Aix, where the final checks were carried out.[16] These last preparations took over a month.

On 2 May, at three o'clock in the afternoon, the French squadron departed Ile d'Aix, heading for Louisbourg. The soldiers of the second battalion were divided among five vessels: *Le Dragon*, *Le Belliqueux*, *Le Sphinx*, *Le Hardi* and *Le Zéphyr*.[17] The first part of the crossing was marked by two incidents. On 7 May, the commander of the second battalion of the Cambis Regiment, M. Henri d'Angre, Chevalier De Contalmaison died aboard Du Chaffault

14 A.M., Série B^4, Campagnes, Campagne d'Amérique, vol. 80, Escadre de Du Chaffault de Besné, 1758, fol. 207; P.R.O., ADM 1, Admiralty and Secretariat: Papers, Intelligence, vol. 3944, 1st Series, 1758, Rochefort, 17 mars 1758, p. 126; Rochefort, 22 mars 1758, p. 137; Rochefort, 3 avril 1758, p. 146.

15 P.R.O., ADM 1, Admiralty and Secretariat: Papers, Intelligence, vol. 3944, 1st Series, 1758, Paris, 30 mars 1758, p. 138; Rochefort, 30 avril 1758, pp. 197-98; Rochefort, 2 mai 1758, p. 205.

16 A.M., Série B^4, *Journal du vaisseau du roi Le Dragon*, fol. 233v.

17 *Ibid.*, fol. 233v.

de Besné's vessel *Le Dragon*.[18] The second incident occurred on 13 May, when the leader of the French squadron captured a British vessel coming from Carolina, loaded with rice. Du Chaffault de Besné evacuated the seventeen crew members, and then set fire to the vessel.[19]

Meanwhile, on Ile Royale, as they were waiting for reinforcement, Drucour and Prévost sent two letters to the Minister for the Colonies. In the first of these, dated 3 May, they informed the minister of a serious logistical problem caused by the arrival of the second battalion of Foreign Volunteers. There was no room left to quarter suitably the troops of the Cambis battalion. Moreover, the King's storehouse in Louisbourg had no bedding left in stock.[20] In a second letter, written by Drucour and dated 4 May, there is a tone of anxiety. The governor explained to the minister that he was waiting "with eagerness" for the arrival of the Cambis battalion. His concern was justified, for already, for some weeks, a British squadron had been cruising off Louisbourg. Drucour informed the minister that he had orders concerning the defence of the fortress and had assigned precise responsibilities to each unit. The second Cambis battalion, when it arrived, would have to look after defending the eastern part of the fortress.[21] For his part, the minister assured the members of the Louisbourg command, in letters dated March, April and May, that all measures had been taken in order to send the battalion as quickly as possible.

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18 Archives de la Guerre [hereafter A.G.], Service historique de l'Armée, Archives historiques, Série X, Archives des Corps de troupe, xb, carton 6, Régiment d'infanterie de Cambis, 1749-[1759]. État de service de M. de Contalmaison.

19 A.M., Série B^4, *Journal du vaisseau du roi Le Dragon*, 13 mai 1758, fol. 234v.

20 Drucour and Prévost requested that they "be given at least wool and ticking for mattresses and bedsheets at the earliest opportunity, even by return of the schooner *La Marguerite*." A.C., Série $C^{11}B$, vol. 38, Lettre de Drucour et Prévost au ministre, 3 mai 1758, fol. 8. The minister received this letter in June, along with the one dated 4 May 1758. In his reply, dated 24 June, he stated that he would ship to Louisbourg on the vessel *La Marguerite* "the wool, ticking for mattresses and straw mattresses, with the bedsheets necessary for bedding down the soldiers of the Foreign Volunteer and Cambis battalions." A.C., Série B, vol. 107, Lettre du ministre à MM. de Drucour et Prévost, Versailles, 24 juin 1758, fol. 391-392v.

21 A.C., Série $C^{11}B$, vol. 38, Lettre de Drucour au ministre des colonies, 4 mai 1758, fol. 22.

On 29 May, about 11 o'clock in the morning, the squadron of Du Chaffault de Besné moored in Ste. Anne's Bay.[22] The squadron commander immediately sent out a group of soldiers in a boat on a reconnaissance mission. When they returned they informed the commander that the entrance to Louisbourg harbour was blockaded by British warships. After some reflection, Du Chaffault de Besné decided to steer for Port Dauphin (Englishtown) instead of taking the risk of running the blockade and possibly losing the second Cambis battalion. Once arrived at their destination, ten guns were unloaded to ensure the defence of Port Dauphin.[23] From 29 to 31 May, the soldiers of the second battalion remained on board the vessels. All operations to land men and equipment were suspended, pending further orders. On 31 May, Du Chaffault de Besné sent to Louisbourg Monsieur de Cumon, one of his officers, along with Monsieur de La Rocque, the adjutant of the Cambis battalion. Their mission was to deliver in person packages and mail from the Court to the governor of the fortress, and to announce to him the imminent arrival of the Cambis battalion.[24]

During the first two days of June, the soldiers of the Cambis battalion, with their equipment, were moved in launches from Du Chaffault de Besné's warships and assembled on the frigate *Le Zéphyr*. On 3 June, the frigate was to head for Baie des Espagnols (Sydney); however, contrary winds hindered the departure. Du Chaffault de Besné went aboard immediately and decided to have ten companies transferred to nineteen boats and launches of the squadron, in order to send them without delay to Baie des Espagnols.[25] On 5 June, about three o'clock in the morning, the squadron commander sent

22 A.M., Série B^4, vol. 80, *Journal de vaisseau du roi Le Dragon*, 29 mai 1758, fol. 236.

23 *Ibid.* fol. 236. Du Chaffault de Besné was also thinking of stretching a cable across the harbour entrance to block access to it by English vessels.

24 *Ibid.*, fol. 236v, A.C., Série $C^{11}B$, vol. 38, fol. 59, *Journal ou Relation sur ce qui se passera des mouvemens pour l'attaque et la deffense de la Place de Louisbourg pendant la presente année 1758* [hereafter Journal de Drucour]. The two officers arrived at Louisbourg on 1 June at eight o'clock in the evening. They informed the governor about the state of Du Chaffault de Besné's fleet, the crossing and the imminent arrival of the second Cambis battalion.

25 A.M., Série B^4, vol. 80, *Journal du vaisseau du roi Le Dragon*, fol. 236v; Lettre de Du Chaffault de Besné au ministre, 29 June 1758, fol. 212.

one of his officers aboard *Le Zéphyr* with orders for the commander of the vessel to weigh anchor and take the last seven companies to the destination.[26] The frigate got under way about eight o'clock, and as he was approaching the mouth of Sainte Anne harbour, the captain became aware that a British schooner and two vessels were sailing in the area. Not wishing to risk confrontation, the commander, Ternay d'Arsac, turned back and rejoined Du Chaffault de Besné's squadron.[27] The boats and launches that had taken the ten companies to Baie des Espagnols came back a few hours later. The members of this little flotilla informed Du Chaffault de Besné that British warships were indeed patrolling in the area.[28] In the course of the same day, the first contingent of Cambis soldiers arrived at the home of a *habitant* named Langevin, at Miré.[29]

On 6 June, Du Chaffault de Besné assigned responsibility for transporting the troops to his second-in-command, Monsieur de La Cory, who had the second contingent board the boats and launches. They left the squadron about four o'clock in the afternoon and entered Baie des Espagnols the next morning about eight o'clock.[30] On 7 June, about noon, the ten companies making up the first contingent arrived at Louisbourg to a warm welcome.[31] Drucour was happy to receive the reinforcements, for in recent days he had seen elements of the Royal Navy joining the already impressive invasion fleet of Admiral Edward Boscawen. Drucour then ordered part of the first contingent assigned immediately to the shore positions at Pointe Blanche

26 *Ibid.*, Lettre de Du Chaffault de Besné à Drucour et Prévost, 5 juin 1758, fol. 208-208v.

27 *Ibid.*, *Journal du vaisseau du roi Le Dragon*, fol. 236v.

28 *Ibid.*, 236v.

29 A.C., Série $C^{11}B$, vol. 38, Journal de Drucour, 5 juin, fol. 60v; A.C., Série $C^{11}C$, vol. 10, *Journal du Siège, Louisbourg, mars-août*, fol. 35. Miré was at a distance of five *lieuses* from Louisbourg.

30 A.M., Série B^4, vol. 80. Lettre de Du Chaffault de Besné à MM. de Drucour et Prévost, 6 juin 1758, fol. 209-209v.

31 A.G., Comité technique du génie, Archives de l'inspection générale du génie, vol. 1, manuscript n° 66, 6 juin, p. 40. *Mémoire des evenements qui interesseront cette colonie Pendant l'année 1758*, par François Claude-Victor Grillot de Poilly [hereafter Journal de Grillot de Poilly]; A.C., Série $C^{11}C$, vol. 10. *Journal du Siège, Louisbourg, mars-août*, fol. 35v.

(White Point) and Pointe Plate (Flat Point),[32] locations where it was feared the British might try to make a landing. The second contingent, meanwhile, spent the night of 6-7 June at Langevin's home, at Miré.

On 7 June, the English command decided to launch an attack. Admiral Boscawen gave orders to Captain John Vaughan to feign a landing attempt near Lorembec (Lorraine).[33] Drucour hastened at once to dispatch two companies of soldiers of the second Cambis battalion to foil the attempt.[34] The following day, on 8 June, the British command launched three assault groups against Anse de la Cormorandière (Kennington Cove), Pointe Blanche and Pointe Plate respectively. Two of the British groups received orders to feign landing attempts, thus preventing the French troops posted in these positions from going to the aid of their compatriots at Anse de la Cormorandière.[35] To remedy the situation, Drucour sent a contingent from the Cambis battalion to strengthen the defences of Pointe Blanche.[36] Meanwhile, Brigadier-General James Wolfe managed to land with his assault troops and drove the French forces, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Mascle de Saint-Julhien, out of their retrenchments at Anse de la Cormorandière. Drucour immediately dispatched reinforcements to the site of the landing, but Saint-Julhien had already fallen back to Pointe Blanche. At this point, the French troops received orders to evacuate the shore retrenchments. An anonymous French witness described the evacuation in these terms: "The retreat of our troops very much resembled flight; all these things were done at eight o'clock in the morning."[37] By noon, the only troops outside the fortress were the dead, wounded and prisoners of war. The only encouraging episode

32 Journal de Drucour, 6 juin 1758, fol. 60v.

33 P.R.O., ADM 50, Admiral's Journals, vol. 3, *Journal of Admiral Boscawen on the Namur*, p. 93. The *Juno* and the *Moncton* and eleven transport vessels were among the elements destined for the Lorembec operation. P.R.O., ADM 51, Captains' Logs, vol. 495, John Vaughan, *Juno*.

34 Journal de Grillot de Poilly, 7 juin 1758, p. 42.

35 P.R.O., ADM 50, Admirals' Journals, vol. 3, *Journal of Admiral Boscawen on the Namur*, pp. 93-94.

36 Journal de Grillot de Poilly, 8 juin 1758, p. 43.

37 A.C., Série C^{11}C, vol. 10, *Journal du Siège, Louisbourg, mars-août*, fol. 37v.

in this disastrous day was the arrival at the back of Louisbourg harbour, about seven o'clock in the evening, of the last seven companies of the second Cambis battalion. They were immediately convoyed to the fortress in launches provided by Admiral Jean-Antoine Charry Des Gouttes,[38] the commander of a squadron of warships.

Since they had made a forced march from Baie des Espagnols to Louisbourg, the soldiers of the second Cambis battalion had not been able to bring their combat equipment with them. Monsieur Durvieux de Villepreaux, the battalion commander, explained in a letter to his colonel that the battalion arrived at Louisbourg "without equipment and destitute of everything."[39] Several members of the battalion, in fact, never did reach Louisbourg. A sergeant and twenty soldiers, too ill to undertake the trip on foot, were left aboard the squadron of Du Chaffault de Besné, which later landed them at Quebec. A contingent of eleven soldiers remained at Miré, and it went to Quebec subsequently.[40]

On 10 June, Governor Drucour gave orders for the formation of five groups of volunteers, recruited among the soldiers and officers of each battalion. Their role was to observe enemy movements, to thwart their attacks, and to support the workmen during demolition operations.[41] The

38 A.C., Série $C^{11}C$, vol. 10, *Journal du Siège de Louisbourg, 15 avril-27 juillet*, fol. 6; A.C., Ministère de la France d'outre-mer, Dépôt des fortifications des Colonies, Amérique septentrionale, numéro 240, *Extrait du siège de Louisbourg à commencer du premier Juin, jour où j'ai aperçû la flotte des Anglais, fait par M. le Marquis Desgouttes*, fol. 3; Journal de Drucour, 8 juin 1758, fol. 62; Journal de Grillot de Poilly, 8 juin 1758, p. 45.

39 A.G., Service historique de l'armée, Série A^1, Section 3, vol. 3499, pièce 14. Lettre de Durvieux de Villepreaux, 6 août fol. 270v-271. Commissioner of war d'Abbadie, attached to Du Chaffault de Besné's squadron, informed the minister in the letter that the baggage and equipment of the Cambis battalion had been transported to Quebec. They would be sent to Louisbourg after the siege or sold in Quebec on the regiment's behalf or returned to France.

40 A.M., Série B^4, Lettre de d'Abbadie au ministre, fol. 27; the soldiers who remained aboard the vessels of Du Chaffault de Besné's squadron were landed in Quebec. Governor Vaudreuil ordered them integrated into the Quebec garrison. Once the siege of Louisbourg had been raised, they were to be sent there, A.C., Série $C^{11}A$, vol. 103, Lettre de Vaudreuil au ministre, Montréal, 30 juillet 1758, fol. 118v; A.G., Série A^1, vol. 3499, Lettre de M. Larocque à (?), 9 août 1758, pièce 23. Monsieur Larocque informed the minister that the contingent left at Miré was under the orders of an officer from the colonies. Four were killed and the rest managed to get back to Quebec.

41 A.C., Série $C^{11}C$, vol. 10, *Journal du Siège, Louisbourg, mars-août*, fol. 39-39v.

group detached from the second battalion of the Cambis regiment was commanded by Monsieur Claude Marie Levesque de Rocqueville, and its mission was to ensure the defence of the perimeter lying between the Dauphin Bastion and the dike.[42] On 12 June, another group of volunteers of the Cambis battalion kept the activities of Brigadier-General Wolfe's troops, in the lighthouse area, under surveillance.[43] On 18 June, the group commanded by Levesque de Rocqueville took part in an offensive operation and destroyed a supply of fascines which the enemy had stored on high ground in front of their camp, opposite the King's Bastion.[44] The British artillerymen had also erected several batteries which were constantly bombarding the main bastions. Other batteries were furiously bombarding Des Goutte's vessels and Battery Island, at the harbour entrance. Their arcs of fire intersected, and struck bastions, houses, vessels and streets without distinction. On 22 and 23 June, several soldiers of each battalion were obliged to work on a large entrenchment along the Quay, to fortify the site and counter an attack. The engineer, François-Claude-Victor Grillot de Poilly, was dissatisfied with the work done; he blamed the officers of the Cambis battalions for not having kept close enough surveillance over the performance of their men.[45] On 28 June, the various groups of volunteers fired all day long on the British positions.[46]

On 1 July 1758, French troops made a sortie in the area occupied by the volunteers of the Cambis battalion. The purpose of the operation was to demolish palisades erected by the British sappers near the Point du Saint Esprit (on the north shore of Louisbourg harbour). Grillot de Poilly noted that the troops and volunteers of the Cambis battalion demonstrated "unequalled ardour; the retreat was sounded in vain; they could not be

42 Journal de Grillot de Poilly, 2 juillet 1758, p. 45.

43 Journal de Drucour, 12 juin 1758, fol. 63-63v.

44 A.C. Série C^{11}C, vol. 10, *Journal du Siège de Louisbourg, 15 avril-27 juillet*, fol. 8.

45 Journal de Grillot de Poilly, 23 juin 1758, pp. 60-61.

46 A.C., Série C^{11}C, vol. 10, *Journal du Siège, Louisbourg, mars-août*, fol. 49v.

induced to withdraw."[47] The next day, several skirmishes were reported in the same area. The lieutenant of the Cambis volunteers, Louis François Granet de Saint-Ferroet, was wounded in the right wrist.[48] On 4 July, Monsieur de Rocqueville, the leader of the group of Cambis volunteers, received orders to support an attack being launched by Lieutenant-Colonel Henri Valentin-Jacques D'Anthonay;[49] the attack was countermanded, however, at the last minute, for many enemy troop movements had been seen in the area. On 5 July, the captain of the Cambis grenadiers, supported by 200 men, attempted to drive into the dike area, harassed the enemy, and then fell back on his earlier defensive positions. Frequent attacks by the Cambis volunteers greatly damaged the British siege works in that area.[50] On 8 July, Grillot de Poilly examined the enemy siege works being erected opposite the perimeter defended by the Cambis volunteers. He wrote in his journal: "We can find on the right [the side defended by the Cambis volunteers] no work that seems to indicate that they wish to move on the Dauphine Gate, for the works that have been built do not appear to have any communication as they do on the left [the side defended by the volunteers from the battalion of Foreign Volunteers]."[51]

During the night of 8-9 July, Lieutenant-Colonel Michel Marin de Bourzt, leading a group of 600 men that also included volunteers from the Cambis regiment, launched an assault on a British entrenchment located by the edge of the sea.[52] The attack turned out to be a great success. An eyewitness, Poisson de Londes, said that the manoeuvre "was brilliant because of the

47 Journal de Grillot de Poilly, 1er juillet 1758, p. 70.

48 A.C., Série C^{11}C, vol. 10, *Journal du Siège, Louisbourg, 15 avril-27 juillet*, fol. 11v; A.G., Comité technique du génie, volume 7, article 15, Campagnes et Sièges, *Mémoires ou Journal de Siège de Louisbourg avec la Capitulation*, par (Poisson de Londes), fol. 325. [hereafter Journal de Poisson de Londes].

49 Journal de Drucour, 4 juillet 1758, fol. 58v.

50 A.C. Série C^{11}C, vol. 10, *Journal du Siège, Louisbourg, mars-août*, fol. 58v.

51 Journal de Grillot de Poilly, 8 juillet 1758, p. 79.

52 *Ibid.* 8-9 juillet, p. 80.

valour of our soldiers, who acted with great intrepidness and vivacity."[53] On 19 July, Monsieur de la Fosse and seven grenadiers captured another British position in the area of the gallows hill, located eighty *toises* from the covered way. This strategic point was briefly occupied by a group of soldiers from the Cambis battalion.[54]

Starting on 21 July, events began to move more quickly and the situation grew steadily worse for the French defenders of Louisbourg. First of all, on 21 July, the French fleet suffered a deadly bombardment. The vessels *Le Célèbre* (64 guns), *Le Capricieux* (64 guns) and *L'Entreprenant* (74 guns) were destroyed by fires caused by bombardment. Louis de Coustin and Lieutenant Dubois, both of the Cambis battalion, were wounded.[55] The British artillery continued pounding the fortress without mercy. Then on 22 July, a fire broke out and spread in the barracks of the King's Bastion. Many soldiers recruited from each battalion fought the flames. At nightfall, Durvieux de Villepreaux sent a messenger to alert the town that a force of 5,000 to 6,000 thousand British was gathering and preparing to make a direct assault on the town.[56] Luckily for the French garrison, this was a false alarm. On 23 July, the barracks inside the Queen's Bastion caught fire. The blaze reached such proportions that the whole town might have been consumed. Seeing the panic which the conflagration was causing, the British artillerymen accelerated their fire. Monsieur de Cibert, an officer of the Cambis battalion, was wounded by a splinter from a cannon ball.[57] An anonymous observer

53 Journal de Poisson de Londes, fol. 45.

54 Journal de Grillot de Poilly, 19 juillet 1758, p. 92; A.C., Série C^{11}C, vol. 10, *Journal du Siège, Louisbourg, mars-août*, fol. 68v-69r.

55 Journal de Poisson de Londes, 19 juillet 1758, fol. 57. Monsieur de Coustin died of his wounds on 23 July; Journal de Drucour, "État Général des officiers et soldats tués et blessés depuis et compris le 1er juin jusqu'au 26 juillet 1758", fol. 104.

56 A.G., Service historique de l'armée, Série A^1, vol. 3499, pièce 13, Lettre de la Houlière au ministre, 6 août 1758, fol. 13.

57 A.C., Série C^{11}C, vol. 10, *Journal du Siège, Louisbourg, mars-août*, fol. 73v; Journal de Poisson de Londes, fol. 45.

noted that the French garrison had had no rest for the last three nights.[58] The soldiers were now obliged to sleep outdoors along the inner walls of the fortifications, using scraps of wood and boards to build temporary shelters. Fires broke out simultaneously in several parts of the town. The soldiers had to act as firemen, stretcher-bearers and workmen. The wounded were cared for and bedded down in the streets. Sleep and hot meals were becoming a luxury.

Aware of the dilapidated state of the fortress and the extreme fatigue of his garrison, Governor Drucour decided to send to Major-General Jeffrey Amherst a request for an honourable capitulation. Amherst, however, rejected the terms suggested by the French governor. He demanded an unconditional surrender. The fortress command was shocked by Amherst's demand. The troops dug in among the ruins and debris of the ramparts and awaited the imminent general assault.[59] Jacques Prévost, the *ordonnateur* of Louisbourg, then asked Governor Drucour to reverse his decision. Prévost justified his request by explaining that it was necessary at all costs to spare the townspeople, and the many sick and wounded, from the horrors of a general assault. The governor gave in to the *ordonnateur*'s request, and sent a message at once to inform the commander-in-chief of the British forces that he accepted the terms of unconditional capitulation. At the news, the officers of the second Cambis battalion were "filled with indignation, tore up their colours, and each soldier, in imitation of them, took his musket by one end and, striking the butt, smashed it to pieces."[60]

At noon on 27 July, the French troops assembled on the Louisbourg parade ground. The adjutants of the various battalions gave orders to their respective corps to lay down their arms. Only the officers had permission to keep their swords. An anonymous witness noted "that [the garrison] threw their arms to the ground and turned away, weeping."[61] Brigadier-General

58 *Ibid.*, fol. 73v.

59 A.C., Série C[11]C, vol. 10, *Journal du Siège de Louisbourg, 15 avril-27 juillet*, fol. 17-17v; Journal de Grillot de Poilly, 26 juillet 1758, p. 105.

60 A.C., Série C[11]B, vol. 38, Lettre de la Houlière au ministre, Rochefort, 19 septembre 1758, fol. 210v.

61 A.C., Série C[11]C, vol. 10, *Journal du Siège de Louisbourg, 15 avril-27 juillet*, fol. 19v; Journal de Grillot de Poilly, 27 juillet 1758, pp. 106-107.

Whitmore reviewed the defeated French garrison.[62] Having laid down their arms, the soldiers broke ranks and went away to the shelters erected here and there throughout the town. They slept in the streets until their deportation, on 8 August 1758.[63]

After the capitulation, the British high command did a survey of all the French military units then stationed in Louisbourg. According to a document entitled "State of the Garrison of Louisbourg, when it capitulated, 26th July 1758," the second battalion of the Cambis regiment included 38 officers, 466 soldiers fit to bear arms and 104 sick or wounded.[64] Despite the capitulation, the battalion had acquitted itself honourably. Though they had lost a commander during the crossing, they had subsequently proceeded to Ile Royale, marched overland to Louisbourg, and been limited to the strict minimum of equipment and supplies. Nonetheless, the members of the battalion distinguished themselves repeatedly and they effectively carried out the tasks assigned to them. The volunteers of the Cambis regiment, under the command of Levesque de Rocqueville, were fully equal to the task of defending the perimeter in front of the Dauphine Gate. The other soldiers of the battalion, posted in various locations inside the fortress, ensured the defence of strategic points, worked tirelessly on entrenchments, carried ammunition to the French gunners and fought fires. The soldiers of this unit were courageous and disciplined. No member of the battalion appeared in a court martial for desertion, disobedience or any other military offence.

On 8 August 1758, at eight o'clock in the morning, the members of the second battalion embarked aboard English vessels and were sent to England.[65]

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62 National Archives of Canada [hereafter N.A.C.], MG 18, L 4, Amherst Family, the Earl of Amherst's Papers, Vol. 3, Packet 19, no. 9, Sir Jeffrey Amherst's Journal, 27 July 1758, fol. 20.

63 A.C., Série $C^{11}C$, vol. 10, *Journal du Siège, Louisbourg, mars-août*, fol. 79-79v.

64 N.A.C., MG 18, L 4, Amherst Family, the Earl of Amherst's Papers, Vol. 5, Packet 30, fols. 3-14, "State of the Garrison of Louisbourg when it capitulated 26th July 1758". The losses of the second battalion of the Cambis Regiment, compared to the other battalions, were the least heavy.

65 A.G., Service historique d l'armée, Série A 1, vol. 3499, pièce 23, Lettre de M. de Larocque à (?), 9 août 1758. The command of the second Cambis battalion decided to leave two officers, Monsieur de Rocqueville and Monsieur Jasmin, along with two sergeants, to look after the soldiers of the Cambis battalion who were too sick or too seriously wounded to undertake the crossing.

The officers were taken aboard the British warship *Burfurd* (66 guns).[66] Upon their arrival in England, the members of the second battalion were incarcerated in Tavistock, Plymouth, Portsmouth and Liverpool.[67] The members of the battalion were repatriated to France in small groups, between November 1758 and April 1759.[68]

66 N.A.C., MG 18, L 4, Amherst Family, the Earl of Amherst's Papers, Vol. 1, Packet 4, Letters from Admiral Boscawen, 1758. Letter from Admiral Boscawen to General Amherst, *Namur*, Louisbourg Harbour, 8 August 1758, pp. 20-21; P.R.O., ADM 50, vol. 3, Journal of Admiral Boscawen (1755-1758), 8 August 1758.

67 A.G., Service historique de l'armée, Série A[1], vol. 3499, pièce 96, Lettre de M. de Larocque à (?), Tavistock, 23 septembre 1758.

68 A.G., Service historique de l'armée, Série A[1], vol. 3499, Correspondance écrite par plusieurs officiers du second bataillon de Cambis entre les mois de septembre et décembre 1758.

Cape Breton Maps in *The Atlantic Neptune*: A Holland-DesBarres Connection

Walter K. Morrison

The misshapen form of Cape Breton Island displayed on the maps of the mid-eighteenth century[1] bears little resemblance to the shape that we see on satellite photos today. Little wonder, since the island was not systematically surveyed and mapped until the mid-1760s. The French effort at mapping the region centred on locating accurately the Atlantic coastline of Nova Scotia[2] and surveying meticulously the bays and harbours of commercial interest. The French charts of Nerichat (Arichat), Port Toulouse (St. Peters), Louisbourg and the entrance to the Great Bras d'Or, while more than equal to *The Atlantic Neptune* in accuracy, were never conjoined with a similar degree of accuracy. One would expect the French chart of Cape Breton published by the Ministry of the Marine in 1780[3] to reflect the sum total of their knowledge of the island. However, it placed Cheticamp and Aspy Bay too far north and the Bird Islands, at the entrance of the Great Bras d'Or, deviated some fifteen degrees off line to the east. Interior detail, especially the shores of the Bras d'Or Lakes, was over-generalized and often incorrect. The entire west coast of the island followed the d'Anville shape of 1755,[4] with a somewhat concave shoreline from Port Hood to the Gut of Canso (as the index map shows, this part of the coast is convex).

Cape Breton's longitude shifted back and forth as much as twenty degrees from map to map, because some charts were based on Paris, some on London, and some on Ferro in the Canary Islands.[5] This confusing variation

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1 Thomas Jefferys, "A New Map of Nova Scotia and Cape Britain Island. . ." (London, 1755) and John Montresor, "A Map of Nova Scotia or Acadia: with the Islands of Cape Breton and St. John. . ." (London, 1768).

2 [Joseph-Bernard] De Chabert, *Voyage Fait Par Ordre Du Roi En 1750 Et 1751, Dans L'Amerique Septentrionale. . .* (Paris, 1753).

3 "Carte Reduite De L'Ile Royale, . . . ," *Neptune Americo-septentrional* (Paris, 1780), Plate 2B.

4 [J.B.] D'Anville, "Canada, Louisiane et Terres Angloise," (Paris, 1755).

5 Thomas Jefferys's "Map of Nova Scotia and Cape Britain. . ." uses longitude from Ferro at the top and from London at the bottom. The French charts were based on Paris, which was considered to be twenty degrees east of Ferro.

CAPE BRETON'S SHARE OF *THE ATLANTIC NEPTUNE*



W.K.Morrison, fecit D.H.Raymond, digitized.

in longitude notation became more than just an inconvenience during the Seven Years' War naval operations, which culminated in the invasions of Louisbourg and Quebec. With the successful conclusion of that war, a cadre of trained map-makers presented the British authorities with an opportunity to rectify the inadequate mapping and charting of the St. Lawrence region. Both the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, eyeing the land, and the Lords of the Admiralty, concerned with coastal navigation, took steps to initiate a comprehensive program to survey the lands and waters around Nova Scotia, as well as those of the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

The Board of Trade chose Samuel Holland to head the land surveying, while the Admiralty assigned the charting of Nova Scotia's waters to J.F.W. DesBarres.[6] Both were trained engineering officers of the Royal American regiment, the 60th Foot, and both were facing unemployment at the end of hostilities between France and Great Britain. The Board of Trade gave Holland the task of mapping and subdividing the Island of St. John (Prince Edward Island), the Magdalens and Cape Breton. The results of the first two surveys were made available to the public,[7] but the manuscript maps of Cape Breton remained lost[8] until copies turned up in General Gage's papers at the William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.[9]

It is likely that all of Holland's Cape Breton surveys are embedded in the various plates of DesBarres's magnificent work, *The Atlantic Neptune*. Within Volumes I, II and IV of that publication, there are a total of fifteen charts bearing wholly or in part on Cape Breton. While Holland was directly employed by the Board of Trade, DesBarres was basically a private contractor and retained the rights to his map compilations and the engraved plates

6 Don W. Thomson, *Men and Meridians*, I (Ottawa, 1966), pp. 100, 106.

7 Thomas Jefferys, *The North American Pilot* (London, 1775), plates 24 and 25.

8 *Holland's Description of Cape Breton Island and Other Documents*, D.C. Harvey, comp., (Halifax, 1935), p. 34.

9 Nathaniel N. Shipton, "Samuel Holland's Plan of Cape Breton," *The Canadian Cartographer*, V, 2 (Dec. 1968), 81.

resulting from them.[10] He published *The Atlantic Neptune* first in 1776, simply as *The Seacoasts of Nova Scotia*[11] with a companion volume, *Charts of the Coast and Harbours of New England*, "bound in two separate [*sic*] volumes."[12]

DesBarres commenced his survey work on the western shores of the Gulf of St. Lawrence at Shediac, Cocagne and Buctouche (in what is now New Brunswick), and eventually ended at Passamaquoddy.[13] The original Volume 1, *The Sea Coasts of Nova Scotia*, seems to be based entirely on DesBarres's field work. This was published in 1776 and contains only four large-scale harbour charts of Cape Breton: St. Peters Bay, Conway (Arichat) Harbour, the Gut of Canso, Port Hood harbour; and one medium-scale coasting chart, S.44, "Southeast Coast of Nova Scotia," which extends to Lennox Passage.[14] As well, the small-scale "Chart of Nova Scotia" contains part of Cape Breton as far as 46 degrees, 12 minutes north latitude. The implication, since the table of contents coincides exactly with DesBarres's description of his surveying coverage, is that all the rest of the charts portraying the Island of Cape Breton were based on the work of Samuel Holland and his assistants. Even the "general Mercator charts" mentioned in the following letter were not included in the first printing of *The Seacoasts of Nova Scotia*.

DesBarres described a proposed collaboration with Samuel Holland in a letter to Commodore Hood, dated 13 August 1770:

> Camp at Port Hebert. . .
> [I] have met with Capt. Holland at Liverpool from whence we sailed out together and parted this morning – I must now trouble you with a narrative of the scheme he proposes for extending the Public Benefits of the Service on which we are employed. I have seen his performances whi[ch] he says

10 G.N.D. Evans, *Uncommon Obdurate: The Several Public Careers of J.F.W. DesBarres* (Salem, Mass., 1969), pp. 12, 22.

11 Henry Stevens, Son & Stiles, *Catalogue of Atlases & Maps. . .*, New Series, No. 24 (London, 1936), p. 3.

12 DesBarres to Lord Howe, DesBarres Papers, Series 5, Vol. 1, pp. 146-47, National Archives of Canada [hereafter NAC].

13 DesBarres to Lords of the Treasury, *ibid.*, p. 159.

14 Edwin B. Newman, *List of the Printed Tables of Contents of The Atlantic Neptune* (Cambridge, Mass., 1987).

> he is sensible cannot be so generally beneficial to the Public for want of proper soundings and as even these few which are laid down, are not to be relied upon, having omitted paying attention to that (tho' most important) while considering it as being without his Sphere of a Surveyor of the land. But in order to extend the utility of what he has done, he proposes to furnish me with his Astronomical Observations and materials (as he names them) by the means of which I am to protract proper Sea Charts and to improve and compleat the same with soundings and necessary observations and remarks, Obser[vatio]n[s] peculiarly adapted for the purposes of Navigation; and he wishes to have a copy of my Surveys on a small scale (eight miles to an inch) to join to his Geographical Map which when done he will send to me to look over. He proposes to distinguish on his Geographic Map what Part he has received of me and I am likewise to acknowledge those with which he may have supplied me should I insert them when I come to publish my Sea Charts. Tho' I must own it is with reluctance that I shall join the work of others to mine, yet I esteem it my duty to embrace this Opportunity to compose a general Mercator Chart comprehending the River and Gulph of St. Lawrence, the Islands of Anticosty, St. John, Cape Breton, The Isle of Sable and this Continent to the Bay of Fundy, Etc.. considering how much a chart is wanted at present.[15]

Just exactly which charts are totally the product of DesBarres and which are Holland/DesBarres collaborations cannot be stated with certainty, except for "A Chart of the South East Coast of Cape Breton Island," which specifically credits "Samuel Holland Esq. Sur^{r} Gen^{l} of the Lands of the Northern District of N. America and his assistants. . . ."[16] A comparison of the three Holland manuscript maps[17] with the equivalent DesBarres plates may give us more clues to the extent of this collaboration, but first let us see what maps or charts describing Cape Breton were published by DesBarres in the various editions of *The Atlantic Neptune*.

The standard notation scheme for reference to the plates of *The Atlantic Neptune* is by the numbers assigned each in the most extensive collection

15 DesBarres to Commodore Hood, DesBarres Papers, Series 5, Vol. 1, pp. 56-69, NAC.

16 Thomas Wright, John Pringle, William Brown, George Sproule and Thomas Hanson are all mentioned in the title of this chart.

17 Photocopies courtesy of David Bosse, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

of DesBarres's work, the Henry N. Stevens collection in the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, England. These are called the "Stevens numbers" [hereafter S.#], and are used on the index map reproduced as the frontispiece. DesBarres's "general Mercator map," for instance, is known as S.9. It is of a very small scale (1 inch = 32 miles), but serves to locate Cape Breton Island accurately in relation to Newfoundland and the rest of eastern Canada. Indeed, for the first time the island was correctly located in terms of longitude west of the meridian of Greenwich, England. Prior to this, maps based on London used the dome of St. Paul's Cathedral for the prime meridian,[18] twelve miles west of Greenwich. The following table shows all the pertinent Cape Breton charts.

CHARTS OF CAPE BRETON IN *THE ATLANTIC NEPTUNE*

Stevens number	Title of Charts	No. of plates	Scale
9.	Coast of N.S., New England &c.	2	1:2 mil.
10.	Chart of Nova Scotia	3	1:500,000
44.	Southeast Coast of Nova Scotia	4	1:132,500
59.	St. Peter's Bay	1	1:28,160
62.	Conway Harbour	1	1:29,300
63.	Lennox Passage, Richmond Isles	3	1:29,000
66.	Gutt of Canso	3	1:31,680
67.	Northeast Coast of Nova Scotia	3	1:142,560
69.	Port Hood	1	1:29,500
122.	Gulph and River St. Lawrence	3	1:514,800
136.	Northeast Coast of Cape Breton	3	1:56,000
137.	Southeast Coast of Cape Breton	4	1:47,520
138.	Cape Breton and St. John Islands	1	1:500,000
139.	Island of Cape Breton	1	1:268,000
140.	Harbour of Louisbourg	1	1:7,920

DesBarres's map of Nova Scotia (S.10) presents a compilation of his own work in the field, therefore only the southern part of Cape Breton is included, but later in Volume IV of *The Atlantic Neptune*, DesBarres included the northern tip of the island (S.122). Unfortuntely, the two maps are not the same scale

18 W.E. May, *A History of Marine Navigation* (Henley-on-Thames, 1973), fn. p. 158.

and there is a gap of some fifteen minutes in latitude between them, so the two cannot be joined. Although DesBarres showed the scheme of his atlas as containing uniform scales for charts--pilotage charts at 1" = *ca.* ½ mile and coasting charts at 1" = *ca.* 2 miles, by the bar scales printed on the "Reference page--his scales in reality vary considerably, making edge matching of detail difficult at the best of times.

Another difficulty with DesBarres's charts is his substitution of names of people of power for the familiar, local toponomy. Anthony Lockwood, the surveyor who was later involved with the first British Admiralty charts of Nova Scotia,[19] deplored this practice, writing that, "DesBarres, in attaching to them the names of noblemen, or men in power, has made his charts of less value." He also noted, "the charts are published on so expensive a plan, that precludes the possibility of those possessing them who need them most."[20]

First on the list of Cape Breton pilotage charts is "St. Peters Bay" (S.59). This was one of the long-settled areas of the island and not even DesBarres cared to tamper with its place-name. (Holland was not so reluctant; he changed the name to "Port Augustus.") The "St. Peters" plate showed the confusion among the ranks of DesBarres's engravers brought about by the urgency of the Admiralty's need for charts of North America, due to the advent of the American Revolution. The first printing of "St. Peters" contained serious errors in both latitude and longitude notation. The original latitudes put the chart in the vicinity of New York City. Some of the early prints had the erring figures scraped off and hand-inked corrections substituted. These changes were usually skillfully done and only show up now when the print is back-lighted. On the positive side, this chart is especially useful for studying the progression of DesBarres's hill-shading techniques, although these hills were mainly cosmetic, used only to fill in blank spaces and to give a more finished appearance. "St. Peters Bay" at first glance appears devoid of all drawing on the land portion, except for streams, but closer scrutiny reveals the blanks completely covered with

19 Peter Thomas, *Strangers from a Secret Land* (Toronto, 1986), pp. 148, 149.

20 Anthony Lockwood, *A Brief Description of Nova Scotia* (London, 1818), p. 17.

tiny dots delineating the hills to be shaded in by a spiked wheel, called a "roulette," usually wielded by an apprentice.[21]

The second Cape Breton chart found on *The Atlantic Neptune* table of contents is "Conway or Arishat Harbour, Port Aylesbury [Petit-de-Grat]. . ." (S.62). The reference here to "Conway" probably refers to Henry Seymour Conway, Secretary of State for the Northern Department in Pitt's administration from 1766 to 1768. Reinforcing this conjecture is the fact that Conway was married to Lady Aylesbury.[22] Despite the inclusion of "Arishat" in the table of contents title, on the charts themselves DesBarres tended to ignore local names in southern Cape Breton and the mainland. For the most part, this insured the impermanence of his grand renaming scheme. Having said that, however, the very next chart on the list provides an exception. "Lennox Passage, The Richmond Isles. . ." (S.63) gives us two names that persist to this day. Holland renamed Isle Madame, "Richmond Island" and DesBarres continued this with some embellishments. This chart was not included in the first table of contents of 1776, so possibly it was not based on DesBarres's own fieldwork.

The Gut of Canso is one area which was surveyed by both Holland and DesBarres. Holland's deputy, Thomas Wright, did a plan in 1766, at virtually the same scale as DesBarres's, though with only the simplest coastal detail and scattered soundings along the shores.[23] There is little similarity between the two works, leaving no doubt that DesBarres relied solely on his own surveys to produce this three-plate chart (S.66).

"The Gut of Canso" seems not to have stimulated DesBarres's name-changing inspiration. Possibly he did not wish to associate anyone with such an alimentary allusion. With nearby "Knight Inlet," however, DesBarres had a chance to honour one of his able assistants, Midshipman John Knight of H.M.S. *Romney*. In fact, DesBarres took the opportunity to praise his "young gentlemen" in a letter transmitting

21 David Woodward, *Five Centuries of Map Printing* (Chicago, 1975), p. 64.

22 *The Compact Edition of the Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 1975), I, 426 [hereafter *DNB*].

23 *Manuscript Maps Relating to North America. . . in the Public Record Office, London* (EP Microform Ltd., Yorkshire, 1980), reel 1, Nova Scotia 42.

". . .Plans to be laid before my Lords of the Admiralty. . . .The Bay of Chedabucto, Richmond Isles, The Gut of Canso and part of the Island of Cape Breton. . . 400 fathoms to in[ch]. . . .These plans are accurate copies of my originals and are a sample of Mr. Jn. Knight and Mr. Jas. Luttrell, two young midshipmen now belonging to H.M. *Romney*, who have been employed with me for upwards of these four years past. . . .The latter has lately. . . been sent to the West Indies to forward his promotion.[24]

Luttrell's name was added to the chart just west of Gut of Canso (S.71), where Merigomish Harbour was designated "Port Luttrell." Luttrell later made his reputation in the West Indies, with mention and a portrait in *The European Magazine*, January 1783, while Knight eventually became an admiral.[25]

The chart entitled "Northeast Coast of Nova Scotia" (S.67) just touches a bit of the Gut of Canso and the west coast of Cape Breton, north to Port Hood, adding little to the knowledge of mapping the island except to show the soundings ending abruptly at Port Hood--another indication of the extent of DesBarres's surveys along that coast. Similarly "Southeast Coast of Nova Scotia" (S.44) touches only a small part of Cape Breton, but the lines of soundings on that chart show a pattern of activity consistent with a comprehensive hydrographic survey. This is possibly the best indication we have of DesBarres's reliance on his own surveys for a map base.

The one-plate chart of Port Hood (S.69) tells a great deal about the system of nomenclature used when DesBarres wanted to pay tribute to a person or family. Commodore Samuel Hood was commander-in-chief of the naval fleet in North America when DesBarres was surveying the waters of Nova Scotia; DesBarres was dependent on the support of the commodore for the success of the project. Many of the supplies and trained personnel who assisted DesBarres came from the commodore's flagship, the *Romney*. This chart was DesBarres's tribute to the commodore and his family. How do we know that the Hood named on this plate was the commodore, outside of common sense? There were a couple of other Hoods who might have

24 DesBarres to Stephens, Secretary to the Admiralty, DesBarres Papers, Vol. 5, p. 52. NAC.

25 *DNB*, I, 256.

been equally honoured.[26] The system DesBarres used was to sprinkle clues lavishly around the entire area. The primary clue was usually the first name of the honoree, somewhere around the entrance of the named bay or harbour. In this case there is a "Samuel River" at the entrance to Little Judique Harbour. The outermost point of what is today Port Hood Island was named, "Point Susannah," as it is still, and the southernmost point was called "Portsmouth Point." The island to the southwest was and still is "Henry Island," while the promontory north of Port Hood derives its present-day name, "Cape Linzee," from the DesBarres chart. To tie these all together, Hood's wife was Susannah Linzee, daughter of Edward Linzee, for several years Lord Mayor of Portsmouth. Their one son was called Henry.[27]

The east coast of Cape Breton was served by two large coasting charts whose origins are not in doubt. One bearing the title "Northeast Coast of Cape Breton" (S.136) coincides with a manuscript of Holland's in the Gage collection.[28] This gives another chance to make direct comparisons between two versions. The soundings supposedly disparaged by Holland, according to DesBarres in the previously quoted letter to Hood, appear to have been reproduced with no alterations. Holland indulged in the renaming game, but DesBarres frequently reverted to translations of the former French place-names. Thus, where Holland used "Dyson Bay" for Glace Bay, DesBarres used the literal translation from the French, "Ice Bay." Sydney Harbour had to wait until DesBarres arrived as governor to acquire the name, because Holland's "Dartmouth Bay" and "Dartmouth Harbour" were not used on DesBarres's chart. Instead, DesBarres reverted to the French name "Baye des Espagnolles" and translated it as "Spanish River." DesBarres, however, did continue with Holland's "Dartmouth River." Morien Bay was similarly rescued from Holland's "Gage Bay," which must have taken some courage on DesBarres's part, considering that Gage was a general in the British Army and DesBarres himself was at that time only a captain.[29]

26 *Ibid.*, I, 998-99.

27 *Ibid.*, I, 998.

28 Samuel Holland, "A Plan of the Sea Coast from Gage Point to Cumberland Cape. . . ," Gage Papers, Clements Library.

29 He did not become a major until 1783: *DNB*, I, 852.

Adjacent to the "Northeast Coast" chart is "Southeast Coast of Cape Breton" (S.137), handsomely credited to the work of Holland and his co-workers, seldom a practice on maps of that period. For such a large chart, it shows relatively little hydrographic detail. Two lines of soundings, apparently from Mowat's survey, are all that occupy the waters that stretch from St. Peters to Louisbourg. Evidence of any DesBarres input is totally lacking on these four plates. The source of the double line of soundings is noted at the bottom of Holland's 1767 plan of Cape Breton: "The soundings and Naval Observations were taken by Lieutenant Henry Mowat of His Majesty's Arm'd Ship the Canceaux with the assistance of the Gentlemen under his directions. N.B. The season being too far Advanced to take the Soundings from Louisbourg to the Gut of Canso, they are defer'd untill [*sic*] the Spring."[30]

This leaves three charts which were never fully completed: "Cape Breton and St. John Islands" (S.138), "Island of Cape Breton" (S.139), and "Louisbourg" (S.140), which never progressed beyond a single state of its plate. The first two, when compared to Holland's complete map of Cape Breton, reveal the same patterns seen in the comparisons of the "Northeast" and "Southeast" coastal maps. The double row of soundings from St. Peters to Louisbourg, seen on the "Southeast Coast" chart, appear again. Mowat's soundings on Holland's "Cape Breton," from Louisbourg, north around Cape North and along the west coast to Port Hood, are repeated on both DesBarres charts with no additions. Holland's lot divisions are retained on DesBarres's "Cape Breton," but the scheme of counties and parishes is ignored. The Bras d'Or Lake is called "St. George's Lake" by Holland and repeated by DesBarres with a subtitle, "La Bras-dor," a switch from "Labrador" used by the French.[31]

The single-plate, large-scale chart of Louisbourg (S.140) appears to record an area that was resurveyed by DesBarres. The orientation of "North East Harbour," as well as the shoreline of that cove, differs substantially from Holland's manuscript. "Rochfort Point" ("Rochford" on DesBarres's) is aligned

30 Samuel Holland, *A Plan of the Island of Cape Britain* [sic] *Reduced from the large survey. . .*, Clements Library.

31 See J.M. Bellin, "L'Isle Royale. . .," *Le Petit Atlas Maritime* (Paris, 1764), Vol. 1, plate 22, and *Neptune Americo-septentrional* (Paris, 1780). Plates 2A, 2B and 7.

more easterly on Holland than DesBarres's more realistic slant toward the northeast. Many more soundings, in completely different patterns, indicate DesBarres paid considerably more attention to the bottom of the harbour than did Holland.

These then were the charts which served the nautical world for the vicinity of Cape Breton until the 1840s. It may have been fortunate that local sailors could not afford them[32] because Captain Henry Bayfield, while surveying these waters in detail for the Admiralty in 1848, cautioned Admiral Sir Francis Beaufort, the Hydrographer, to discontinue issuing DesBarres's charts of Cape Breton, noting that they were dangerous because they lacked essential information on shoals and soundings.[33] This was in 1848; thus, either the charts were not quite so bad as Bayfield stated, or no one had used them in the previous sixty-odd years. Bayfield's own efforts lasted about as long.

Shipton's description of *The Atlantic Neptune* Cape Breton charts as copies of Holland's work which were "skeleton charts stripped of the elegance and polish of their progenitor," is accurate as far as it goes. Yet DesBarres would certainly never be guilty of designing the awkward title block found on Holland's manuscript for Louisbourg harbour. DesBarres, had time permitted, would probably have embellished the Cape Breton charts with more artistry and innovation. In the end, however, little more was done to any of the charts of Cape Breton after 1781, although some editions of *The Atlantic Neptune* were printed as late as 1803.[34] "The North East Coast of Cape Breton Island" is the sole exception, because sometime after 1785, a small plan labelled "Town of Sydney Laid out by Governor Des Barres [*sic*] in 1785," was added to the plate.[35] The reason why no more attention was paid to the Cape Breton area was that the focus of the Revolutionary War had shifted to southern waters,

32 Lockwood, *Description of Nova Scotia*, p. 17.

33 Ruth McKenzie, ed., *The St. Lawrence Survey Journals of Captain Henry Wolsey Bayfield 1829 - 1853* (Toronto, 1986), II, 357.

34 Edwin B. Newman and Augustus P. Loring, "Some notes on the paper of *The Atlantic Neptune*," *The American Neptune*, XLVI, 3 (Summer 1986), p. 176.

35 John R. Sellers and Patricia Molen Van Ee, comp., *Maps and Charts of North America and the West Indies 1750-1789* (Washington, 1981), entry number 329.

and DesBarres was pressing to turn out the required charts. The waters around Nova Scotia and the St. Lawrence, although thoroughly charted, were quite simply not where the action was.

After all that has been noted about the dependence of DesBarres on the work of Holland and others, one must not forget what William P. Cumming has pointed out so succinctly: "Joseph Frederick Wallet DesBarres' [*sic*] chief claim to fame is *The Atlantic Neptune;* however much others contributed to its success, his was the intellectual acumen, the driving physical stamina that brought it to a successful completion."[36]

36 William P. Cumming, *British Maps of Colonial America* (Chicago, 1974), p. 52.

Lawrence Kavanagh I: An Eighteenth-Century Cape Breton Entrepreneur

Phyllis MacInnes Wagg

The years from the defeat of the French at Louisbourg in 1758 to the formation of the separate British colony of Cape Breton in 1784 are a cloudy period in the history of Cape Breton Island. One person who does stand out in that little known era, however, was Lawrence Kavanagh I.[1] The position of Kavanagh in the commercial life of the island, and his influence with the British officials, is remarkable in an era when both the legal and social environment discriminated against Roman Catholics. His achievements, however, have been overshadowed by the political career of his son Lawrence Kavanagh II, who became the first Roman Catholic to sit in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly.[2]

It was the policy of the British government, after the conquest of Cape Breton Island, not to grant lands on the island until a survey was completed. This had both positive and negative effects. One positive result was that it prevented the granting of large tracts of land to speculators.[3] On the negative side, it prevented the growth of a resident commercial group. It was likely that the policy was designed for this purpose, since island-based merchants would have provided competition for the British and Channel Island commercial interests.[4] While the policy appears to have discouraged most entrepreneurs from becoming permanent residents, it did not have that effect on the Kavanagh family.

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1 There are several inconsistencies in the published sources on the Kavanagh family mentioned in the references and these sources must be used with caution. There were four Lawrence Kavanaghs in a direct line: Lawrence d. ca. 1775 married to Margaret Farrell; Lawrence II (1764-1830) married to Felicity LeJeune; Lawrence III (1789-1862) married to Cathrine Murphy; and Lawrence IV (ca. 1816/26-1898?).

2 For further information on the career of Lawrence Kavanagh see Anthony Travalee, *Lawrence Kavanagh, 1764-1830*; Rev. D.J. Rankin, "Lawrence Kavanagh," *The Canadian Catholic Historical Association Report 1940-41*; Rev. A.A. Johnston, *History of the Catholic Church in Nova Scotia*, Vol. II (Antigonish, 1960).

3 Petitions for land in Cape Breton appear in CO 217, Vol. 5. Many of these petitions were for 20,000 acres.

4 See W. Gordon Handcock, *Soe longe as there comes noe women* (St. John's, 1989), p. 13 for information on how this policy worked in Newfoundland. Very few individuals and businesses that appear in records, such as AO 3, Vol. 141, and Public Archives of Nova Scotia [hereafter PANS], RG 37, Vol. 17, Halifax County Inferior Court of Common Pleas, appear to have maintained residence on Cape Breton Island for a significant period of time.

Israel Longworth, who claimed to have received the information from Lawrence Kavanagh's grandson, Lawrence Kavanagh III, stated that the first Lawrence and his wife, Margaret Farrell, came to Louisbourg from Waterford, Ireland with goods valued at 9,000 pounds sterling. His business activities included the supplying of ninety vessels from thirty to eighty tons in the codfishery, the average catch being 33,000 quintals which was shipped to the Spanish market. Longworth also stated that Lawrence I owned three brigs: of 100, 140, and 160 tons. Along with the brigs, he owned two schooners of 100 and 90 tons respectively, as well as a sloop of 118 tons.[5]

D.J. Rankin wrote that soon after the capture of Louisbourg by the British, a certain Morris Kavanagh, with his sons Lawrence, Morris and Edward, all natives of Ireland, arrived there from Newfoundland.[6] This family had the support of merchants in London and consequently enjoyed position in Louisbourg.[7] It has been difficult to prove either Longworth's or Rankin's statements from contemporary sources, though records do indicate that Lawrence Kavanagh had a substantial commercial enterprise and that he did have support in London.

The earliest known documentary source for the arrival of the Kavanaghs in Louisbourg is a reference in Samuel Holland's accounts for the survey of Cape Breton, dated 15 September 1763.[8] The next document indicating Kavanagh's presence in the town is dated 15 February 1764; it refers to the fact that Lawrence Kavanagh, Deputy Provost Marshal, had arrested Francis

5 Sandra Creighton, ed., *Israel Longworth's History of Colchester County, Nova Scotia (circa 1886)* (Truro, 1989), p. 70. The date given here for the Kavanaghs' arrival at Louisbourg is 1700, but this is clearly a misprint.

6 No records of Morris Kavanagh, Sr., Edward Kavanagh, or Morris Kavanagh, Jr. have been found at Louisbourg between 1760 and 1784. A Maurice Cavanagh, master of the schooner *Nova Scotia Packet* was charged in the Supreme Court at Halifax for the illegal importation of liquor in 1767 (PANS, RG 39, C, Vol. 6, No. 2h). However, no connection to Lawrence has been established.

7 Rankin, "Lawrence Kavanagh," pp. 54-55.

8 Audit Office 3, Vol. 120 (405), Fortress of Louisbourg National Historic Park. The names L. Kavenagh, Mr. Kavanagh and Mr. Cavanagh appear throughout AO 3, Vol. 141, with entries covering the period 1763 to 1770.

Wroughton,[9] and committed him to jail in Louisbourg.[10] On 23 February 1764, Lawrence Kavanagh incurred a debt for customs duties at Louisbourg.[11] A case was brought against him by George Cottnam, Collector of Customs, in the Supreme Court at Halifax on 29 August 1766 for failing to pay a total of £52.16.1.[12]

The name Lawrence Kavanagh also appears on a petition to the Lords of Trade from the residents of Louisbourg on 28 April 1767. In this document the petitioners indicated that they had been encouraged to come from Newfoundland to carry on the fisheries, but the government of Nova Scotia was making no attempt to relieve them from the difficulties caused by their distance from the capital. They complained that they had no voice in the Assembly, and had to pay "exorbitant rents" to dwell in the "wretched remains of said Town." Furthermore, they had no court of justice, they had been refused grants, and they were highly taxed on spirituous liquors.[13] The petitioners went on to state that "spirituous liquors" were an "essential article in carrying on the fishery in this Intemporate [*sic*] climate" and that they could not possibly retain people in their employ without considerable quantities.[14] That Kavanagh was importing "considerable quantities" is supported by the fact that on 23 February 1764 he imported 600 gallons of rum and on 25 November 1765 imported 1000 gallons of wine.[15]

The only indication that Lawrence Kavanagh may have been in Louisbourg as early as 1760 is contained in a letter from Michael Franklin, lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia, to the Earl of Shelburne dated Halifax,

9 Francis Wroughton was the partner-in-trade of the late William Ancel. These merchants were trading at Louisbourg from 1758 to about 1764 (see PANS, RG 37, Vol. 17, for several cases brought against Wroughton).

10 PANS, RG 37, Vol. 17, Halifax County Inferior Court of Common Pleas.

11 PANS, RG 39, C [HX], Vol. 4, No. 62f, Halifax Supreme Court.

12 *Loc. cit.*

13 CO 217, Vol. 22, pp. 45-58, PRO (mfm. at PANS).

14 *Loc. cit.*

15 PANS, RG 39, C [HX], Vol. 4, 62f.

16 December 1767. Franklin listed those who had been granted licences of occupation on Cape Breton Island, and he stated that they had "resided at Louisbourg for seven or eight years."[16] The list contains the names John Robin, George Cottnam, William Russell, Laurence [*sic*] Cavanagh and James Gethings.

On 10 December 1767 Lawrence and his partner in trade, James Gethings, were granted a licence "to occupy a tract of land on the Isle of Cape Breton situated between the west end of Little St. Peters and ending at the eastern-most end of Pointe Louis containing five hundred acres or thereabouts."[17] In a document dated 26 September 1768, Michael Franklin reported that Gething and Kavanagh had built a house, storehouses, stages and flakes, and had a large quantity of cattle on their St. Peters property.[18] Kavanagh's name also appears in a list of people who had fenced three- to five-acre lots at Louisbourg with the permission of Lieutenant-Colonel Tulliken.[19]

In July 1769, Kavanagh received a licence of occupation from Lord William Campbell, governor of Nova Scotia, to occupy a storehouse at Louisbourg.[20] Little information has been found on Lawrence's partner, Gethings, except that on 30 April 1768 the latter was appointed a Justice of the Peace.[21] On 13 August 1770 Lawrence bought out Gethings's interest in their business for £1,000.[22]

Although the full extent of his business operations is difficult to determine, Kavanagh was certainly involved in the fisheries and in trade, and had a substantial quantity of livestock. The 1772 census of Louisbourg[23] gives

16 CO 217, Vol. 45, p. 25.

17 *Ibid.*, Vol. 195, p. 47.

18 *Ibid.*, Vol. 25, pp. 143-146.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 145.

20 *Ibid.*, Vol. 195, p. 56.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 28.

22 PANS, RG 47, Halifax County Deeds, Vol. 10, pp. 174-179.

23 PANS, Micro. Biography. Dartmouth. Dartmouth Papers, Reel 2, p. 2457.

an indication of his dominance over the economic life of the community. This census reveals that Kavanagh had 42 servants,[24] 60 horned cattle, 10 horses, 30 sheep, and 50 pigs. His closest rival, William Russell, had 19 servants, 18 horned cattle, 3 horses, 10 pigs, and 8 goats. Kavanagh owned 47 per cent of the horned cattle, 45 per cent of the horses, 52 per cent of the sheep and 54 per cent of the pigs, and employed 59 per cent of the workers in Louisbourg.

Impressive though these figures are, they do not take into account Lawrence Kavanagh's fishery operation nor his retail business, through which he supplied flour, pork, molasses, bread, sugar, tea, soap, candles, blankets, shirts, coats, breeches, stockings, cotton, tobacco, guns, shot, powder, cordage, sail needles, pitch, fish hooks, blocks, and many other items used for the fishery. There is at least one example of his renting boats for the use of fishermen.[25] He also occupied three of the twenty-two houses in the town and controlled eight of seventeen storehouses in Louisbourg.[26] Finally, he received a licence of occupation to cut hay on 9 July 1769, and a licence to use the coal wharf at Louisbourg.[27]

Both the 1772 and 1774 census returns indicate that Kavanagh had six children. Kavanagh was a Roman Catholic, and since there was no priest available to baptize his family, it was not until Father Charles-François Bailly visited Louisbourg on 7 September 1771 that four of Kavanagh's children were baptized: Marie; Elizabeth, aged two years; Laurent, aged seven years; and Eduard, aged three months.[28] A fifth child was his eldest son, James. A Catherine Cavanagh who stood as the godmother to Marie may have been the sixth child.

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24 "Servants" in this context would be synonymous with "employees."

25 PANS, RG 39, Series C[HX], Vol. 14, No. 4d, 4f, and 4g.

26 Dartmouth Papers, Reel 1, p. 172.

27 *Ibid.* pp. 228-229.

28 *Registre de l'Abbé Charles-François Bailly,* 1768 à 1773 (Caraquet), transcrit sous la direction de Stephen A. White (Moncton, 1978), pp. 67-68.

While Lawrence Kavanagh's family was growing and his businesses were flourishing, there were a few other people in Cape Breton who did not look so kindly on his success. George Cottnam, who was appointed justice of the peace for Cape Breton on 24 January 1764,[29] and the naval officer, Lieutenant George Dawson, held the opinion that Kavanagh's operations were not in the best interest of the other inhabitants of the island. The two officials constantly complained of Kavanagh's activities to the officials at Halifax. It appears that the situation reached a crisis about 1771, when Kavanagh was deprived of the storehouse for which he had received a licence in 1769. As a result, the provincial secretary, Richard Bulkeley, found it necessary to order Cottnam to return the storehouse to Kavanagh. He further directed that "the said Lawrence Kavanagh shall without hindrance occupy and convert to his own use the remaining part of a frame House at Louisbourg known by the name of the nunnery, together with half an acre of land or thereabouts thereto adjoining," and that he also be put into possession of a house called the "mess house."[30]

The complaints against Kavanagh continued, especially concerning his control over so much of the real estate in Louisbourg. In 1773 it was alleged that he had "several times pulled down the public buildings there, and taken away boards and timber, iron, lead, and other materials and carried them to his own dwelling and converted them to his own use."[31] Kavanagh did not deny the charges, but claimed that he had "converted them to the use of the Public Buildings which were then in a ruinous condition."[32] On 8 December 1773 Kavanagh made countercharges that Lieutenant Dawson had unjustifiably impressed Kavanagh's seamen, and misused power to stop and detain Kavanagh's fishing and trading vessels. Moreover, Kavanagh charged that Cottnam had, in his role as justice of the peace, "solicited dispositions [*sic*] of several persons to make false testimony against him."[33]

29 CO 217, Vol. 195, p. 42.

30 *Ibid.*, pp. 228-229.

31 *Ibid.*, p. 28.

32 *Ibid.*

33 *Ibid.*, Memorial of Lawrence Kavanagh, merchant and trader, dated 8 Dec. 1773.

On 7 November 1774, Cottnam complained that Kavanagh had removed building material from Louisbourg to St. Peters.[34] With the arrival of Governor Francis Legge in Halifax in October 1773, the officials at Louisbourg found a slightly more sympathetic ear. Legge reported to the Earl of Dartmouth the situation described to him that "Mr. Cavanagh had engrossed the most of the buildings, and improvements, very much to the disadvantage of all the other Settlers." Dartmouth's reply was that Kavanagh had been "very much recommended, by some of the principal merchants here trading to Nova Scotia."[35] Dartmouth indicated that he wanted Kavanagh granted "every reasonable indulgence" in the fishery branch of his business. Governor Legge replied to Dartmouth that he was "very solicitous to promote every branch of business that may be advantageous to the colony, in particular the Fishery, which ever will be the greatest object of its Trade."[36]

In 1777 the Kavanagh family decided to move from Louisbourg to St. Peters. On 18 August 1777, a letter from the provincial secretary, Richard Bulkeley to George Cottnam, instructed that when the lieutenant-governor learned that Mr. Kavanagh was to quit the town of Louisbourg, Kavanagh was to be given notice that he was not "on any account to move or take away any part of any of the buildings whatever," otherwise he would be prosecuted. Kavanagh was also ordered to remove several fences and enclosures that were obstructing the highways and streets.[37] The Mr. Kavanagh here referred to could not have been Lawrence I, as other records indicate that he had died before August 1777.

One published source gives the date of death for Lawrence Kavanagh I as 1774;[38] another as 1777.[39] Neither appears to be accurate. Longworth's account was that Lawrence I was going to Halifax on his 160-ton brig in

34 *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32, letter dated 7 Nov. 1774.

35 Dartmouth Papers, Reel 2, p. 2857, Dartmouth to Legge, 24 Feb. 1775.

36 PANS, RG 1, Vol. 44, No. 61. Legge to Dartmouth, Halifax, 24 April 1775.

37 CO 217, Vol. 195, No. 84, p. 254. Richard Bulkeley to George Cottnam, Halifax, 18 August 1777.

38 Johnston, *Catholic Church*, I, 451.

39 Terrence Punch, *Some Sons of Erin in Nova Scotia* (Halifax, 1980), p. 25.

1774 with a load of codfish, and the ship was lost on the Jeddore Ledges. However, several cases were initiated by Lawrence in the Supreme Court at Halifax in the summer of 1775,[40] so it is more likely that he died about August of that year. A document signed by Lawrence I's son James on 13 September 1775,[41] refers to him as the attorney of Lawrence Kavanagh, possibly indicating that the whereabouts of his father were unknown at that date. On 7 September 1776 a licence for a fishing lot at Mainadieu was granted to Margaret and James Kavanagh,[42] suggesting that Lawrence I must have been deceased by this time. A document dated 25 April 1777 refers to James as the executor of Lawrence Kavanagh, late of Louisbourg, trader, deceased.[43] Richard Bulkeley wrote to James on 11 September 1777 that,

> The Lieutenant Governor requires that immediately on the receipt of this letter you do deliver up to Mr. Russell all those Lands Houses and Stores which he occupies by leave from Government, and the kings Storehouses which you have possessed yourself of. That you do make an equal division of the Lands you now possess with the Inhabitants of Louisbourg under the inspection of Mr. Cottnam, and Mr. Russell.
>
> And also that when you quit the Town of Louisbourg you do deliver up to the chief magistrates all those Houses and Stores which you occupy by leave from government without the least damage whatever, otherwise you will be made accountable for the damages they may sustain.[44]

According to A.A. Johnston, the date of the Kavanaghs' move from Louisbourg to St. Peters was 10 October 1777.[45] Unfortunately, though the term 'executor'[46] suggests that Lawrence I had a will, no record of it has been found.

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40 PANS, RG 39, Series C [HX], Vol. 15, No. 62 and No. 63.

41 *Ibid.*, No. 63K.

42 PANS, Nova Scotia Land Grants, Vol. 10, p. 339.

43 RG 39, C [HX], Vol. 17, No. 65e.

44 CO 217, Vol. 195, No. 85, p. 258.

45 Johnston, *Catholic Church*, I, 451.

46 In the document in the Supreme Court (PANS, RG 39C [HX], Vol. 17, No. 65c), the term was first recorded as 'administrator', which was crossed out and 'executor' written in.

While the full extent of the Kavanagh business on Cape Breton Island during the first fifteen years of British rule cannot be determined, it is likely that Lawrence Kavanagh I was the principal resident merchant operating on the island in that period. It is interesting that an Irish Catholic had reached such a prominent level in commercial activity, and had also achieved such political influence during the eighteenth century, when the penal laws against Roman Catholics in Nova Scotia were still in force.[47]

47 See Johnston, *Catholic Church*, II, 78-80, for a brief review of the penal laws against Roman Catholics operating in Nova Scotia in this period.

William Donkin, Northumbrian, and his Nova Scotian Descendants. *Corrigenda*

Marion Donkin Oldershaw

The correct order of numbers, beginning with No. 8, Thomas[3] Donkin, on page 100, is as follows:

p. 100:	8	Thomas[3] Donkin		
		15	i.	John William[4]
		16	ii.	Albert
p. 101:		17	v.	James
	10	Robert[3] Donkin		
p. 102:		18	i.	George Oxley[4]
		19	iv.	Frederick Augusti
p. 103		20	vii.	Rupert Bent
		21	viii.	Hiram
	11	John[3] Donkin		
		22	i.	William Henry[4]
		23	ii.	Lewis Seaman
		24	v.	Charles Edwin
		25	vi.	Levi Brundage
	12	Charles[4] Garrison Donkin		
p. 104		26	ii.	William Frederick
		27	iii.	Joseph Edmund Dennis
		28	v.	Charles Clinton DesBrisay
	13	William[4] Donkin		
p. 105		29	iv.	Robert Terhune
		30	vii.	James
		31	x.	Henry L.
p. 106	16	Albert[4] Donkin		
p. 107		32	iii.	Thomas Cecil
p. 108	19	Frederick Augusti[4] Donkin		
p. 109		33	i.	Ernest A[5]
p. 110	21	Hiram Fergusson[4] Donkin		
p. 111		34	i.	Francis William[5]
		35	ii.	Robert Percy
	22	William Henry[4] Donkin		
		36	iii.	Samuel Walter

Nova Scotia Historical Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (June 1990), pp. 88-120.

p. 113	25	Levi Brundage[4] Donkin
	26	William Frederick[5] Donkin
p. 114	27	Joseph Edmund Dennis[5] Donkin
p. 115	28	Charles Clinton DesBrisay[5] Donkin
	29	Robert Terhune[5] Donkin
	30	James M.[5] Donkin
	31	Henry Lowther[5] Donkin
	32	Thomas Cecil[5] Donkin
p. 116	33	Ernest A.[5] Donkin
	34	Francis William[5] Donkin
	35	Robert Percy[5] Donkin
p. 117	36	Samuel Walter[5] Donkin

Fraser's "A Sketch of Shelburnian manners--anno 1787"

Historian Neil MacKinnon gave two pages of his monograph on the Loyalists to an examination of "Shelburnian manners," which he considers to be perhaps the most critical contemporaneous treatment of them.[1] Professors Charles Wetherell and Robert W. Roetger, in their recent social-scientific analysis of the decline of Shelburne, described the work as a "particularly vitriolic sketch of Shelburne's inhabitants in 1787 [which] painted a picture of unfettered frivolity bordering on decadence."[2] Though the existence of this brief work has been known to archivists for seventy-five years, not until the resurgence of academic interest in the Loyalist phenomenon in the late 1960s and early 1970s did it even begin to attract the attention of scholars concerned with the aetiology of Shelburne's decline; with revising and rationalizing the traditional "historiography of failure." Though the qualitative evidence of impressionistic accounts such as this may be of little value in analysing demographic, economic or social structure, one must nevertheless agree with Professors Wetherell and Roetger that they "sound convincing and, indeed, represent legitimate evidence for assessing the history of early Loyalist Shelburne."[3] The work is a panorama of Shelburne society--manners and mores--as viewed firsthand by a sensitive and intelligent, but judgemental and wholly unsympathetic outsider. In a mere seven pages the author sketches social life and customs, commerce and the economy, the administration of justice and religious life. The theme of the work is the pervasiveness of *fin-de-siècle* decadence; it was righteous indignation which moved the author to write down his observations.

The colophon[4] of the manuscript identifies the anonymous author as James Fraser, c. 1760-1822, a rising young entrepreneur who had emigrated

1 Neil MacKinnon, *This Unfriendly Soil. The Loyalist Experience in Nova Scotia 1783-1791* (Kingston and Montreal, 1986), 115-16. MacKinnon, however, is wrong both to suggest that Fraser was "probably a loyalist" (p. 211, n. 88), and to imply that the famous epithet 'dancing beggars' was conferred by the author of "Shelburnian manners"; cf. Marion Robertson, *King's Bounty. A History of Early Shelburne, Nova Scotia* (Halifax, 1983), 183.

2 Charles Wetherell and Robert W. Roetger, "Another Look at the Loyalists of Shelburne, NS, 1783-95," in *Canadian Historical Review*, 70 (1989), 79.

3 *Ibid.*, 80.

4 "The preceding M.S. is the production and holograph of Mr Fraser of Miramichi . . . formerly a district Judge of the Province of New Brunswick: and afterwards established as an extensive Merchant in Halifax."

from Scotland about 1780 and had recently established himself as a salmon exporter and general retail merchant at Miramichi.[5] Fraser may have visited Shelburne *en route* to or from Halifax, where he had previously been based, and his especial indignation at the sharp practices of the Shelburne merchants may have been caused by an unhappy experience of doing business with them. The attitude of the author towards the inhabitants of Shelburne, whom he regards as bad characters, is unremittingly negative and hostile. A probable source of Fraser's hostility was the disdain bordering on contempt generally felt by new British immigrants, whether English or Scotch, towards the loyal Americans, whether civilian refugee or military. The evidence of a hostile witness is not necessarily hearsay, however, and Fraser was a keen observer closely engaged with his subject, as well as an articulate social commentator. The effect of Fraser's critique was to distract the attention of students of the history of early Shelburne, who have generally been more interested in chronicling the events of its founding than in trying to explain the reasons for its rapid decline and ultimate failure. It is significant that Fraser made his observations in 1787, the year in which the royal bounty of provisions came to an end. Marion Robertson concludes her magisterial history of early Shelburne at 1787, by which time the Loyalist metropolis had already begun to decline. Despite a population of some five thousand, there were 360 abandoned houses.[6]

Though the provenance of the document has not been positively established, it is certain that it once formed part of the Andrew Brown papers now at the British Library. Reverend Brown arrived in Halifax in 1787, and about two years later he began to collect materials, including original documents, for his projected "History of Nova Scotia," which unfortunately was never completed. Fraser and Brown were contemporaries: they each joined the North British Society of Halifax at about the same time, and Fraser is known to have worshipped at St. Matthew's Protestant Dissenting Church, where

The date and authorship of the colophon are unknown, though the script and verbal style are the same as the unknown annotator ("A.R.G.") of the Andrew Brown Papers at the British Library: Add. MSS. 19069-19076 (mfm. at the Public Archives of Nova Scotia [hereafter PANS]).

5 W.A. Spray, "Fraser (Frazer), James," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, VI (1987), 262-63. Fraser's authorship of this remarkable diatribe, however, is not mentioned.

6 Robertson, *King's Bounty*, 245.

Brown was minister. It would appear that Fraser's "Sketch of Shelburnian manners," which demonstrably influenced Brown's account of Shelburne,[7] was one of the historical manuscripts acquired by the reverend doctor during his eight-year ministry in Nova Scotia, and carried thence to Scotland by him in 1795.[8] How and why the manuscript thereafter became separated from the other materials collected and accumulated by Brown is unclear. Brown's biographer remarks that through family neglect many of his papers were lost;[9] doubtless many were also misplaced. Whatever the circumstances of its disappearance from the Brown archive after his death in 1834, "Shelburnian manners" was subsequently acquired by Sir Thomas Phillipps (1792-1872), the antiquary and bibliophile, whose collection of manuscripts ultimately numbered about sixty thousand. Several of the manuscripts of Canadian interest, including "Shelburnian manners," were acquired at auction by the Public Archives of Canada in 1913.[10] The work is now available on microfilm both at the National Archives in Ottawa and at the Public Archives in Halifax.[11]

James Fraser was an "acute inquisitive man" of wide intellectual interests. No one who has read "Shelburnian manners," moreover, could dissent from Brown's judgement of him, penned in 1815, that Fraser was "a man of shrewd understanding, calm passions with nothing of the Romantic in his

7 See, e.g., the passage quoted by MacKinnon, *Unfriendly Soil*, 114.

8 Proof of their acquaintanceship and collaboration occurs elsewhere in the Brown Papers, where Brown acknowledges Fraser's assistance in collecting for him in Miramichi and the district of Chignecto "Traditionary memorandums" concerning the expulsion of the Acadians: Brit. Lib. Add. MSS. 19070 No. 56 (mfm. at PANS).

9 George Shepperson, "Brown, Andrew," in *DCB* VI (1987), 88.

10 MG 9, B 9-14, Vol. 1, pp. 56[212]-62[218], NAC. Volume 1 formerly constituted "Phillipps MS 22186," which was made up of four separate manuscript documents bound together in the same book due to unity of subject matter as well as provenance: Port Roseway Associates Minute-Book, 1782-3; Muster-Book of Free Black Settlement at Birchtown, 1784; Petition of Overseers of the Poor to Magistrates of Shelburne, 1789; and Sketch of Shelburne [*sic*] Manners, 1787. (The original was withdrawn from circulation in 1975.)

11 Mfm. reel no. H-984 (NAC); Micro: Places: Shelburne County: Loyalists: Reel 1 (PANS). A negative photostat is in MG 4, Vol. 294, PANS.

nature. . . ."[12] Like Brown himself, he was a true product of the Scottish Enlightenment.[13]

A Sketch of Shelburnian manners--anno 1787

[1] The Inhabitants of Shelburne from the highest to the lowest have a pitiable passion for finery, revelling & dancing & every species of sensual gratification. They vie with one another in making an external appearance in the public eye, as being persuaded that the world will jud[g]e of them much more by this, than from their internal worth. The modish sort of female, ever studious to attract public notice, spare no expence to set off their persons with shewish[14] vanities--So much are they abject Slaves to fashion, that charming bewitching thing.

The higher orders of people have private dancing parties each consisting of a few families who live in a constant habit of intimacy with one another. The Dance takes place in rotation at each family, where a Suitable repast is provided for the Guests. It is matter of regret, that the Assembly for the Season,[15] tho' designed for promoting social & friendly Intercourse among neighbours, should yet become the occasion of Censoriousness, affronts & ill will, thro' the imprudence of some foreward, pert & Gay young people who assume consequential airs by shewing themselves **[2]** reserved, haughty & distant towards those whom they deem their Inferiors, & by

12 Brit. Lib. Add. MSS. 19070 No. 56 (mfm. at PANS).

13 As much is clear from the inventory of his personal library taken after his death in 1822: Halifax County Original Estate Papers, F 89 (mfm. at PANS).

14 I.e., showy; 'shewish' was familiar eighteenth-century idiom.

15 "The public assembly, which formed a regular feature of fashionable life in the 18th century, is described by Chalmers (*Cycl.* 1751) as 'a stated and general meeting of the polite persons of both sexes, for the sake of conversation, gallantry, news, and play' " (*Oxford English Dictionary* [1st ed.], I, 504). "In the winter of 1786-7 we find dancing to have been in vogue, and that the Subscription Assemblies for the season were to begin at half-past six o'clock on the 18th of January;--this. . . in the Long Room of Steel's Tavern [Merchant's Coffee House], which seems to have been the fashionable dining and dancing room of that day" (J.P. Edwards, "Vicissitudes of a Loyalist City," in *Dalhousie Review*, 2 [1922-23], 321). Though admittance was restricted to those in their teens, internal evidence suggests that Fraser attended the Assembly which commenced on Thursday, 18 January 1787.

scoffing at proprieties as well as improprieties in dress & behaviour. Their skewish dress bespeaks a frivolous, loose & extravagant turn of mind. If you except their dress, diet & a few articles of furniture, everything else belonging to them indicate[s] that they are of the Dregs of mankind. As further indications of this, might I not add the low kinds of artifice which they practise in order to gratify their inclination towards Gaiety & pleasure. Never were known greater mixtures of finery & meanness than many of the families here exhibit. Those among them who seem passionately fond of all kinds of delicious food & drink are not few in number. To gratify their desire after these, no expence is spared & to support this extravagance, recourse is had to iniquitous means. To them may be applied what was remarked by S$^{t.}$ Paul as distinguishing traits in the Character of the Cretians "whose God is their Belly--who glory in their shame."[16] Officers of the army on Half-pay & Loyal refugees who have had Compensation for their losses do in the general run give into questionable extravagancies & follies, & the better to support these, the former in particular monopolize (if I may use the expression) almost every public office which is in the gift of Government.[17] **[3]** The liberal Provision made for them allowing them a great deal of idle Time, & enabling them to live well at ease, their manners are loose & Corrupt; the generality of them being luxurious, mean spirited & subservient. The ruinous effects of luxury not limited by fortune have been so felt by some families as to reduce them to very straitened Circumstances, which has obliged them to content themselves w$^{h.}$ necessaries. Their frugality is not a virtue of choice, but is with them as w$^{h.}$ the bulk of mankind, the native Consequence of the necessity of Circumstances. It is unfortunate for such at least that this necessity has made them temperate & frugal. Deprived of a multitude of animal enjoy$^{ts.}$ w$^{h.}$ which they were insatiated in the days of ease & of affluence, they are less exposed to those temptations which might Corrupt & debase the heart.

16 Titus 1:12; Philippians 3:19 (the two passages are conflated).

17 The text is paraphrased by Robertson (*King's Bounty*, 242-43), who attributes the statement made to resentment "[a]mong those who were capable of holding government positions." This interpretation, however, presupposes that the author was an interested inside observer, which it is clear from internal evidence that he could not have been.

To an extravagant passion for fine cloaths & sensual pleasure, they join an immoderate love of money which tempts many to practise roguish tricks. Hence it is, that they have no Scruple to get gain by illicit trade, to import & circulate base Coppers, to make use of those gross methods of dishonest Gain, the false balance, deceitful weights, & illegal measures, to adulterate spirituous [*sic*] liquors, & to make an artificial want of several articles brought to market. Some few, by keeping a sort of Grocery Shop, have raised **[4]** & enriched themselves, while others bred up in the lap of ease & plenty, not having it in their power to add to their fortunes, have exhausted them & fallen to decay.

The Bulk of the Inhabitants having been accustomed to a trading & rambling way of life during the late war, contracted an aversion to all kinds of work which are laborious. Add to this, that business being dull makes many idle hours in the day, which the inactive spend in hearing something new, in playing at games of hazard & in tippling or what may be termed a sort of sober intemperance. Hence it is, that schemes of gainful artifice & commercial speculation are more common methods than hard labour & application for gaining a livelihood. Knavish, fraudulent tricks are so common in this place, that but few seem to blush at standing chargeable with them, because they are not branded with the disgrace they deserve. This trickish disingenuous turn of mind is accompanied w$^{h.}$ a prone[ne]ss to harass with duns[18] & vexatious law-suits. So true is this, that the Houses & lands in the settlement round are mostly encumbered with mort-gages or attachments. This has been the fertile Source of animosities & litigations.[19] It is to [be] lamented that property is often taken away by Subtilty [*sic*] of law; the law being made an instrument of injury, instead of personal Security. A man is too often Oppress'd **[5]** where he expected Security, & the Dispenser of Justice becomes more terrible than a Highway-man.[20]

18 I.e., subtle or sophistical, as in the manner of John *Duns* Scotus, the "Subtle Doctor."

19 In 1787 as many as 239 actions and suits were *sub judice* in the Inferior Court of Common Pleas at Shelburne: RG 37 [SH], Vol. 16, files 18; 19, PANS. As the local bar consisted of only three attorneys, they must have been unquestionably the busiest lawyers in Nova Scotia.

20 The chief magistrate of Shelburne at this time was the Reverend Isaac Wilkins, the "Pole Star of the Loyalists." It is distressing to see his character traduced in this way.

An Indolent, & vagrant Habit so easily noticeable in the Inhabitants is contrasted with a supine disregard, if not contempt of religion. Habituated to a wandering way of life during the late civil Commotions, & living amid the alarms of war, the hurry of business, & dissipations of pleasure, in a forgetfulness of God & divine things, they become regardless of religious Concrns. Hence they appear to have a greater zeal for any thing other than religion. Of this the temporary houses of public worship both of Episcopalians & Presbyterians are striking evidences.[21] Those religious edifices being mean & shabby exhibit no fair emblem of the Piety of the Inhabitants. They have suffered their desires, hopes & fears to be so engrossed either by the Cares or pleasures of life as to leave them no disposition for religious regards. This irreligious bias has been strengthened by blemishes on those who make an open & solemn profession of their pious faith & hope, & by the ridiculous extravagancies of Character so palpably glaring in Bigots & Enthusiasts which have thrown disgrace on true religion.[22] A Spirit of discontent & repining pervades the whole Settlement. When people accustomed to live easily **[6]** like many in this place, are obliged to work hard & to feel straits, they become dissatisfied & restless; suffering much by toil & want, breeds discontent & wretchedness especially where they have no near prospect of bettering their Circumstances. After enduring much fatigue & many hardships, in a Country which does not afford people but very scanty provision, they become impatient for a change of Scene. Happy as they may be under an easy, free Government, the happiness of it is very little perceived or felt, neither Rulers nor ruled having virtue enough to forego immediate petty Gains for the public good. Accordingly we find that not a few who enjoy posts of profits, betray their trust & embezzle the public money & that almost every public undertaking is made a Jobb of.

21 Until the completion of Christ Church in December 1789, Shelburne's divided Anglican community appears to have met in the temporary church or meeting-house constructed by the vestry of Trinity Church 'in as central a part of the town as could be found' and opened in January 1785 (Robertson, *King's Bounty*, 178-79). The Presbyterian meeting-house, "a rough temporary building" erected in 1784, was situated on "the crest of the hill facing St. John's Street, near the corner of Digby Street" (Robertson, *King's Bounty*, 174-75; *idem*, *Trinity United Church, Shelburne, N.S.* [Hantsport, 1983], 8).

22 Fraser is presumably referring to the activities of the charismatic Methodist preachers, Freeborn Garretson and James Mann (Robertson, *King's Bounty*, 173-74).

People brought up in the lap of ease & plenty cannot endure the straits & inconveniences to which the inhabitants of a new settlement are Subjected.[23] Having been accustomed to what we call good living in a plentiful Country, they cannot enjoy life out of it. And Even numbers who removed from the British dominions in Europe, previous to the late war, have contracted [7] a restless roving Spirit, the effect of an ardent desire after those pleasures & Conveniences which they once enjoyed there, but which they may now seek in vain. To many those days of ease, of pleasure & of happiness are no more. All they have got by tasting the Sweets of a fertile, pleasant Country, is a restless desire after ease & plenty, which disturbs their tranquility & distracts their minds.

After living very easily, they cannot be contented $w^{h.}$ a scanty allowance of the Comforts of life. Hence it is, that they are tormenting their brains $w^{h.}$ some scheme of private utility & are immoderately solicitous saying "what shall we eat? what shall we drink? wherewith shall we be clothed?["][24] While they think within themselves, "what shall we do to fare sumptuously, to wear fine apparel & live in grandeur"? Sure am I that people who are Strangers to the enjoyments & advantages of rich Countries, may be accounted happier, as enjoying more of an easy peace of mind.

23 This passage is quoted by Wetherell and Roetger ("Another Look," 81) as a basis for "[t]he interpretation that Shelburne failed because of the poor fit between its urban cosmopolitan population and the realities of Nova Scotia's natural and economic environment. . ."

24 Matthew 6:25.

Book Reviews and Notes

Allen B. Robertson

Champions of the Truth: Fundamentalism, Modernism, and the Maritime Baptists, by George A. Rawlyk. ISBN 0-7730-0783-3 (Paper), 0-7735-0760-4 (cloth). McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, for the Centre for Canadian Studies, Mount Allison University, 1990. xiii + 116 pp., $11.95 (paper), $29.95 (cloth).

Diary of a Frenchman: François Lambert Bourneuf's Adventures from France to Acadia 1787-1871, ed. and trans. J. Alphonse Deveau. ISBN 0-921054-42-7. Nimbus Publishing, Halifax, N.S., 1990. xxi + 115 pp., illustrated, softcover, $12.95.

Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Volume XII (1891 to 1900), general editors, Frances G. Halpenny and Jean Hamelin. ISBN 0-8020-3460-8. University of Toronto Press, 1990. xxixx + 1,305 pp., hardcover (regular edition), $75.00.

Irish Emigration and Canadian Settlement: Patterns, Links, and Letters, by Cecil J. Houston and William J. Smith. ISBN 0-8020-5829-9. University of Toronto Press, 1990; Ulster Historical Foundation, Belfast, 1990. ix + 370 pp., illustrated, hardcover, $45.00.

Johnny Miles: Nova Scotia's Marathon King, by Floyd Williston. ISBN 0-921054-39-4. Nimbus Publishing, Halifax, N.S., 1990. xiv + 114 pp., illustrated, softcover, $14.95.

Louisbourg: The Phoenix Fortress, by Chris Reardon and A.J.B. Johnston. ISBN 0-921054-35-1 (paper), 0-921054-51-3 (cloth). Nimbus Publishing, Halifax, N.S., 1990. iv + 83 pp., illustrated, $16.95 (paper), $24.95 (cloth).

In the past year there have been several publications concerning Maritime biography. That list undeniably begins with the latest volume of the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, which continues to be an indispensible reference source for researchers. Other collective biographical works include Houston and Smith's *Irish Emigration and Canadian Settlement*, Reardon and Johnston's evocative *Louisbourg: The Phoenix Fortress*, and the intriguing study of Queen's University historian George A. Rawlyk, *Champions of the Truth*. Nova Scotians should be especially interested in two individual biographies/memoirs, J. Alphonse

Deveau's edited version of *Diary of a Frenchman: François Lambert Bourneuf's Adventures from France to Acadia 1787-1871*, and Floyd Williston's captivating *Johnny Miles: Nova Scotia's Marathon King*. The interest in all these volumes derives from the ever-present curiosity among the reading public about private lives, and the high level of scholarship brought to each study.

A decade ago Donald Swainson's article, "Trends in Canadian Biography: Recent Historical Writing" [*Queen's Quarterly*, 87, 3 (Autumn 1980), 413-9] examined standard and changing approaches to the writing of biographies by professional historians. The intended readership for a study, whether academics or the general public, certainly determines style and format. Swainson was determined to point out, though, that a more important point concerned whether a biography dealt mainly with the person, or the institutions (political, religious, economic) with which an individual was associated. Methodologies borrowed from the social sciences have had an impact as well (psychobiography and collective biography, for example), for these can tempt the historian away from a proper historical perspective. While wrestling with these matters, Swainson acknowledged that the pre-eminent role of biographies in Canada was to educate readers about Canadian history. A biography must inform the reader about the context of the times to make the subject's life come alive; in the process our country's past stirs to life in the popular imagination.

All biography is a form of history. It is the training or determination of the author which ensures whether a life history will be accurate, informative and illuminating. A successful biography concentrates on an individual's social, educational and religious formation, which in turn influence how the person may or may not be receptive to externals (politics, economic life, social concerns, artistic trends). Equally valuable are studies which provide a matrix in which to set a subject better to understand his or her life. The *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* can be seen as an attempt to combine both approaches.

Volume XII of the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* completes the series, which now runs from A.D. 1000 to 1900. The 584 entries in this latest publication cover a wide range of careers (politicians, clergy, authors, engineers, to name only a few), matched in turn by the diverse backgrounds of the contributors. The latter include thirty-seven listed as Nova Scotia residents. Cape Breton (as an independent colony) and Nova Scotia account

for sixty-five subjects' places of birth or principal association. Beyond statistics, this *DCB* re-emphasizes the continued contributions of immigrants to Canada's development, in association with native-born residents. The formation of Canada in 1867 and its subsequent acquisition of more territory, along with the creation of new provinces, accounts for the large number of policitians' biographies (a feature not expected to diminish as the *DCB* begins to cover the twentieth century). It is Volume XII which at last provides an in-depth examination of the life of Sir John A. Macdonald. Halifax native Sir John S.D. Thompson, and Hants County son Amor De Cosmos (*né* William Alexander Smith), who became premier of British Columbia, are only two of several noteworthy Nova Scotians given extensive treatment.

The *DCB* obviously is not intended to provide a comprehensive history of Canada. Its editors' aim was to make available reliable studies of individuals who had an impact at the local, provincial or national level in a wide spectrum of concerns. The stature of John A. Macdonald or John S.D. Thompson ensured their importance in Canadian history. It is the interpretation of their careers' significance which demands periodic reassessment; *DCB* XII offers two of the latest finely researched attempts to that endeavour. From a Nova Scotian perspective, perhaps the best means of guaging the value of the *DCB* can be gained from a critical look at a sample entry.

Brian C. Cuthbertson's article on Thomas Beamish Akins (1809-1891) provides a good example of the wide-ranging influence one person can have on his society without necessarily intending to seek public attention. Akins, descended from old Halifax and New England Planter families in Nova Scotia, was a contemporary version of the learned gentleman antiquarian. Trained as a lawyer, T.B. Akins's lucrative career and family fortune enabled him to retire early enough in life to turn his attention to book-collecting and the preservation of the documents of colonial Nova Scotia history. His own research and writing on the early settlement of Halifax led to Akins's championing the idea of a public records repository. Eventually Akins's lobbying resulted in his appointment by the provincial government as commissioner of the public records (29 May 1857). For thirty-four years Akins laboured to organize government holdings, to obtain transcripts of records relevant to the colony held in England or elsewhere, and to promote the writing of local history. Several of our county histories were inspired by Akins Prize, offered through King's College for that very purpose.

Cuthbertson devotes considerable space to the controversy Akins became embroiled in following the publication of his 1869 compilations, *Selections from the public documents of the province of Nova-Scotia*. A renewed interest in the circumstances surrounding the expulsion of the Acadians (1755) flared up when it was charged that Akins had suppressed certain documents critical of the ruling British government in Nova Scotia at the time of the event. Cuthbertson summarizes the pertinent details of what became an international *cause célèbre*, which had less to do with historical research than with French Canadian nationalism in Québec, and a growing Acadian renaissance in the Maritimes. (For greater detail, see M. Brook Taylor's *Promoters, Patriots and Partisans* [1989], pp. 187-207.) It is rightly pointed out that T.B. Akins was unjustly maligned in the controversy. Though an antiquarian not untouched by feelings of imperial pride, Akins endeavoured to be scrupulous in presenting all historical documents on a subject, flattering or not, before the public.

Fortunately the Acadian Expulsion controversy did not diminish Akins's valuable contribution in laying the foundation for today's Public Archives of Nova Scotia. His keen interest in Nova Scotians, as well as, early printed European books provided a further legacy in the Akins Library housed at the Public Archives, and rare fifteenth- to eighteenth-century volumes now shared between Dalhousie University and the University of King's College. The centenary of Akins's death (1991) should remind us how one publicly-minded individual continues to have a positive impact on Nova Scotian life.

The biographical articles in the *DCB* are necessarily constrained by space and format. Cuthbertson, in his Akins entry, was not able to elaborate on his subject's personality, religious expressions (other than to observe that he was a low-church evangelical) or style of personal writing. Where the *DCB* articles are unable to expand on such points the reader can do so himself, if able to consult the sources noted at the end of each biography. That select bibliography, indeed, is a primary reason for the great value of the *DCB*--it is both a source in regard to the biographies, and a source on the subjects discussed.

Less readily recognizable at first glance as a biographical work is the impressive study by Cecil J. Houston and William J. Smyth on Canada's Irish. This particular volume, *Irish Emigration and Canadian Settlement: Patterns,*

Links, and Letters, does much to dispel erroneous ideas of the nature of Irish settlement, the religious background of immigrants and their social experience. What emerges is a distillation of collective biographical information which significantly alters the historical picture of Irish Canadians. At the same time, genealogists tracking down Irish ancestors now have the opportunity to understand their forbears' world in a far different light from that presented in American history or through American popular media (movies, television, pulp novels). Houston and Smyth are at pains to differentiate the Irish experience in Canada from that encountered by emigrants to the United States. That distinctiveness of our Irish immigrants' settlement accounts in part for the present Canadian identity.

The book itself is divided, as the title implies, into three sections. "Links in Emigration" is a detailed mapping of places of Irish origins (counties, towns); the social, economic and religious backgrounds of the emigrants; and the emigration process in its physical and financial aspects. One of the highlights of *Irish Emigration* is its frequent use of graphic representation of statistics. Rather than provide bare statistical lists, the authors have used maps (Ireland, the Maritimes, Ontario and Quebec) to enable both the general reader and students of history to see at a glance areas of high emigration, or density of settlement in Canada, and of out-migration.

Part two of the volume pays special attention to the immigrant's adjustment to life in Canada. Actual settlement patterns, social-religious life and interaction with other colonists are examined in some detail. Nova Scotians will be interested in the use made by Houston and Smyth of Terrence Punch's extensive research on the Irish of Halifax. His genealogical studies of Irish county origins, religion and social status illustrate the tremendous worth of disciplined family history reconstruction in exchange with scholarly histories. Punch's work is notable in regard to one aspect of *Irish Emigration,* which tends to be Ontario-Quebec oriented. This deficiency is less the fault of the authors, who actually strive to maintain a cross-Canada portrayal, than it is that of Maritimers who have not adequately attended to the Irish presence in eastern Canada. Houston and Smyth rightly observe that much more remains to be done to bring the role of Irish colonists into focus in Maritime historiography.

Readers may well be surprised at the conclusions reached in *Irish Emigration* if their knowledge of the Irish is based on American "Irish Potato Famine"

lore. The majority of Canada's Irish settlers arrived before the "Famine," many in the 1820s and 1830s, while Halifax had an influx since 1749. Overall the Protestants outnumbered the Catholic Irish (*c.* 65 per cent Protestant), local variations excepted. One may be taken aback to learn that the Protestants included large numbers of what in Canada would be called Church of England adherents, rather than Presbyterians. Charles Inglis, the first bishop of Nova Scotia, and Richard John Uniacke (long-time attorney-general of the province) were two such Anglican Irish newcomers. Finally, whereas Irish Americans tended to cluster in large urban centres, Irish Canadians spread out over the country as farmers, loggers, fishermen and labourers.

One intriguing point made by Houston and Smyth is that Irish Canadians, coming to the country in large part before the "Famine," retained fewer living links with Ireland and readily merged into the surrounding population. The authors may have overstated their case here, since this implies a loss of ethnic consciousness. The intent (not developed) by the book's researchers appears to be that of distinguishing political activity between Canadian and American Irish immigrants. The latter, as "Famine" exiles, harboured bitter antagonism toward the British, manifested in 1860s Fenian raids into Canada and twentieth-century sponsorship of paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland. Canadian Irish settlers and their descendants maintained ethnic traditions but realigned their political consciousness to fit the Canadian scene.

The third section, " Lives and Letters," presents three sets of letters from Irish immigrants in Upper Canada and British Columbia. The general statements and statistics of the earlier sections are in the final part brought into personal focus as one reads of the trials, successes and hopes of these new Canadians. Letters are insightful sources for biographical sketches. In *Irish Emigration* these documents show how the commendable research by Houston and Smyth can bring the information in such letters into greater relief. Individuals' lives as reconstructed in biographies can benefit from the use of admirable historical analysis as exemplified in *Irish Emigration*, just as histories can be enriched by genealogical information, or by reliable biographies such as in the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*.

Louisbourg: The Phoenix Fortress is a tourist souvenir with a difference. Historian A.J.B. Johnston has provided a succinct account of the twentieth-

century creation of this national historic site, in addition to a useful synopsis of the trading centre's eighteenth-century economy, life-styles, and military campaigns. He continues his pertinent observations throughout the book to enliven the splendid photographic art of Chris Reardon. The latter has captured the spirit of 1744 Louisbourg as portrayed by present-day animators. Together, Johnston and Reardon permit one to catch glimpses of a world which has utterly vanished from Nova Scotia.

In the context of biographical studies, *Louisbourg* provides a visual representation of collective biography. Written texts can go only so far in stimulating the imagination of the reader to see in the mind's eye how an individual or his environment may have appeared. Portraits, sketches and photographs broaden that imaginative reconstruction. Johnston and Reardon have assembled society's biography through shots of the architecture and occupations as interpreted by archaeologists and historians. True, the photographs do not depict depressed, rain-sodden soldiers manning fortress walls, nor is the whole of life and death portrayed. One may wonder why no Micmac are to be seen wandering the town's streets, or a New England merchant engaged in illicit trade. Perhaps in time these aspects will be added to Louisbourg, the National Historic Park of the 1990s.

It is unfortunate that Johnston did not provide a brief bibliography for *Louisbourg*. Readers may well be stimulated enough by the text and photographs to wish to read further about historic reconstruction, architecture, clothing styles or gardening practices. Raised, symmetrical garden lots as shown by Reardon's camera are one feature of the past which the non-professional historian or hobby gardener can recreate for pleasure. The measure of a biography's success, of course, is whether it can prompt readers to learn more about an individual or subject.

The designation "biographical study" as applied to *Louisbourg* is certainly unconventional. Johnston and Reardon have nonetheless given readers the opportunity to see the efforts of the practitioners of historical reconstruction in living studies, and stone, wood and plant. Looking backward through past lives is accomplished in the more conventional fashion by means of documents and oral history interviews. *Louisbourg* serves to remind one that other fields of research can add depth and colour to the written page.

George A. Rawlyk's *Champions of the Truth: Fundamentalism, Modernism, and the Maritime Baptists* uses biographical sketches and conventional historical

analysis to produce an uncommonly vibrant, penetrating examination of 1920s-30s Maritime religious culture. Ostensibly the author sought to understand why the heartland of Canadian Baptist congregations had become so receptive to modern Biblical criticism and liberal views. To achieve that end, as Professor L. McCann rightly observed in the Forword, Rawlyk contrasted that comparative religious open-mindedness (active at the Divinity College of Acadia University) with the founders and promoters of the Kingston Bible College in the Annapolis Valley. Chief among the latter were the peripatetic Reverend J. Sidey, and John B. Baggett. The central drama was the legal fight played out in the Kentville Courthouse between the Baptist Convention and Bible College associates over the control of church property (the Kingston Baptist parsonage). The trial became a public forum for Sidey to proclaim that "the Convention was no longer Baptist but Unitarian, and in some cases, infidel" (p. 56). This May 1935 Supreme Court case generated enough public debate to be rightly compared to the Scopes Monkey Trial in its head-on clash between Fundamentalism and Modernism.

At the heart of *Champions* (based on Rawlyk's 1987-88 Winthrop Pickard Bell Lectures at Mount Allison University) is George Rawlyk's belief that the spiritual legacy of eighteenth-century New Light revivalist Henry Alline continues to influence Maritime Baptists. Significantly the book opens with a recapitulation of Alline's life, doctrines and impact on Maritime religious culture, as contrasted to the revivals sparked in 1785-86 by the Methodist preacher Freeborn Garrettson. Alline was a mix of contradictions. He operated within a general framework of orthodox Congregationalism, yet in advocating free will denied the former's Calvinist predestinarian teaching. Alline considered outward forms (including the sacraments) as non-essential compared to the necessity of dramatic conversion through the Holy Spirit on the one hand, while on the other insisting rigidly on visible, emotional conversion displays. By the promotion of free will he supposedly opened the way to all for salvation, yet Alline's standards for determining who had been saved were as rigid if not more so than the regulations of seventeenth-century New England Puritan ministers.

Baptists in the Maritimes went off in two diverse streams. There were the rigid Calvinistic Baptists who rejected Alline's doctrinal writings, though they perpetuated his rivalistic legacy. Free Will Baptists (concentrated mainly

in New Brunswick, with some Nova Scotian congregations in existence) were Allinites become Baptists by immersion. The merger of the two branches early in this century did not totally submerge either legacy. Fundamentalism appealed to the Bible literalist, revivalistic Free Will descendants in opposition to Calvinistic Baptists who tended toward a mild Arminianism ("Free Will" written small), tolerance of other denominations and advance in Biblical criticism (the dreaded modernism of Fundamentalists). Rawlyk has shown how this tension became crystallized in the Kingston Baptist Parsonage Case as espoused by Fundamentalists Sidey, Daggett and their central Canadian inspirational mentor, T.T. Shields. The result is a thought-provoking depiction of one denomination's clash with the twentieth century.

Champions of the Truth provides for the reader, as does *Irish Emigration*, a matrix in which to place and understand the world of a particular group. The lives of Maritime Baptists are more comprehensible when it is realized that the region's eighteenth-century heritage kept it distinct from Upper Canadian/Ontario Baptist experience. Rawlyk drew out Sidey's Methodist background, his drift to Premillenarianism while in the United States, and how his association with the fundamentalist Baptist John Daggett on Prince Edward Island led Sidey to emphasize doctrinal purity. Maritime Baptists in general, however, from the time of Alline place greater importance on experiential faith, a Christ-centered religion, at times a piety that bordered on mysticism, which rejected rigid credal statements (except for adult believers' baptism). Rawlyk demonstrates that Fundamentalism as introduced by Sidey and Daggett had limited appeal in the region, even among the Free Will descendants. It was the post-World War II shift toward conservatism in the Atlantic Baptist Convention, and the infiltration by American preachers who espoused Fundamentalism, that has allowed the latter to grow and undermine Maritime Baptists' religious legacy.

Two books which concentrate solely on individuals rather than the collective portrait are J. Alphonse Deveau's edited translation of François Lambert Bourneuf's *Diary of a Frenchman* and Floyd Williston's *Johnny Miles*. The former is in fact the autobiography of a member of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly (1843-59). Bourneuf, a French-born navy man, arrived in Nova Scotia during the War of 1812 as a prisoner. His reminiscences, written when in his early seventies, are a mix of delightful vignettes about life in France, and later encounters with Acadian communities in Nova

Scotia, to adventurous accounts of naval fighting, escape attempts and dangers of the sea.

Deveau's translation does not appear at first reading to flow smoothly, until one realizes on reading aloud that it captures the accent of what Bourneuf may have sounded like in speaking English. This is a permissible reconstruction when it is further realized that the original manuscript (two notebooks and extracts from a third) appear to have been recorded in an episodic, summarizing fashion. Footnotes are removed to the sides of the text in an unsatisfactory arrangement; absence of source citations to support the explanatory notes is a further annoyance. Having noted this flaw, the judgement can be made that the editor has produced a well-illustrated, explanatory text to bring Bourneuf's autobiography alive for modern audiences. The use of maps, and black-and-white prints nearly contemporary with the events recorded provide a pleasing "antique" flavour without detracting from what is a well-researched supporting commentary. Deveau might have checked Halifax newspapers for escaped prisoner notices to add to the text. This reviewer found in the *Nova Scotia Royal Gazette* the 26 August 1812 advertisement, "French Prisoners. Escaped from the Prospect Road on Monday evening last. . ."; the three individuals included Jean Parmentier (28 years), Louis Bourbon (24 years), and Françoise Bourgneuf [*sic*]. The latter was described as 29 years old, 5 feet 9½ inches in height, of pale complexion, black hair, brown eyes, long visage, and stout made. Here was a snapshot in words of the youthful Bourneuf to compare to the 1840s-50s portrait in *Diary of a Frenchman*.

François Bourneuf was born into a moderately successful bourgeois family. He led an eventful life as a French navy man, prisoner-of-war, school teacher and farmer among the Acadians; as a fisherman-trader-merchant in the District of Clare; and as a provincial politician. His reminiscences are of considerable importance for the first-hand accounts he provides of life in early nineteenth-century Nova Scotia. The memoir itself is engaging, and it is enhanced by Deveau's presentation (aimed at a general reading public). One thing which is rather striking is the number of men Bourneuf encountered in Acadian communities who had been prisoners-of-war like himself, and who had chosen to settle in these districts. In the Pubnico region, for example, he met Jean Cottreau, Pierre Hinard and Antoine Richard, only to discover that he and they had been born within fifteen

miles of each other, not far from St. Malo in Normandy. This should serve to alert one to the fact that the Acadian communities were not so insular as was once believed, even at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

A century after Bourneuf made his appearance in Nova Scotia, another immigrant was making international news headlines. *Johnny Miles: Nova Scotia's Marathon King* is an exceptionally well-written biography of this legendary sports hero. Williston has a gift for blending newspaper accounts, oral history interviews and his own narrative style. The result is a compelling story of how Welsh-born, Cape Breton-raised Johnny Miles captured the imagination and hearts of Nova Scotians during the 1920s. Twice winner of the Boston marathon (1926, 1929), twice a competitor in the Olympics, and holder of a bronze medal from the first British Empire Games, Johnny Miles epitomized the best in amateur athletics without benefit of expensive running gear, highly paid coaches, or the need to resort to artificial stimulants and drugs to enhance performance.

Williston's biography of Miles concentrates on the major races in which the subject participated. Even readers with only the slightest interest in sports will be caught up in the lively depiction of these events. At times there is a tendency to show Miles as an unbeatable superman, in part the influence of hindsight on the author, who knows the outcome of each race. It is obvious that Williston is particularly sympathetic toward Miles. This trend is in part redressed by the attention given to Miles's family background, his days as a coal-mine labourer, and family encouragement of Miles's interest in running. It was this working-man's upbringing which goes some way toward explaining the enthusiasm among Nova Scotians for Miles's success. He was readily identified as the peoples' man, who in certain respects embodied their own aspirations to do the unusual.

It would be wrong to leave the impression that *Johnny Miles* is only a succession of racing stories. The reader has more than a glimpse of working-class life in the Sydney region, the hopes of turn-of-the-century British immigrants to Nova Scotia, adjustment to a later transplanted life in industrial Hamilton, and Miles's work for International Harvester in post-war Europe and Chicago. The social history to be found in *Johnny Miles* adds to its interest. Finally, the institution of the Johnny Miles Marathon at New Glasgow to perpetuate Miles's legacy ties in three matters of note: the Marathon committee has resisted the establishment of money prizes to

ensure the amateur nature of the event; the committee and Miles advocate drug-free competition to uphold the true spirit of athletics; and the Nova Scotia Track and Field Association needs occasional reminders that it must promote competition, rather than restrict it or institute fees so high that runners are discouraged from competing. The last words which summarize the underlying theme of Williston's biography belong to the author himself, a most suitable conclusion to any review of *Johnny Miles*: "The oldest living winner of the Boston Marathon, who marked his 84th birthday on October 30, 1989, is still working for the cause of clean sports." That statement is indeed cause for reflection, as are all of these biographical studies from the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* to *Diary of a Frenchman*.

Book Notes

Essays in the History of Canadian Law: Volume III: Nova Scotia, edited by Philip Girard and Jim Phillips. ISBN 0-8020-5863-9. University of Toronto Press, 1990 for the Osgoode Society. xiii + 369 pp., hardcover, $50.00.

This latest publication by the Osgoode Society brings together several commendable, finely researched studies in Nova Scotia legal history. The contributors' essays cover diverse aspects of the law from the eighteenth to early twentieth centuries in areas which range from the legal system itself, criminal law in society, women and the family, to public economic concerns. For an area of Nova Scotia history too long neglected, it is all the more noteworthy that experts in the law are beginning to develop what promises to be an exciting aspect of Nova Scotian historiography. One looks forward to further studies by this volume's authors and their colleagues, to match articles such as Rebecca Veinott's "Child Custody and Divorce: A Nova Scotia Study, 1866-1910" and T.G. Barnes's " 'The Dayly Cry for Justice': The Juridical Failure of the Annapolis Royal Regime, 1713-1749."

What Mean These Stones? The Old Horton-Wolfville Burying-ground by James D. Davison. ISBN 0-9694209. Wolfville Heritage Advisory Committee, Wolfville, N.S., 1990, xii + 218 pp., illustrated, softcover, $7.95.

The decision by the town's Heritage Advisory Committee to restore the Old Wolfville Cemetery and to apply for registration as a heritage site produced as a result a survey of the burial ground. Davison has provided a listing of known burials with gravestone inscriptions, biographical notes on a number of these predominantly New England Planter families, and photographs of many of the stones. There are in addition notes on making tombstone rubbings, burial customs, tombstone carvers and the restoration procedures used in the Old Wolfville Cemetery itself. A useful genealogical reference source. Readers will want to compare it with Deborah Trask's *Life How Short, Eternity How Long: Gravestone Carving and Carvers in Nova Scotia* (1978).

Department of Tourism and Culture

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